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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In 1964, the first session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) recognised the importance of insurance in the trade and development 
matrix. UNCTAD stated that the ‘insurance market is an essential characteristic of 
economic growth’ (United Nations 1964).1 Subsequently, non-life insurance sector’s 
role and its contribution to economic growth have been analysed and discussed in both 
academia and industry. In practice, worldwide non-life insurance premiums reached 
US$2,123 billion in 2014 and accounted for 2.64% of the world’s gross domestic 
product (GDP), 80.9% of which belonged to Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) countries (Swiss Re 2016a). Non-life insurers in OECD 
countries paid US$ 2,968 billion for total insured losses with regard to all non-life 
insurance products in 2013 (OECD 2015a). In particular, non-life insurance plays an 
important role in the economy in terms of dealing with risks caused by weather-related 
catastrophes (Coleman 2003). For example, total global economic losses caused by 
natural disasters (e.g., earthquakes, cyclones, severe floods, winter storms) and man-
made disasters (e.g., sunk boats, plane crashes, fires and explosions) amounted to 
US$112.7 billion, of which non-life insurers expended US$35.7 billion (Swiss Re 
2016a). However, non-life insurance expenditure varies significantly across countries. 
For example, in 2012, average non-life insurance density, measured by premiums per 
capita, was US$1,260.0 for the OECD countries and US$40.0 for Asian economies 
(Swiss Re 2016a). Non-life insurance expenditure also differs among countries with a 
similar level of per capita income. For instance, the average non-life insurance density 
of the Netherlands in 2012 was four times higher than that of Japan, even though both 
countries had a similar per capita income. 
Non-life insurers, policymakers and researchers have pointed out that many socio-
economic factors play a role in determining non-life insurance expenditure. Swiss Re 
(2012, 2014) stated that the variation of spending on non-life insurance was due to 
country-specific economic, institutional, cultural and geographic drivers, while a weak 
                                                 
1 Insurance, including life and non-life insurance, is defined as ‘the pooling of fortuitous losses by 
transfer of such risks to insurers, who agree to indemnity insured for such losses, to provide other 
pecuniary benefits on their occurrence, or to render services connected with the risk’ (Rejda 2011). 
According to the OECD, non-life insurance includes insurance against the following risks: accident, 
sickness, land vehicles, railway rolling stock, aircraft, ships, goods in transit, fire and natural forces, 
other damage to property, motor vehicle liability, aircraft liability, liability for ships, general liability, 
credit, suretyship, miscellaneous financial loss and legal expenses 
(https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=3040). 
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economic environment, tighter credit conditions and less supportive economic policies 
may restrain expenditure. For instance, non-life insurance expenditure in some 
European countries (e.g., Portugal, Greece and Hungary) decreased significantly 
during the financial and economic crises. Specifically, non-life insurance expenditure 
in Hungary decreased by 25% due to the deep economic recession in 2009 (OECD 
2015a). In 2015, the non-life insurance industry was one of the fastest-growing sectors 
of the Vietnamese economy, but its growth had been low during previous years. The 
remarkable growth might have been caused by rising income levels and the easing of 
restrictions on foreign investment. The Chairman of the Insurance Association of 
Vietnam, Phan Kim Bang, stated that the signing of several key free trade agreements 
with strategic partners in 2015, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) Economic Community and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, may have 
promoted the development of the Vietnamese non-life insurance market. Indeed, these 
types of agreements encourage the broadening of operations and foster international 
competition in the industry (Oxford Business Group 2016). Experts in the non-life 
insurance industry have also claimed that different expenditure around the world may 
be due to the cultural differences. According to Ian Balfour, the Chief Executive 
Officer of Inspac Limited (an insurance company in Papua New Guinea), cultural 
factors can affect demand for insurance; for example, individuals may rely on family 
members for support rather than insurance products (Yale Insights 2013). 
Despite the significant effect of non-life insurance on the economy, little consideration 
has been given to the socio-economic factors that influence non-life insurance 
expenditure. This may be due to the difficulty in identifying key drivers of non-life 
insurance expenditure as well as the availability of non-life insurance data. Some 
previous papers (Esho et al 2004; Elango and Jones 2011; Park and Lemaire 2012) 
have identified per capita income, education, legal system and culture as potential key 
drivers of non-life insurance expenditure.2 
This thesis attempts to perform a comprehensive assessment of the determinants of 
non-life insurance expenditure across countries. To this end, Chapter 2 presents a 
survey of the literature on the determinants of non-life insurance expenditure from 
theoretical and empirical perspectives. It outlines eight deficiencies in previous papers. 
First, a theoretical model incorporating the factors affecting non-life insurance 
                                                 
2 However, the results of these papers may be biased due to the endogeneity problem and other issues. 
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expenditure needs to be revisited. Second, the endogeneity problem caused by reverse 
causality and omitted variables has often been neglected. Third, a dataset from the 
Fraser Institute that contains updated data on the economic freedom index has been 
ignored by earlier studies in regard to non-life insurance expenditure. This index has 
been widely used by researchers studying topics other than non-life insurance because 
it covers many countries over a long period and has clear descriptions. Fourth, in 
regard to culture, the latest cultural dimensions of Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov 
(2010) and Minkov (2011), such as indulgence and hypometropia, have also been 
neglected by previous papers. These dimensions reflect the degree of optimism and 
violence in society and thus may be key drivers in explaining non-life insurance 
expenditure. Fifth, the recent global financial crisis (GFC) that severely dampened 
economic activities in many developed countries has increased the need to study the 
determinants of non-life insurance expenditure. Sixth, a dynamic panel data model 
allowing a one-year-lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable has been 
ignored by earlier studies, although spending on non-life insurance in the previous 
period may have had a significant effect on non-life insurance expenditure in the 
current period. Seventh, the use of disaggregated non-life insurance data has been 
ignored in previous papers. Adding up insurance premiums leads to a loss of 
information due to heterogeneity in both the characteristics of and spending on non-
life insurance products. Finally, most previous papers have used datasets that have 
limited coverage of countries and time periods. 
To fill these gaps, this thesis undertakes three core studies to provide comprehensive 
empirical analyses of the determinants of non-life insurance expenditure using a panel 
dataset that covers a large number of countries. The aim of the thesis is to address the 
following two key research questions: ‘How do the various socio-economic factors 
influence non-life insurance expenditure across countries?’ and ‘How did the GFC 
change the way in which socio-economic factors affect non-life insurance expenditure 
across countries?’  
Chapter 3 studies the determinants of non-life insurance expenditure using a panel 
dataset covering 67 countries during the period 20002011. The contributions of this 
chapter to the literature are as follows. First, a theoretical model incorporating the 
factors affecting spending on non-life insurance is introduced. Second, the endogeneity 
problem associated with the economic freedom index in the empirical analysis is 
addressed by applying the instrumental variables (IV) model. Third, analysis is 
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conducted for all sample countries and for developed and developing countries 
separately. Finally, the results before and during the GFC sub-periods are compared. 
The main empirical findings based on the IV analysis in Chapter 3 show that factors 
such as per capita income, economic freedom, bank development, urbanisation, culture 
and the legal system play an important role in explaining non-life insurance 
expenditure. However, their effects differ significantly between groups of developed 
and developing countries. Interesting results are also found regarding how the GFC 
has changed the way various socio-economic variables affect non-life insurance 
expenditure. For instance, urbanisation (in both developed and developing countries) 
and long-term orientation (in developed countries) have a significant effect on non-life 
insurance expenditure before the GFC, but are insignificant in explaining non-life 
insurance expenditure during the GFC. 
Chapter 3 raises a number of issues that require further investigation. First, the IV 
model used in Chapter 3 may not work as well in overcoming the endogeneity problem 
caused by reverse causality between per capita income and non-life insurance 
expenditure. The system generalised method of moments dynamic panel data analysis 
(the system GMM estimator) may address this issue. In particular, by allowing a one-
year-lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable, this estimator may yield 
further results, as spending on non-life insurance in the previous period may have a 
significant effect on non-life insurance expenditure in the current period. Second, the 
determinants of non-life insurance expenditure may change across countries and vary 
across groups of countries based on income levels over the long term. To overcome 
these issues, Chapter 4 follows a system GMM estimator approach to analyse the 
effects of determinants on non-life insurance expenditure using a panel dataset 
covering the same 67 countries used in Chapter 3 for both the short term (20002011) 
and long term (19802009). 
Chapter 4 adds to the empirical literature in a number of ways. First, it examines a 
dataset from the Fraser Institute that contains updated data on the economic freedom 
index, as well as a dataset from Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov (2010) and Minkov 
(2011) that includes the latest cultural variables such as indulgence and hypometropia. 
Second, the system GMM estimator is applied to address the endogeneity problem that 
may persist in many earlier studies due to either omitted variables or reverse causality 
between per capita income and non-life insurance expenditure. Third, determinants of 
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non-life insurance expenditure in the long term are investigated. Finally, interesting 
results are found by disaggregating the long-term data into three groups of countries 
based on level of income. The key results based on the system GMM estimator indicate 
that the effects of lagged non-life insurance expenditure and per capita income on non-
life insurance expenditure in all sample countries and developing countries in the short 
term (20002011) are significant, and these factors may dominate the effects of factors 
such as economic freedom, bank development and urbanisation. Further, economic 
freedom, education, urbanisation, indulgence, individualism, uncertainty avoidance 
and hypometropia have a significant effect on non-life insurance expenditure in the 
long term, but an insignificant effect in the short term. Finally, the empirical findings 
show that the relative effects of the determinants on non-life insurance expenditure in 
the long term vary significantly across the three groups of economies. 
Chapter 4 extends the analysis in Chapter 3 in a significant way but raises two issues 
in need of further investigation. First, the use of aggregated non-life insurance 
expenditure data in both chapters may not be optimal given the heterogeneity across 
insurance products. Second, the endogeneity problem caused by reverse causality 
between per capita income and non-life insurance expenditure may need a more 
thorough examination. Chapter 5 takes a step further by investigating factors driving 
the development of non-life insurance markets across individual products including 
property, accident and health, motor, and general liability insurance in OECD 
countries in the period 20002013. OECD countries are chosen as the sample due to 
data availability (in particular, non-life insurance data at the product level) and 
similarity in their level of development. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first 
study to examine the drivers of expenditure for various non-life insurance products in 
OECD countries. The key findings in Chapter 5 are as follows. First, more economic 
freedom may promote spending on property and general liability insurance, but 
constrain expenditure on accident and health insurance. Second, there is strong 
evidence for the important roles played by cultural characteristics such as long-term 
orientation, individualism, masculinity and uncertainty avoidance in determining 
spending on property, accident and health, motor, and general liability insurance across 
OECD countries. Third, in the presence of the GFC, the effects of cultural factors 
mostly disappear. Fourth, per capita income, which has long been regarded as one of 
the most important drivers of demand for non-life insurance, fails to explain spending 
on accident and health insurance during the GFC. Finally, lagged non-life insurance 
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expenditure consistently explains current insurance expenditure regardless of the GFC 
and insurance products. 
The findings of this thesis have many implications for both governments and non-life 
insurance companies with regard to the development of the non-life insurance sector 
across countries. One of the most important policy implications is that governments 
around the world can promote expenditure on non-life insurance by promoting policies 
that support improvements in the economic freedom index (e.g., low tariffs, high 
effective enforcement of the law and security of property rights, and high personal 
choice). Another significant implication concerns policies during the GFC in OECD 
countries. Governments in these countries can support low-income individuals when 
future GFCs occur by implementing appropriate policies to help them continue to use 
related non-life insurance products, especially compulsory ones. Finally, the empirical 
results of this thesis can be used as a reference to support multinational non-life 
insurance firms seeking a new market or expanding existing markets across countries. 
Chapter 6 presents the conclusions and outlines limitations that require further 
investigation. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the important role of non-life insurance has been recognised 
for a long time; however, compared with the voluminous literature on the life insurance 
sector, very little empirical research has been devoted to studying the determinants of 
non-life insurance expenditure. This may be due to the lack of available non-life 
insurance data and difficulty in identifying key drivers of non-life insurance 
expenditure. This chapter provides an overview of the existing contributions and 
limitations of theoretical and empirical papers that analyse the determinants of non-
life insurance expenditure. It is structured as follows. The next section defines and 
discusses the significance of non-life insurance markets in the economy, and it 
identifies popular indicators used to measure non-life insurance development. The 
subsequent section presents a detailed discussion of previous papers that examined the 
effects of various factors on non-life insurance expenditure. Finally, the chapter 
discusses some econometric issues associated with earlier studies, as well as potential 
effects of the global financial crisis (GFC) on the non-life insurance market. 
2.2 Economic significance of non-life insurance markets 
2.2.1 Contributions of non-life insurance to the economy 
The non-life insurance sector plays an important role in the economy because of its 
key characteristics of risk transfer and indemnification, and pooling of losses and 
payment of fortuitous losses (Rejda 2011). Risk transfer is the basic element of non-
life insurance; it involves transferring a pure risk, such as the risk of disability, poor 
health, premature death, destruction and theft of property, and personal liability 
lawsuits, from the insured to the insurer, who typically has a stronger financial position 
than the insured (Rejda 2011). Another essential property of non-life insurance is 
indemnification for losses that the insured can recover to achieve the approximate 
financial position prior to losses having occurred (Rejda 2011). Based on the 
underwriting process, which includes collecting, inspecting and analysing the 
information with regard to risks, non-life insurers can estimate risks and the probability 
of losses, and thus may offer appropriate policies to help the insured reduce risks by 
providing useful risk management (Brainard 2008). Further, non-life insurers can 
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provide the insured with risk-averse equipment such as seatbelts, smoke detectors and 
automatic fire extinguishing systems and extinguishing agents. In addition to these 
benefits, the non-life insurance sector provides economic benefits such as investing as 
a financial intermediary and complementing other financial intermediaries.  
From 1980 to 2014, total direct non-life insurance premiums that the insured paid to 
global non-life insurance companies increased by 672%, from US$275 billion to 
US$2,123 billion (Swiss Re 2016a). Previous researchers (e.g., Ward and Zurbruegg 
2000; Arena 2008) have claimed that insurance companies play an important role as 
financial intermediaries because they accumulate capital and invest in financial 
products. From a financial intermediary perspective, non-life insurers play a role 
similar to savings deposits in a bank, yielding the financial profits from investing the 
premiums received from policyholders (Brockett et al. 2005). In addition, the total 
assets of insurance companies increase faster than banks’ assets; thus, these companies 
become significant players in international capital markets (Das, Davies and Podpiera 
2003). According to Insurance Europe (2013), insurers in European countries are one 
of the largest institutional investors through investment activities such as deposits with 
credit institutions, loans, debt securities, and land and buildings. The main proportion 
of these investments is in fixed-income securities. The effectiveness of investments 
measured by return on investments (ROIs) is noteworthy; around 75% of European 
insurers had a positive ROI during the GFC (IAIS 2014). In addition to its investment 
role, the non-life insurance sector complements other financial intermediariesin 
particular, the banking system. Brainard (2008) asserted that non-life insurance 
companies and banks play a complementary role in the process of economic growth. 
Banks help non-life insurers sell products to their existing customers through 
bancassurance departments. Further, investable funds of non-life insurers can promote 
some capital markets associated with banks. (Impavido, Musalem and Tressel 2003). 
In summary, non-life insurance has the characteristics of risk transfer and 
indemnification, and pooling of losses and payment of fortuitous losses, which help 
expand aggregate economic activities and function as an effective financial 
intermediary in the economy. 
2.2.2 Indicators for measuring non-life insurance development 
Basically, two indicators are used to measure non-life insurance development. First, 
non-life insurance density, which is defined as direct domestic premiums per capita in 
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US dollars, reflects the average amount that an individual spends on non-life insurance. 
It has been used by many papers in the literature and can also be adjusted by purchasing 
power parity (PPP) to reflect differences in price levels across countries (Park and 
Lemaire 2012). The second indicator is non-life insurance penetration. This proxy, 
which is measured by the ratio of direct premiums to GDP, is used to show the degree 
of non-life insurance activity relative to the size of the economy. 
The main disadvantage of the aforementioned indicators is that premiums are 
aggregated, but non-life insurance includes a number of different products such as 
motor, property, accident and health insurance, freight, and general liability insurance. 
Using the aggregated data may lead to a loss of information (Esho et al. 2004; Park 
and Lemaire 2012). This will be discussed in detail in the next section. 
2.3 Determinants of non-life insurance expenditure 
2.3.1 Theoretical studies 
Mossin (1968) and Szpiro (1985) studied a risk-averse model of the determinants of 
the demand for non-life insurance. Their framework was later extended by Beenstock, 
Dickinson and Khajuria (1988) to include the supply side. These studies considered 
the expected utility of an individual who owns a piece of property, and they solved the 
related equations to find the direction of the variables. All authors concluded that the 
value of property at risk and the real interest rate have a positive effect on non-life 
insurance expenditure, whereas the probability of loss has a negative effect and the 
effect of wealth is ambiguous. In a subsequent related study, Outreville (1990) 
suggested that financial development has a positive effect on the demand for non-life 
insurance. 
2.3.2 Empirical studies 
On the empirical front, Sherden (1984) pointed out that increasing automobile 
purchase prices may lead to decreases in average price elasticities for physical damage 
coverage. Conversely, when the value of a car is reduced, price elasticities for coverage 
increase. Demand for physical damage coverage depends on the net effect of these two 
trends in terms of increasing the price of automobile insurance. Sherden (1984) 
showed that suburban consumers would be an ideal target market for non-life 
insurance companies that want to maximise their amount of coverage. He concluded 
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that income risk and the need for automobile insurance coverage are directly related. 
A number of authors (e.g., Outreville 1990; Browne, Chung and Frees 2000; Esho et 
al. 2004; Feyen, Lester and Rocha 2011; Elango and Jones 2011; Park and Lemaire 
2012; Kamiya, Li and Zanjani 2014) have followed this approach to examine 
determinants of non-life insurance expenditure by including a richer set of explanatory 
variables in the regression equations. These studies are summarised in Table A2-1 in 
the Appendix. Generally, determinants of non-life insurance expenditure, can be 
classified into economic, demographic, financial, social, legal system and cultural 
factors. These are discussed in the following subsections. 
2.3.2.1 Economic factors 
Per capita income: Liu and Neilson (2006) argued that wealthier individuals tend to 
spend more on risk-averse activities. Consequently, many studies have shown that 
income is a significant variable in explaining non-life insurance expenditure. Almost 
all previous papers in the literature (e.g., Beenstock, Dickinson and Khajuria 1988; 
Outreville 1990; Browne, Chung and Frees 2000; Esho et al. 2004; Elango and Jones 
2011; Park and Lemaire 2012; Kamiya, Li and Zanjani 2014) have examined the effect 
of per capita income on non-life insurance expenditure and found it to be significantly 
positive. However, the magnitudes of the coefficients may be biased due to the 
endogeneity caused by the causal effect between per capita income and non-life 
insurance expenditure, which was often ignored in earlier papers.3 
Price of non-life insurance: A few previous studies have also examined the effect of 
the price of non-life insurance on non-life insurance expenditure. Outreville (1990) 
examined the determinants of demand for non-life insurance using a cross-section 
dataset of 55 developing countries and found that the price of non-life insurance 
proxied by the inverse of the loss ratio, which indicates that the cost per dollar of losses 
required to administer operations in the non-life insurance sector has an insignificant 
effect. Similarly, Esho et al. (2004) investigated the effect of the price of non-life 
insurance proxied by the inverse of the loss ratio on non-life insurance consumption 
using a panel dataset comprising 44 countries and found an insignificant effect. In 
contrast, Browne, Chung and Frees (2000) used a market share of foreign non-life 
                                                 
3 Lee (2011) and Ward and Zurbreuugg (2000) found that there is a bi-directional causal relationship 
between non-life insurance expenditure and per capita GDP. In addition, Chang et al. (2013) found that 
globalisation, which includes economic factors, has a causality with insurance activity across countries 
under different conditions.  
CHAPTER TWO 
11 
 
insurers in one country as a proxy for the price of non-life insurance and claimed that 
a lower market share of foreign non-life insurance companies may result in higher 
spending on non-life insurance in OECD countries. Browne, Chung and Frees found a 
negative significant effect of the market share of foreign non-life insurers on motor 
vehicle insurance consumption.  
Inflation rate: Kamiya, Li and Zanjani (2014) examined the determinants of non-life 
insurance consumption using a cross-country panel of data from 139 countries in the 
period 19882010 and found that the inflation rate had a negative effect on non-life 
insurance expenditure. In contrast, Feyen, Lester and Rocha (2011) examined the 
determinants of non-life insurance expenditure using a panel dataset of 90 countries in 
the period 20002008 and found the effect to be insignificant. Despite these results, 
the inflation rate may not be a key driver of the determinants of non-life insurance 
expenditure, as a typical non-life insurance policy only covers a one-year period.4 
2.3.2.2 Economic freedom factors 
The significance of economic freedom for economic growth has been recognised in 
the economic literature. Dawson (2003) claimed that the overall level of economic 
freedom plays an important role in promoting long-term economic prosperity. 
Gwartney, Holcombe and Lawson (2004) concluded that the effect of economic 
freedom on growth and investment is positive, and that countries with policies that are 
more consistent with economic freedom achieve higher income levels. Similarly, 
Justesen (2008) found that economic growth and investment are affected by economic 
freedom. Azman-Saini, Baharumshad and Law (2010) pointed out that economic 
freedom is an essential factor driving the absorptive capacity of a nation; hence, 
countries may boost economic activities, especially from foreign direct investment 
(FDI) inflows by improving economic freedom.  
A number of papers have also investigated the link between economic freedom and 
the non-life insurance sector. Among these, Elango and Jones (2011) examined the 
determinants of demand for non-life insurance in emerging markets from 1998 to 2008 
using six indicators of the Heritage Foundation rather than the summary of the Index 
of Economic Freedom. They found that the effect of financial freedom on demand for 
                                                 
4 In the life insurance sector, many studies have found a negative effect of the inflation rate on demand 
for life insurance (e.g., Houston 1960; Hoflander and Duvall 1967; Neumann 1969; Fortune 1972; 
Babbel 1981; Browne and Kim 1993; Outreville 1996; Beck and Webb 2003; Li et al. 2007). 
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non-life insurance is positive, whereas business freedom has a negative effect.5 Park, 
Borde and Choi (2002) investigated the determinants of total insurance expenditure 
(both life and non-life insurance) using cross-national data analysis. They used the 
economic freedom index published by the Heritage Foundation as a proxy for the 
degree of regulation to examine the effect of the degree of regulation in a country on 
total insurance expenditure and found that a lower degree of restriction on entry into 
markets may increase the competitiveness of the insurance market. 
To the best of my knowledge, five major surveys have measured economic freedom 
on a systematic basis: (1) the Fraser Institute’s economic freedom index, (2) the 
Freedom House’s economic freedom indicators, (3) the Heritage Foundation’s indices 
of economic freedom, (4) the International Institute for Management Development’s 
(IMD) indices and (5) the World Economic Forum’s (WEF) indices. The indices of 
the IMD and WEF are more valuable to business executives because of their emphasis 
on forecasting growth for developed countries, whereas the economic freedom indices 
of the Fraser Institute, Freedom House and Heritage Foundation aim to provide 
valuable information about economic institutions in both developed and developing 
countries (Hanke and Walters 1997). 
The Fraser Institute’s economic freedom index, which includes five major areassize 
of government, legal system and property rights, sound money, freedom to trade 
internationally, and regulationhas been widely used in the literature for the 
following reasons. First, as stated by Berggren (2003), many of its variables are 
derived from secondary sources and are therefore easy to verify. Second, according to 
Gwartney and Lawson (2003), the Index of Economic Freedom of the Heritage 
Foundation/Wall Street Journal is less valuable to researchers analysing the effect of 
changing economic freedom across time periods. In addition, the Heritage 
Foundation’s indices are less precise and less transparent than those of the Fraser 
Institute. Third, as noted by Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu (2006), most researchers 
studying economic freedom in topics other than insurance (33 out of 52 papers) used 
                                                 
5 The Heritage Foundation’s economic freedom index includes four groups with ten key ingredients of 
economic freedom. The four groups are (1) rule of law (property rights, freedom from corruption); (2) 
limited government (fiscal freedom, government spending); (3) regulatory efficiency (business 
freedom, labour freedom, monetary freedom); and (4) open markets (trade freedom, investment 
freedom, financial freedom). Business freedom refers to measuring the extent to which the regulatory 
and infrastructure environments constrain the efficient operation of businesses while financial freedom 
measures the banking efficiency and degree of independence from government control and interference 
in the financial sector (Miller, Holmes and Feulner 2014).  
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the Fraser Institute’s economic freedom index because it had the most comprehensive 
timespan. De Haan, Lundström and Sturm (2006) critically discussed the Fraser 
Institute’s economic freedom index and concluded that its indicators are both useful 
and reliable because of their clear descriptions. Finally, Justesen (2008) pointed out 
that the Fraser Institute’s economic freedom index covers a large number of countries 
over a long period (see also Berggren 2003; Rode and Coll 2012). 
2.3.2.3 Cultural factors 
De Mooij (2003) and Johar, Maheswaran and Peracchio (2006) stated that culture is 
one of the main drivers in explaining differences in consumption behaviour over time 
and across countries. In the insurance sector, Hofstede (1995) stated that the 
globalisation of markets would lead to changing environments and technology, and 
that ageing populations were a challenge for national insurance systems. The ways in 
which people deal with these changes differ from one country to another. In addition, 
the demand for non-life insurance products varies from one person to another because 
non-life insurance is an immaterial product. That is, perceptions of insurance benefits 
or a sense of security vary between individuals. Hence, non-life insurers must be aware 
of cultural attitudes. 
To transfer the risks to non-life insurers, individuals must perceive the risks that they 
are unable to bear. Park, Borde and Choi (2002) argued that people purchase insurance 
to minimise perceived risks rather than using other mechanisms to hedge risks. Park, 
Borde and Choi also claimed that the amount of perceived risks and decision making 
in purchasing insurance depends on cultural traits and the socio-political environment. 
Individuals in some countries may accept a reasonable amount of risk, while people in 
other countries may be more willing to hedge risks. 
Many papers have previously investigated cultural dimensions as explanatory 
variables for insurance expenditure (combining life and non-life insurance) (e.g., 
Hofstede 1983; Schwartz 1994; Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner 1998; House et al. 
2004; Hofstede 2001; Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov 2010; Minkov 2011). 
Hofstede’s (1983, 2001) dataset has mainly been used in these studies because it covers 
many countries and is relevant to the insurance industry (Park, Borde and Choi 2002; 
Chui and Kwok 2008). The dataset contains the following dimensions: individualism, 
power distance, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity and long-term orientation. House 
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et al. (2004) also provided cultural data through the GLOBE project, but these are 
conceptually correlated with aspects of Hofstede’s definitions. For instance, gender 
egalitarianism and assertiveness orientation are related to Hofstede's construct of 
masculinityfemininity and family collectivism, institutional collectivism to 
individualismcollectivism, uncertainty avoidance and power distance to the two 
Hofstede dimensions with the same labels, and future orientation to long-term 
orientation. Although some important refinements and clarifications were made in the 
subsequent work, the GLOBE project suggested that Hofstede’s cultural dimensions 
are robust (Leung et al. 2005).  
Park, Borde and Choi (2002) used data from 37 countries to examine the effect of 
socio-cultural variables on the degree of insurance expenditure (life and non-life 
insurance combined). They used four former cultural variables of Hofstede, Hofstede 
and Minkov (2010) in the analysis, including uncertainty avoidance, individualism, 
masculinity and power distance. However, except for the masculinity variable, they 
found an insignificant effect of cultural variables on insurance expenditure.  
Chui and Kwok (2008) believed that the national culture plays an important role in 
explaining the differences in life insurance consumption across countries. Using four 
of Hofstede’s cultural variables (uncertain avoidance, individualism, masculinity and 
power distance) they examined the effect of culture on life insurance consumption and 
showed that individualism has a positive effect on life insurance consumption, while 
power distance and masculinity have a negative effect. Park and Lemaire (2011) 
followed the study of Chui and Know (2008) but included the fifth cultural variable of 
Hofstede (2001)namely, long-term orientationto investigate the determinants of 
demand for life insurance. They found that long-term orientation positively influences 
demand for life insurance. 
With respect to the non-life insurance sector, Park and Lemaire (2012) showed that 
demand for non-life insurance has a higher growth rate in emerging countries with a 
low power distance index and a high individualism and uncertainty avoidance index. 
To the best of my knowledge, Park and Lemaire (2012) are the only researchers who 
have explored the effect of the four cultural variables of Hofstede (1983, 2001) on non-
life insurance consumption in emerging economies. Park and Lemaire showed that, in 
countries with low power distance, high individualism and uncertainty avoidance, non-
life insurance consumption has a higher growth rate compared with other countries, 
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holding other factors constant. However, the new cultural dimensions of Hofstede, 
Hofstede and Minkov (2010) and Minkov (2011) were not included in Park and 
Lemaire’s (2012) study. The characteristics of cultural dimensions and their 
relationship with the insurance market based on earlier studies are summarised below. 
Individualism: Individualism refers to societies that have loose attachments between 
individuals (Hofstede 2001; Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov 2010). Countries with 
high individualism include the United States (US), Australia, the United Kingdom 
(UK) and Canada. Countries with low individualism (collective culture) include South 
American countries such as Colombia, Chile, Venezuela and Ecuador. Park, Borde and 
Choi (2002) asserted that people in collectivism cultures tend to develop human 
relationships to avoid potential risks, whereas in individualism cultures people may 
not trust human relationships for hedging risks. Hence, people in individualism 
cultures tend to buy more insurance than those in collectivism cultures. Similarly, Park 
and Lemaire (2012) demonstrated that people in individualism cultures purchase more 
non-life insurance to hedge risks.  
Masculinity: Masculinity refers to societies where social gender roles are clearly 
distinct. In these societies, men focus on material success, such as career and business, 
whereas women focus on improvements in the quality of their family (Hofstede 2001; 
Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov 2010). Countries with high masculine societies are 
Japan, Slovakia, Austria and the UK, whereas low masculine (high feminine) countries 
include Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway. Dermott (2008) claimed that men in 
the UK contribute a larger proportion to the family income than women. Park, Borde 
and Choi (2002) found a positive effect of masculinity on insurance consumption (both 
life and non-life insurance).  
Uncertainty avoidance: Uncertainty avoidance assesses the extent to which people 
feel threatened by uncertain situations that they want to avoid (Hofstede 2001; 
Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov 2010). Greece, Portugal and Guatemala have a high 
uncertainty avoidance index, while Sweden, Denmark and Singapore have a low 
uncertainty avoidance index. Esho et al. (2004) used uncertainty avoidance as a proxy 
for risk aversion and found an insignificant effect on non-life insurance expenditure. 
In contrast, Park and Lemaire (2012) found that it had a positive effect. 
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Power distance: Power distance measures the degree of inequality among people in a 
society (Hofstede 2001; Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov 2010). Countries with a large 
power distance index include Slovakia, Malaysia and Guatemala, whereas those with 
a small power distance index include New Zealand, Denmark and Austria. Chui and 
Kwok (2008) and Park and Lemaire (2012) found that this variable has a negative 
effect on demand for life insurance.  
Long-term orientation: Long-term orientation refers to the fostering of merits 
towards future advantages such as thrift and perseverance (Hofstede, Hofstede and 
Minkov 2010). Countries with a high long-term orientation include South Korea, Japan 
and China, while Colombia and Nigeria have a short-term orientation.  
Indulgence: Indulgence refers to a society that allows people the right to enjoy life 
and have fun (Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov 2010). Countries with high indulgence 
include Venezuela, Mexico and El Salvador, while Latvia and Pakistan have low 
indulgence (high restraint). Park, Borde and Choi (2002) claimed that people in some 
countries may accept risks because of their optimistic nature, while others may not 
because of their pessimistic nature.  
Hypometropia: Hypometropia assesses whether a society has high violence and 
national murder rates (Minkov 2011). This variable is used to represent the feature that 
some nations have more serious violence than other populations. Countries with a high 
hypometropia include South Africa and El Salvador, while Singapore and Japan have 
a low hypometropia. 
2.3.2.4 Financial development factors 
Feyen, Lester and Rocha (2011) claimed that financial development leads to an 
expansion of mortgages and other personal loans, thereby increasing demand for 
insurance. Feyen, Lester and Rocha examined the effect of financial development 
proxied by the ratio of private credit to GDP on both life and non-life insurance 
consumption and found a positive effect. Similarly, Kamiya, Li and Zanjani (2014) 
found a positive effect of bank credit on non-life insurance expenditure in lower-
middle-income countries. Commercial banks are one of the most effective distribution 
channels in selling non-life insurance products. Customers of these banks are usually 
advised to choose appropriate non-life insurance products to cover properties or 
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productive activities financed by banks. Chui and Kwok (2008) found a positive effect 
of bank development on demand for life insurance. 
2.3.2.5 Demographic factors 
A number of studies have examined the effect of urbanisation, which is used as a proxy 
for the probability of loss, on non-life insurance expenditure. Along this line, Browne, 
Chung and Frees (2000) and Esho et al. (2004) stated that the frequency of loss is 
greater in areas with a higher degree of urbanisation. Glaeser and Sacerdote (1999) 
and Esho et al. (2004) claimed that crime rates in large cities are much higher than in 
small cities and rural areas because areas with a higher degree of urbanisation have a 
greater concentration of assets than other areas. Esho et al. (2004) showed that 
urbanisation has a positive effect on non-life insurance expenditure, while Browne, 
Chung and Frees (2000) and Park and Lemaire (2012) found an insignificant effect. 
Outreville (1990) used agricultural status, measured by the percentage of the 
agricultural labour force, as a proxy for the probability of loss and found an 
insignificant effect on non-life insurance expenditure. 
2.3.2.6 Social factors 
Browne, Chung and Frees (2000) and Esho et al. (2004) investigated the effect of 
education, which is used as a proxy for risk aversion, on non-life insurance 
expenditure. Browne, Chung and Frees showed that the effect of education on non-life 
insurance expenditure is insignificant, whereas Esho et al. found a significant positive 
effect. Feyen, Lester and Rocha (2011) and Park and Lemaire (2012) used the 
percentage of population of Muslims, Buddhists and Christians as a proxy for religion. 
They found that religion has a significant effect on non-life insurance expenditure. 
Feyen, Lester and Rocha (2011) examined the effect of population size on non-life 
insurance consumption and found a negative effect, while Nakata and Sawada (2007) 
found an insignificant effect. 
2.3.2.7 Legal system factors6 
La Porta et al. (1999) and Park and Lemaire (2012) stated that countries that pursue 
the Common Law (or English Law) provide the highest protection for creditors’ rights 
                                                 
6 Following the literature, this study only examines Common Law and Islamic Law as drivers of non-
life insurance expenditure. 
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and shareholders, whereas countries following the French Civil Law provide the 
lowest protection. Park and Lemaire (2011) found a positive effect of Common Law 
on demand for life insurance. For Islamic Law, Kwon (2007) claimed that there are 
some restrictions for non-life insurance companies caused by Islamic principles in 
financial services, such as no depreciation of property, no deductibles and no 
coinsurance. Therefore, Islamic Law countries may limit insurance products to certain 
forms (Ward and Zurbruegg 2002). Park and Lemaire (2012) found a negative effect 
of Islamic Law on non-life insurance expenditure.  
2.4 Issue of endogeneity in earlier studies  
Endogeneity is one of the most regular causes of estimator inconsistency (Cameron 
and Trivedi 2005); however, this issue has been almost ignored by previous studies 
(e.g., Beenstock, Dickinson and Khajuria 1988; Outreville 1990; Browne, Chung and 
Frees 2000; Park, Borde and Choi 2002; Esho et al. 2004; Elango and Jones 2011; Park 
and Lemaire 2012; Kamiya, Li and Zanjani 2014) that have examined the determinants 
of non-life insurance expenditure. Basically, endogeneity can be caused by an omitted 
variable or a reverse causality relationship between a regressor and a dependent 
variable. 
2.4.1 Omitted variables 
Park, Borde and Choi (2002) used the economic freedom index as a proxy for the 
degree of regulation in their analysis and found that it had a significant effect on total 
insurance (both life and non-life insurance) expenditure. Similarly, Elango and Jones 
(2011) used the economic freedom indices to examine the drivers of total insurance 
demand in emerging markets from 1998 to 2008. Elango and Jones found that business 
freedom, financial freedom and freedom from corruption have a negative effect on 
demand for non-life insurance. While the economic freedom index includes several 
areas regarding size of government, legal structure, access to sound money, 
international trade and regulation of credit, labour and business, the use of normal 
regressions, such as ordinary least squares (OLS) and fixed/random-effects estimation, 
may lead to biased results due to omitted variables. 
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2.4.2 Reverse causality relationship 
Most previous papers have found that the relationship between non-life insurance 
development and economic growth is both a supply-leading and a demand-following 
phenomenon.7 Patrick (1966) claimed that economic growth may generate more 
demand for financial services and lead to stronger development of these services; in 
turn, this accelerates economic growth. Ward and Zurbruegg (2000), Lee (2011), 
Pradhan, Arvin and Norman (2015) and Alhassan and Biekpe (2016) found a bi-
directional causal relationship between non-life insurance development and economic 
growth in both the short run and long run. 
Boon (2005) examined the causal relationship between financial indicators and 
economic growth in Singapore in the period 19852002 using time-series data. Boon 
found that the role of the insurance market in promoting economic growth is supply 
leading. That is, the growth in insurance causes economic development. Likewise, 
Liedtke (2007) stated that insurance is a key component of economic growth. Haiss 
and Sümegi (2008) showed that the effect of general liability insurance is greater than 
life insurance on economic growth in some countries of Central and Eastern Europe. 
Arena (2008) found a positive effect of non-life insurance on economic growth in high-
income and developing countries. Arena (2008) indicated that non-life insurance has 
a larger effect on high-income countries than developing countries. Avram, Nguyen 
and Skully (2010) examined the insurance-growth nexus in 93 countries in the period 
19802006 and found a positive effect of non-life insurance on economic 
development. Han, Moshirian and Tian (2010) employed the dynamic panel data 
model in 77 economies for the period 19942005 and also found a positive effect of 
non-life insurance development on economic growth. Han et al. argued that non-life 
insurance development plays a much more significant role in developing economies 
than in developed economies.   
Therefore, the use of per capita income as the main explanatory variable without 
overcoming endogeneity, as in most previous studies (e.g., Beenstock, Dickinson and 
Khajuria 1988; Outreville 1990; Browne, Chung and Frees 2000; Esho et al. 2004; 
Elango and Jones 2011; Park and Lemaire 2012; Kamiya, Li and Zanjani 2014), may 
                                                 
7 According to Blum et al. (2002), supply-leading means that growth in insurance induces economic 
development, whereas demand-following means that economic growth leads to a rise in demand for 
insurance. 
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yield inconsistent estimates due to a reverse causality problem between per capita 
income and non-life insurance expenditure. 
2.4.3 Overcoming the endogeneity problem 
The IV method is a general approach to control for endogeneity (Cameron and Trivedi 
2005). Endogeneity associated with the economic freedom index has been mostly 
addressed in studies investigating its influence on economic growth. Nelson and Singh 
(1998), Carlsson and Lundström (2002) and Rode and Coll (2012) used a number of 
IVs, including one-year-lagged economic freedom index, degree of political right and 
civil freedom, degree of trade openness, human development index and life expectancy 
of a country, as the main instruments in IV regressions to deal with the endogeneity 
caused by the economic freedom index. A dynamic model from panel data by the 
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator has been introduced to overcome 
the endogeneity caused by omitted variables and reverse causality (Holtz-Eakin, 
Newey and Rosen 1988; Arellano and Bond 1991; Arellano and Bover 1995; Blundell 
and Bond 1998). The GMM estimator uses lagged values of the dependent variable 
and the explanatory variables as the main instruments. 
2.5 Issue of using aggregated non-life insurance expenditure data 
Most previous studies (e.g., Outreville 1990; Esho et al. 2004; Elango and Jones 2011; 
Feyen, Lester and Rocha 2011; Lee and Chiu 2012; Park and Lemaire 2012), have 
used aggregated data to examine the determinants of non-life insurance expenditure. 
As argued by Esho et al. (2004) and Park and Lemaire (2012), adding up the insurance 
premiums leads to a loss of information due to heterogeneity in both the characteristics 
of and spending on insurance products8. Therefore, there is a need for policymakers, 
firms, researchers and customers to revisit the issue using disaggregated non-life 
insurance data.  
Browne, Chung and Frees (2000) and Kamiya, Li and Zanjani (2014) are the only 
researchers to date who have examined non-life insurance consumption using 
disaggregated data at the product level. Focusing on the period 19871993, Browne, 
Chung and Frees (2000) studied the determinants (mainly economic and demographic 
                                                 
8 For other fields, Orcutt, Watts and Edwards (1968), Garrett (2003) and Ferrer, Juan and Poncela (2006) 
noted the following disadvantages of using aggregated data: (1) using aggregated data before analysis 
may discard information; (2) it may result in misleading conclusions regarding the economic behaviour 
of individuals; and (3) disaggregated models yield better performance. 
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factors) of demand for motor insurance and general liability insurance. Browne, Chung 
and Frees claimed that motor insurance is chosen primarily by households, while 
general liability insurance is purchased predominantly by businesses. Together with 
the issue of endogeneity, many other non-life insurance productsin particular, 
property insurance and accident and health insurance, which this research is interested 
inwere not considered in their study.9 Shares of property insurance and accident and 
health insurance in aggregated insurance spending in OECD countries in 2013 were 
21% and 27%, respectively. Therefore, the factors that have driven the development 
of these markets deserve attention. Further, cultural and legal system factors were not 
investigated in Browne, Chung and Frees’ (2000) analysis. Kamiya, Li and Zanjani 
(2014) examined the effect of the banking crisis on non-life insurance consumption 
using aggregated non-life and motor insurance data in the period 19882010. Kamiya, 
Li and Zanjani focused on motor insurance because it has the largest market share in 
the non-life insurance sector.  
2.6 Global financial crisis 
2.6.1 Causes and effects of the GFC on the global economy 
McKibbin and Stoeckel (2009) argued that three main shocks capture the GFC: the 
bursting of the housing bubble in the US, a sharp rise in the equity risk premium and 
a reappraisal of risk by households, causing them to discount their future labour 
income and increase savings and decrease consumption. Ivashina and Scharfstein 
(2010) showed that new loans to large borrowers and new lending for real investment 
fell during the peak of the financial crisis of 2008. Naude (2009) documented that the 
US and European Union, which were experiencing the most substantial economic 
slowdown, were at the epicentre of the GFC. In addition, countries with looser credit 
market regulations and higher incomes suffered the most from the crisis (Rose and 
Spiegel 2011). The GFC also had a negative effect on investmentin particular, in 
countries with low tolerance for uncertainty that results in a fall in total output (Inklaar 
and Yang 2012). Chor and Manova (2012) examined the effect of the GFC on trade 
flows, finding that the US imports decreased by 2.5% more due to the effect of credit 
                                                 
9 For example, take the Netherlands and Finland. In 2012, the two countries had a similar level of per 
capita income, but the aggregated non-life insurance spending of individuals in the Netherlands was 
four and a half times higher than that of Finland. Further, individuals in the Netherlands spent 48 times 
more on accident and health insurance than people in Finland, while their spending on other non-life 
insurance products (e.g., motor insurance and property insurance) was similar.  
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conditions such as interbank rates. Further, through the easing of the credit crunch, the 
real economy could be affected by financial market disturbances. Costs to develop and 
manufacture a product by domestic producers could be equally hurt by credit 
conditions. However, Chor and Manova (2012) argued that exporters may be 
influenced more by shipping expenses. Furceri and Mourougane (2012) also found 
that financial crises in OECD countries over the period 19602008 had a negative and 
persistent effect on potential output. Furceri and Mourougane indicated that around 
1.52.4% of potential output in OECD countries may decline because of the effects of 
financial crises, which mainly derive from the hit on capital and potential employment. 
Finally, Morgan and Astolfi (2015) investigated the effect of the GFC on health care 
spending across OECD countries and found that most OECD countries have had a 
slowdown of health spending growth since 2009. 
2.6.2 Effects of the GFC on the non-life insurance sector 
Harrington (2009) stated that the insurance sector played an important role on the 
periphery of the crisis. Financial rating agencies publicised downgrades of leading 
‘monoline’ mortgage and bond insurers because of their significant losses.10 
Harrington also found that systemic risk in non-life insurance is relatively low 
compared with banking because of non-life insurers’ large amounts of capital. 
Therefore, the need for broad government guarantees to prevent a potential spread in 
the non-life insurance sector is less demanding than for the banking sector. Kamiya, 
Li and Zanjani (2014) showed that the banking crisis had a negative effect on non-life 
insurance consumption, while Yu (2015) concluded that the performance of insurance 
companies during the GFC in the US were affected severely due to the risk of 
bankruptcy. 
2.7 Conclusion 
This Chapter has provided an overview of the economic benefits of the non-life 
insurance sector in developing the economy, as well as the main indicators used to 
measure non-life insurance expenditure. The literature review has largely focused on 
surveying theoretical and empirical studies in regard to examining the determinants of 
non-life insurance expenditure. In addition to highlighting the contributions of existing 
                                                 
10 ‘Monoline’ insurers are defined as insurance companies that can write one line of business only 
(Baluch, Mutenga and Parsons 2011). 
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studies to the literature on the determinants of non-life insurance expenditure, this 
chapter has confirmed that there are limitations in the existing research. The review of 
the theoretical literature has shown that previous studies have been based on specific 
demand functions and a number of strong assumptions on the supply side. Moreover, 
capturing some factors, such as economic freedom and culture in earlier theoretical 
frameworks, has been ignored in previous studies. These gaps in the literature can be 
filled by developing a theoretical model that incorporates factors as determinants of 
non-life insurance expenditure, thereby facilitating a number of testable hypotheses. 
The empirical literature review on the determinants of non-life insurance expenditure 
has indicated some existing limitations that need to be corrected. This chapter has 
noted that, in addition to traditional factors (per capita income, education and 
urbanisation), factors such as culture, economic freedom and the legal system should 
be key drivers in explaining non-life insurance expenditure. Further, previous studies 
have mostly ignored potentially important econometric issues such as the endogeneity 
associated with economic freedom and income, the use of aggregated non-life 
insurance data and the effect of the GFC. These gaps in the literature suggest the need 
for a comprehensive study into the determinants of the demand for non-life insurance 
expenditure that not only uses the latest developments in econometric methodology to 
overcome the issue of endogeneity, but that also captures data at the product level. 
This thesis attempts to fulfil these objectives. 
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Appendix 
Table A2-1. Summary of previous papers 
Notes: insig. indicates insignificant;  (*) Elango and Jones (2011) used six indicators of the economic freedom index of Heritage rather than its summary. (**) Park, Borde and Choi (2002) used the 
summary economic freedom of Heritage in 1997, where the lower score of the economic freedom index, the higher the degree of economic freedom. Therefore, a negative effect of the economic freedom 
index on insurance consumption is comparable to a positive effect if the new construction of the economic freedom index is used, where higher scores indicate more economic freedom.
 
Non-life insurance Total insurance Life insurance 
Kamiya, Li and Zanjani (2014) Park and 
Lemaire 
(2012) 
Elango 
and Jones 
(2011) 
Feyen, Lester 
and Rocha 
(2011) 
Esho et al. 
(2004) 
Browne, Chung 
and Frees 
(2000) 
Outreville 
(1990) 
Park, Borde and 
Choi (2002) 
Park and 
Lemaire 
(2011) 
Chui and 
Kwok 
(2008) 
Dependent variable  
Aggregated data Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes    
Disaggregated  data 3 products No No No No 2 products No    
Independent variables Non-life 
(OECD) 
Motor 
(High-
Income) 
Property 
(High-
Income) 
Liability 
(High-
Income) 
  Motor 
(OECD) 
 
Liability 
(OECD) 
    
Economic freedom 
 
   
 
+/-(*) 
 
   
 
+ (**) + + 
Income per capita - -   + + + + + + + + - + 
Bank development Insig. Insig.   
  
+    
 
 Insig.  
Education 
 
   Insig. Insig. 
 
+ Insig. - -  Insig.  
Urbanisation 
 
   Insig. 
  
+ Insig. - 
 
   
Bank crisis Insig. Insig. + Insig.           
Indulgence 
 
   
   
   
 
   
Individualism 
 
   + 
  
   
 
Insig. + + 
Long term-orientation 
 
   
   
 
 
 
 
 +  
Masculinity 
 
   Insig. 
  
 
 
 
 
+ - - 
Uncertainty avoidance 
 
   + 
  
Insig. 
 
 
 
Insig. + + 
Power distance 
 
   - 
  
 
 
 
 
Insig. + - 
Hypometropia               
Islamic Law     -        -  
Common Law     Insig.   Insig.     +  
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Chapter 3: Determinants of Non-life Insurance Expenditure 
in Developed and Developing Countries:  New Results from 
an Instrumental Variable Analysis11 
3.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 2, despite the effect that life and non-life insurance has on the 
economy, little consideration has been given to the socio-economic factors that 
influence non-life insurance expenditure. This is in sharp contrast to the rich body of 
research on the determinants of life insurance consumption (see Chui and Kwok 2008, 
2009 and Park and Lemaire 2011 for recent surveys of the literature on the 
determinants of life insurance consumption). Nevertheless, a number of studies have 
pointed out that economic freedom, income, education, culture and law are the drivers 
of non-life insurance expenditure (Outreville 1990; Browne, Chung and Frees 2000; 
Park, Borde and Choi 2002; Esho et al. 2004; Elango and Jones 2011; Lee and Chiu 
2012; Park and Lemaire 2012). However, their arguments are based on results from 
cross-sectional and time-series data analyses in which the endogeneity problem has 
often been neglected. This chapter addresses the issue of endogeneity associated with 
the economic freedom variable caused by omitted variables. To enrich the analysis, 
the chapter also examines the role of the global financial crisis (GFC) in severely 
dampening economic activities in many developed countries. As mentioned in Chapter 
2, the GFC may have changed the ways in which socio-economic factors affect non-
life insurance expenditure. Figure 3-1 graphs the trends of worldwide average 
premium per capita non-life insurance expenditure and per capita GDP. As shown, the 
pattern of average non-life insurance expenditure and per capita income changed after 
2007. Further, Figure 3-2 shows that average non-life insurance expenditure was 
affected more in developed countries than in developing countries during the GFC. 
Despite this, to the best of my knowledge, no one has studied the effect of the GFC on 
non-life insurance expenditurein particular, before and during the crisis.  
Theoretically, this chapter augments the theoretical models of Mossin (1968) and 
Szpiro (1985) to explore the determinants of non-life insurance expenditure when 
                                                 
11 Major empirical results of this chapter were presented at the Asia-Pacific Trade Seminars (APTS) 
2015 held at the Australian National University in June 2015 and subsequently published at Applied 
Economics in May, 2016 (doi:10.1080/00036846.2016.1181834). 
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incorporating the discount factor, which represents people’s perceptions towards the 
future value of their property in a risky environment. 
 
Figure 3-1. Worldwide average non-life insurance expenditure and income per capita, 20002011 
Sources: Sigma (Swiss Re 2014) and World Bank (2014a) 
 
Figure 3-2. Average non-life insurance expenditure in developed and developing countries, 20002011 
Source: Sigma (Swiss Re 2014) 
By studying a panel dataset covering 36 developed and 31 developing countries in the 
period 2000–2011, this chapter aims to address the following two key research 
questions: ‘How do the various socio-economic factors influence non-life insurance 
expenditure in developed and developing countries?’ and ‘How did the GFC change 
the way in which socio-economic factors affect non-life insurance expenditure in 
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developed and developing countries?’ The contributions of this chapter to the literature 
are as follows. First, a theoretical model is presented that incorporates the factors 
affecting non-life insurance expenditure and has the potential to add more variables to 
the framework. Second, following Nelson and Singh (1998), Carlsson and Lundström 
(2002) and Rode and Coll (2012), trade openness, indices of human development and 
life expectancy, among  others, are chosen as instrumental variables (IV) for the 
economic freedom index, thereby addressing the endogeneity problem associated with 
this variable. Third, analysis is conducted for all sample countries and for developed 
countries and developing countries separately. Finally, this chapter divides the data 
into ‘before GFC’ and ‘during GFC’ sub-periods to investigate how the GFC has 
changed the ways in which the factors in question have affected non-life insurance 
expenditure. 
The main empirical findings of this chapter show that income, economic freedom, 
bank development, urbanisation and a number of cultural and law variables are the key 
drivers of non-life insurance expenditure. However, their effects differ significantly 
between developed and developing countries. For example, more urbanisation and 
greater hypometropia (i.e., higher violence and murder rates) increase non-life 
insurance expenditure in developing countries and decrease it in developed countries. 
These findings not only complement earlier results in the literature, but also uncover 
the connections between the levels of development and the determinants of non-life 
insurance expenditure. 
A number of interesting results have also been found regarding how the GFC has 
changed the ways in which various socio-economic variables affect non-life insurance 
expenditure. In particular, this study finds that urbanisation (in both developed and 
developing countries) and long-term orientation in developed countries are highly 
significant in explaining non-life insurance expenditure before the GFC, but they 
become insignificant during the GFC. Meanwhile, masculinity in developed countries 
and power distance in developing countries are significant drivers of non-life insurance 
expenditure during the GFC. 
This research is the first to attempt a comprehensive framework based on IV analysis 
to examine the factors driving non-life insurance expenditure. The findings of this 
chapter, as summarised above, are useful for both domestic and multinational non-life 
insurance companies in developing their existing markets and/or choosing new 
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potential markets. For policymakers, understanding the drivers of non-life insurance 
expenditure may help them to adjust their regulations to assist the development of this 
sector, which is an important engine for long-run economic growth and prosperity. 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 introduces a simple 
theoretical model for non-life insurance expenditure and justifies the roles played by 
various socio-economic factors. Section 3.3 outlines hypotheses, data and 
methodology. Section 3.4 presents and discusses the results. Finally, Section 3.5 
provides some concluding remarks. 
3.2 Theoretical model on non-life insurance expenditure 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, previous studies have introduced some theoretical 
frameworks studying risk-averse models of the determinants of spending on non-life 
insurance. Mossin (1968) considered theoretical models to address different problems 
concerned with purchasing optimal non-life insurance coverage in various situations, 
such as maximum acceptable premium for full coverage, optimal coverage at a given 
premium and optimal amount of deductibles. Mossin (1968) concluded that if an 
individual’s risk aversion decreases, he or she may assume more risk the larger his or 
her wealth. Importantly, Mossin indicated that the coverage decreases when the risk 
premiums increases. Szpiro (1985) extended Mossin’s (1968) study by specifying the 
amount of non-life insurance coverage. Likewise, Beenstock, Dickinson and Khajuria 
(1988) introduced a simple model that specifies for the supply and demand for non-
life insurance. Beenstock, Dickinson and Khajuria stated that per capita income has a 
positive effect on non-life insurance premiums, while the effects of the probability of 
loss and interest rates on non-life insurance premiums may be ambiguous. 
Subsequently, Outreville (1990) developed a simple model to capture the non-life 
insurance demand function with some assumptions. Outreville indicated that per capita 
income and financial development have a positive effect on demand for non-life 
insurance. 
This section introduces a simple model on optimal insurance coverage based on the 
seminal contributions of Mossin (1968), Szpiro (1985), Beenstock, Dickinson and 
Khajuria (1988) and Outreville (1990). The model incorporates some factors that may 
influence non-life insurance expenditure and that were neglected in the earlier studies. 
It also provides a rationale for the empirical analysis. 
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Consider a representative risk-averse individual who owns a property, the value of 
which is 𝐿, and some assets, the total value of which sum up to 𝐴. The property suffers 
from the risk of losing its value. To simplify the analysis, this study assumes that when 
a loss occurs, the entire value of the property is lost. Let 𝜋 be the probability that the 
loss occurs and 1 − 𝜋 the probability that the loss does not occur. The individual 
decides the amount of coverage, 𝐶, that he or she wants to purchase from the insurance 
companies, where 0 ≤ 𝐶 ≤ 𝐿. Let 𝑝 be the premium rate so that 𝑝𝐶 represents the 
insurance premium. The insurance premium is paid at the beginning of the period when 
the individual purchases the insurance; however, the insurance benefit can only be 
realised at the end of the period depending on whether the loss has occurred during the 
period. The present value of the individual’s wealth when the loss does not occur and 
when it does occur are respectively given by: 
𝑊1 = 𝐴 − 𝑝𝐶 + (1 − 𝛿)𝐿        (1) 
𝑊2 = 𝐴 − 𝑝𝐶 + (1 − 𝛿)𝐶         (2) 
where 𝛿 ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor. It captures the valuation of the individual on 
the future (i.e. end-of-period) value of the property in question against its present 
value. The discount factor represents all factors that may affect such a valuation by the 
individual, including the opportunity cost of money and cultural and social 
characteristics that affect people’s perceptions of risk and future values. The inclusion 
of this discount factor differentiates this model from those of Mossin (1968) and 
Beenstock, Dickinson and Khajuria (1988); it establishes some new and potentially 
important linkages between socio-economic factors and non-life insurance 
expenditure. Then, the interpretation of (2) is that when the loss occurs, the 
individual’s wealth is reduced by 𝐿, but he or she receives the insurance benefit 𝐶, 
both of which are only realised at the end of the period. 
The expected utility is therefore: 
𝐸(𝑈) = (1 − 𝜋)𝑈(𝐴 − 𝑝𝐶 + (1 − 𝛿)𝐿) + 𝜋𝑈(𝐴 − 𝑝𝐶 + (1 − 𝛿)𝐶)  (3) 
The representative individual chooses the value of 𝐶 to maximise his or her expected 
utility. This requires that the first derivative of 𝐸(𝑈) with respect to 𝐶 is zero and the 
second derivative of 𝐸(𝑈) with respect to 𝐶 is negative: 
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𝑑𝐸(𝑈)
𝑑𝐶
= (1 − 𝜋)𝑈′(𝐴 − 𝑝𝐶 + (1 − 𝛿)𝐿)(−𝑝) + 𝜋𝑈′(𝐴 − 𝑝𝐶 + (1 − 𝛿)𝐶)(1 − 𝑝 −
𝛿) = 0           (4) 
𝑑2𝐸(𝑈)
𝑑𝐶2
= (1 − 𝜋)𝑈′′(𝐴 − 𝑝𝐶 + (1 − 𝛿)𝐿)(−𝑝)2  + 𝜋𝑈′′(𝐴 − 𝑝𝐶 + (1 −
𝛿)𝐶)(−𝑝 + 1 − 𝛿)2<0         (5) 
Notice that for all standard risk-averse utility functions (with 𝑈′(𝑊) > 0 and 
𝑈′′( 𝑊) < 0), condition (5) is automatically satisfied, whereas due to 𝑈′(𝐴 − 𝑝𝐶 +
(1 − 𝛿)𝐿) < 𝑈′(𝐴 − 𝑝𝐶 + (1 − 𝛿)𝐶), the solution to (4) requires: 
𝑝(1 − 𝜋) < 𝜋(1 − 𝑝 − 𝛿) ↔ 1 − 𝛿 <
𝑝
𝜋
       (6) 
To capture the effect of the various socio-economic factors on non-life insurance 
expenditure, a closed-form solution to (4) is required. Following Mossin (1968), the 
following risk-averse utility function: 𝐿𝑛(𝑊) is considered.12 It can be established that 
the solution to (4) in this case is given by: 
𝑑𝐸(𝑈)
𝑑𝐶
=
(1−𝜋)(−𝑝)
𝐴−𝑝𝐶+(1−𝛿)𝐿
+
𝜋(1−𝑝−𝛿)
𝐴−𝑝𝐶+(1−𝛿)𝐶
= 0 → 𝐶∗ =
𝐴(𝜋(1−𝛿)−𝑝)
𝑝(1−𝛿−𝑝)
) +
𝐿(1−𝛿)𝜋
𝑝
    (7) 
As the focus of the thesis is non-life insurance expenditure, this research assumes that 
the non-life insurance market is perfectly competitive with firms competing in prices. 
Free entry then ensures that the equilibrium price is equal to the lowest possible 
marginal cost, which is assumed to be exogenous in this model. This in turn implies 
that the premium rate, 𝑝, is exogenous.13  
From (7), it follows that the optimal non-life insurance premium is given by: 
𝑝𝐶∗ =
𝐴(𝜋(1−𝛿)−𝑝)
1−𝛿−𝑝
+ 𝐿𝜋(1 − 𝛿)          (8) 
                                                 
12 An alternative approach is to consider the power utility function of the form 𝑈 =
𝑊1−𝑦
1−𝑦
, where 𝑦 > 0 
and 𝑦 ≠ 1. Then, by letting 𝐻 = (
𝑝(1−𝜋)
(1−𝑝−𝛿)𝜋
)
1/𝑦
, it can be shown that in equilibrium, 𝑝𝐶∗ =
𝑝(𝐴(1−𝐻)+(1−𝛿)𝐿)
𝐻(1−𝑝−𝛿)+𝑝
. With 
𝜕𝐻
𝜕𝜋
< 0 and 
𝜕𝐻
𝜕𝛿
> 0, it then follows that (9)(10) as shown below carry over. 
Hence, the results also hold under the case of the power utility function. 
 
13 It is possible to extend the theoretical model in this chapter to analyse the case of monopolistic 
competition with differentiated non-life insurance products or the case with limited firm entry. In those 
extensions, one would expect the degree of product differentiation and the number of firms to play a 
role in the model. 
CHAPTER THREE 
31 
 
The following partial derivatives hold in equilibrium: 
𝜕(𝑝𝐶∗)
𝜕𝐿
= (1 − 𝛿)𝜋 > 0                                   (9) 
𝜕(𝑝𝐶∗)
𝜕𝜋
=
𝐴(1−𝛿)
1−𝛿−𝑝
+ 𝐿(1 − 𝛿) > 0                 (10) 
𝜕(𝑝𝐶∗)
𝜕𝛿
= −
𝐴(1−𝜋)𝑝
(1−𝛿−𝑝)2
− 𝐿𝜋 < 0                                       (11) 
This study can now present the key findings of the theoretical model. 
Proposition 1: When the market for non-life insurance is perfectly competitive, an 
individual will: 
(i) increase his or her non-life insurance expenditure if the value of his or her 
property at risk increases 
(ii) increase his or her non-life insurance expenditure if the probability of loss 
increases 
(iii) decrease his or her non-life insurance expenditure if the discount factor 
increases. 
Proof: (9)(11) together imply the results. 
Proposition 1 states that non-life insurance expenditure depends on the value of the 
property at risk, the probability of loss and the discount factor. In a perfectly 
competitive environment, the intuition behind Proposition 1 is straightforward, as all 
of these factors clearly influence people’s incentives to purchase non-life insurance. 
However, the discount factor deserves further discussion. Given that the discount 
factor is related to how the individual weighs future values against present values, he 
or she is more reluctant to purchase non-life insurance when the discount factor 
increases. Although the discount factor tends to work in a similar manner to the real 
interest rate (see Beenstock, Dickinson and Khajuria 1988), the extent and role of the 
discount factor in this chapter’s model, as mentioned earlier, is more important than 
the real interest rate. 
In the subsequent section, this chapter empirically investigates how the value of 
property at risk, the probability of loss and the discount factor affect non-life insurance 
expenditure. Given that data on these factors are not immediately available, the chapter 
will use the best possible proxy variables in the analysis. Specifically, in line with the 
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literature, this research uses per capita income as a proxy for assets, the economic 
freedom index as a proxy for the value of property at risk, and level of urbanisation as 
a proxy for probability of loss. The use of these proxy variables has been well justified 
in the literature review chapter; however, this chapter will proceed a step further by 
addressing the endogeneity problem associated with the economic freedom indexan 
issue that has been neglected in previous studies. In regard to the discount factor, given 
the development of country-specific characteristics in survey data, this chapter uses a 
number of variables as a proxy, including the latest cultural variables of Hofstede, 
Hofstede and Minkov (2010) and Minkov (2011). To this end, the study will develop 
several hypotheses in line with the theoretical model introduced in this section and test 
them against a newly collected dataset. The results of the empirical analysis will help 
people better understand the actual development of the non-life insurance market 
across countries, and it will provide useful policy recommendations for governments.  
3.3 Hypotheses, data and methodology  
3.3.1 Hypotheses 
The theoretical model allows this chapter to propose the following testable hypotheses: 
H3-1: The higher the level of the initial non-life insurance expenditure, per capita 
income, economic freedom, education, bank development and urbanisation in a 
country, the higher the non-life insurance expenditure. 
H3-2: The lower the degree of indulgence, long-term orientation, masculinity and 
power distance in a country, the higher the non-life insurance expenditure. 
H3-3: The higher the degree of individualism, uncertainty avoidance and hypometropia 
in a country, the higher the non-life insurance expenditure. 
H3-4: Islamic Law has a negative effect on non-life insurance expenditure, whereas 
Common Law has a positive effect on non-life insurance expenditure. 
These hypotheses are based on Proposition 1. Note that legal factors, stated in 
hypothesis H3-4, are in the form of dummy variables, which may affect the wealth, 
value of property at risk and probability of loss. Table A3-1 provides detailed 
definitions/descriptions for each factor mentioned in the hypotheses. 
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3.3.2 Data and methodology 
3.3.2.1 Empirical model, data and variables 
The basic empirical model is as follows: 
INSit = α + β1EFIit + β2INCit + β3BDVit + β4EDUit + β5URBit + β6CULi + β7LSYi +  
8Dt + it, 
where INSit is the non-life insurance expenditure for country i in year t; EFIit is the 
economic freedom index for country i in year t; INCit is GDP per capita for country i 
in year t; BDVit is the bank development level for country i in year t; EDUit is the 
tertiary school enrolment level in country i in year t; URBit is the urbanisation level for 
country i in year t; CULi is an array of time-invariant cultural variables; LSYi is an 
array of law dummy variables (Common Law and  Islamic Law); Dt is an array of 
time-invariant dummy variables used to control the effect of time on non-life insurance 
consumption; α is a constant term; β1 to β8 are vectors of coefficients; and it is the 
error term. 
A panel dataset consisting of 36 developed countries and 31 developing countries in 
the period 20002011 is used (Table A3-10 provides the list of these countries). It is 
noted that the Fraser Institute’s economic freedom index was not available yearly 
before 2000. Definitions of variables used in the analysis are presented in Table A3-1, 
and summary statistics and the correlation matrix of the variables can be found in 
Tables A3-2A3-5. 
Dependent variable: Non-life insurance density provided by Sigma (Swiss Re) is 
used as a proxy for non-life insurance expenditure in this chapter.14 Non-life insurance 
density is defined as direct domestic premiums per capita in US dollars. This variable 
is the primary variable of the chapter because it reflects the average amount or 
expenditure that an individual spends on non-life insurance. The main disadvantage of 
this proxy variable, as discussed in Chapter 2, is the aggregation of non-life insurance 
premiums (i.e., aggregating premiums across various lines of non-life insurance 
                                                 
14 Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2000, 2010) introduced a dataset that contains indicators of the 
insurance sector such as private credit, total assets, penetration and density. However, this dataset only 
focuses on life insurance. To the best of my knowledge, there is no comparable dataset in the non-life 
insurance industry. 
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including non-compulsory and compulsory insurance) and heterogeneity across 
countries. Unfortunately, non-life insurance data for each non-life insurance line are 
only available for a few countries.15 For a robustness check, this chapter also examines 
the determinants of non-life insurance expenditure by using non-life insurance density 
adjusted by PPP, which reflects differences in prices between a country and the US, 
and using non-life insurance penetration measured by non-life insurance premiums per 
GDP. 
Independent variables: Per capita GDP (per capita income), the Fraser Institute’s 
economic freedom index, bank development, education, urbanisation, cultural 
variables of Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov (2010) and Minkov (2011) and legal 
systems are selected as independent variables and described in Table A3-1. 
3.3.2.2 Empirical strategy 
Following the literature, this chapter applies panel data analysis because it has many 
advantages. For instance, Cameron and Trivedi (2005) pointed out that panel data are 
repeated measures on individuals (i) over time (t), and using panel data has three major 
advantages. First, using panel data leads to increasing precision estimation as a result 
of combining or pooling several time periods of data for each individual. Second, panel 
data can produce consistent estimates in the fixed-effects model. Third, understanding 
more about the dynamics of individual behaviour is better than from a single cross 
country (Cameron and Trivedi 2005). In addition, this approach reduces collinearity 
and increases the degree of freedom of the tests and the significance of the results (Park 
and Lemaire 2012). To examine both cross-sectional and time-series determinants in 
the regression equation presented above, the following regression models are used. 
First, the pooled OLS estimator is applied for the observations pooled across country 
i and year t. This is followed by the pooled generalised least squares (GLS) estimation, 
which has a special interest in relation to time-series and cross-section observations. It 
is asymptotically more efficient than system OLS because it requires stronger 
assumptions for estimates to be consistent (Wooldridge 2010). The random-effect 
model is then used to examine the sensitivity of the results. While fixed-effect models 
                                                 
15 According to Swiss Re (2014), non-life insurance in their dataset is categorised according to standard 
European Union and OECD conventions. Non-life insurance provided by Swiss Re includes the 
following products: accident, sickness, land vehicles, railway rolling stock, aircraft, ships, goods in 
transit, fire and natural forces, other damage to property, motor vehicle liability, aircraft liability, 
liability for ships, general liability, credit, suretyship, miscellaneous financial loss and legal expenses. 
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cannot be used because of existing time-invariant variables (cultural and dummy 
variables), random-effect models are used to decrease the problem of autocorrelation 
caused by country-specific effects. Finally, IV estimation is applied to address the 
endogeneity caused by omitted variables. 
3.3.2.3 Issue of the endogeneity 
The pooled OLS estimation may lead to biased estimates when explanatory variables 
are related to other explanatory variables and excluded variables. This leads to an 
omitted-variables bias (Angrist and Imbens 1995). In the regression, the economic 
freedom index may be an endogenous variable because it is determined by a number 
of variables and may be correlated with both other explanatory variables and excluded 
ones16. To solve the endogeneity problem, two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimators 
using IVs to account for endogeneity are applied (Angrist and Imbens 1995; 
Wooldridge 2010). The lagged values of the economic freedom index can be used as 
a possible instrument, as lagged values are less likely to be affected by current shocks. 
Alternatively, this chapter attempts to identify some instruments that are appropriate 
for examining the effect of economic freedom on non-life insurance demand by 
applying the following principle: a good instrument should correlate with the key 
independent variable (economic freedom index), but not with the main equation-
dependent variable (non-life insurance density or penetration). 
3.3.2.4 Instruments 
Following previous studies that addressed endogeneity associated with the economic 
freedom index (mostly in studies investigating its effect on economic growth), this 
chapter chooses five groups of instruments (Nelson and Singh 1998; Carlsson and 
Lundström 2002; Rode and Coll 2012). These groups are (i) Group 1, which includes 
the three-year-lagged economic freedom index; (ii) Group 2, which includes the degree 
of political rights and civil freedom, degree of trade openness, Human Development 
Index and life expectancy of a country; (iii) Group 3, which includes the three-year-
lagged economic freedom index, gross capital formation and variables in Group 2; (iv) 
Group 4, which includes gross capital formation and variables in Group 2; and (v) 
Group 5, which includes ratio of credit to government- and state-owned enterprises to 
                                                 
16 I have checked whether non-life insurance expenditure and economic freedom variable are 
cointegrated by applying the panel error-correction–based cointegration tests of Westelund and results 
in Table A3-16 in the appendix show a cointegration. 
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GDP, financial system deposits to GDP, gross capital formation to GDP and variables 
in Group 2. The definitions of IVs are available in Table A3-1. 
3.3.2.5 Specification tests 
This chapter undertakes a number of specification tests in regard to IV regressions. 
First, a DurbinWuHausman test is conducted to check endogeneity (Maddala and 
Lahiri 2009; Wooldridge 2010). This is followed by tests for heteroscedasticity and 
over- and under-identification to check the validity and relevance of instruments. The 
instruments are then checked regardless of whether they are weak by applying the 
weak identification test. One rule of thumb is that in term of a single endogenous 
regressor, the instrument is not weak if a Wald F-statistic of CraggDonald is larger 
than 10 (Staiger and Stock 1997)17. The summary of statistic tests is also provided in 
Table A3-14. 
3.4 Results and discussions 
3.4.1 Statistical tests 
Table 3-1 below provides the findings of the tests for heteroskedasticity, endogeneity, 
over-identification, under-identification and weakness of instruments. The results 
show that the disturbance term is heteroskedastic for all instrument groups, suggesting 
that 2SLS-IV regressions are appropriate (Baum and Schaffer 2007). The 
DurbinWuHausman test (Maddala and Lahiri 2009; Wooldridge 2010) further 
illustrates that the exogeneity hypothesis of Group 3 and Group 5 can be rejected. Both 
of these groups also go through the over- and under-identification tests. Finally, the 
hypothesis of weak instruments can be rejected (Staiger and Stock 1997) for both 
Group 3 and Group 5. However, the three-year-lagged economic freedom index may 
be correlated with non-life insurance expenditure. Therefore, Group 5 is chosen as the 
main instrument group in the analysis. 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 As discussed in subsection 3.3.2.3, single endogenous regressor here is economic freedom variable 
and the first-stage F-statistic is based on the single endogenous regression (Staiger and Stock 1997). 
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Table 3-1. Summary of statistic tests (all sample countries) 
Tests Group 1 
(1 instrument) 
Group 2 
(4 instruments) 
Group 3 
(6 instruments) 
Group 4 
(5 instruments) 
Group 5 
(7 instruments) 
Heteroskedasticity 
test (p-value) 
Disturbance is 
heteroskedastic 
(0.000) 
Disturbance is 
heteroskedastic 
(0.000) 
Disturbance is 
heteroskedastic 
(0.000) 
Disturbance is 
heteroskedastic 
(0.000) 
Disturbance is 
heteroskedastic 
(0.000) 
DurbinWuHausma
n statistic test (p-
value) 
0.1673 0.1673 0.011 0.216 0.002 
Endogeneity test Exogeneity 
cannot be 
rejected 
Exogeneity 
cannot be 
rejected 
Exogeneity is 
rejected 
Exogeneity 
cannot be 
rejected 
Exogeneity is 
rejected 
Under-identification 
test (p-value)  
  0.000  0.000 
Over-identification 
test (p-value) 
  0.000  0.000 
Weakness of 
instruments (1st F) 
  Not weak  
(152.974 >10) 
 Not weak 
(18.88 >10) 
 
Following the literature, the natural logarithm of the non-life insurance density, 
economic freedom index and per capita GDP are used, while other variables are 
retained at their levels. This is because this chapter mainly focuses on the direction of 
the effects of the explanatory variables on the dependent variable; therefore, using a 
logarithm rather than level values on these selected variables allows us to compare the 
findings directly with previous papers. This chapter reports and focuses the discussions 
on IV regressions for all sample countries, developed countries and developing 
countries, which is an addition to the literature. Further, the analysis is conducted based 
on the pooled OLS, OLS with robustness, pooled feasible generalised least squares 
(FGLS), and random-effects GLS regressions to show differences of coefficients 
among those regressions due to the endogeneity.   
3.4.2 Determinants of non-life insurance expenditure in all sample countries  
The findings based on IV regressions in Table 3-2 show that economic freedom, per 
capita income, bank development and urbanisation have a highly positive significant 
effect on non-life insurance expenditure. These results support hypothesis H3-1 and can 
be explained as follows. More economic freedom and higher incomes increase both 
wealth and the value of risky assets, whereas higher urbanisation leads to a greater 
concentration of risks, which induces people to increase their spending on non-life 
insurance. These findings are consistent with previous papers (e.g., Outreville 1990; 
Browne, Chung and Frees 2000; Park, Borde and Choi 2002; Esho et al. 2004; Chui 
and Kwok 2008; Elango and Jones 2011; Park and Lemaire 2012). The positive effect 
of bank development on non-life insurance expenditure highlights the importance of 
the banking sector; as banks are more competitive, people’s valuation of future values 
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increases, which in turn increases the demand for non-life insurance. This finding is 
an addition to the literature (see Table A3-13, which compares the results of this 
chapter with previous studies). However, it should be noted that the results based on 
IV regressions have addressed the endogeneity problem that has been neglected in 
previous studies on the same topic. 
Table 3-2 also provides several interesting (and new) results regarding the cultural 
variables. Notably, power distance has a significant positive effect on non-life 
insurance expenditure, which does not support hypothesis H3-2. An explanation could 
be that compulsory insurance in many countries requires employers to pay for the 
insurance for their employees despite the distance between managers and employees.18 
In contrast, as expected, masculinity has a significant negative effect on non-life 
insurance expenditure. In high masculine countries, Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov 
(2010) postulated that while men focus on their material success, such as career and 
business, women focus on taking care of their family and, therefore, the family unit 
may spend less on non-life insurance expenditure given limited incomes and specific 
gender roles.19 Long-term orientationthe new cultural variable of Hofstede, 
Hofstede and Minkov (2010)has a significant negative effect on non-life insurance 
expenditure, thereby supporting hypothesis H3-2. In societies with high long-term 
orientation, people have an optimistic outlook towards the future and hence may lower 
their spending on short-term non-life insurance products.20 However, other remaining 
cultural variables are insignificant in explaining non-life insurance expenditure. 
Finally, the results regarding law system variables in Table 3-2 reveal that Islamic Law 
has a highly significant negative effect on non-life insurance expenditure, while the 
effect of Common Law is insignificant. The negative effect of Islamic Law on non-
life insurance expenditure supports hypothesis H3-4. This may be because non-life 
insurers in Islamic countries must follow Islamic principles in providing financial 
services: no depreciation of property value, no deductibles and no coinsurance (Kwon 
                                                 
18 In some countries (such as the US), it is also a custom that employers provide employees and their 
family with health insurance assistance (Liu and Jin 2015). 
19 In the sample countries of this chapter, non-life insurance expenditure in some countries with a high 
masculinity index was lower than that of countries with a low masculinity index. For example, in 2011 
Slovakia’s masculinity index was 7.9 times higher than that of the Netherlands; however, the 
Netherlands’ non-life insurance expenditure was 16.8 times higher than that of Slovakia. 
20 In the life insurance sector, Park and Lemaire (2011) found that long-term orientation has a highly 
significant positive effect on demand for life insurance. 
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2007).21 Such principles affect people’s perceptions of risks and future values and 
lower the demand for non-life insurance (Ward and Zurbruegg 2002). This result is 
consistent with the finding of Park and Lemaire (2012). However, it should be noted 
that education has a positive but insignificant effect on non-life insurance expenditure. 
This surprising result (and some other results) might be driven by the heterogeneity 
among countries in the sample, which is discussed in what follows. 
Table 3-2. Determinants of non-life insurance expenditure in all sample countries 
Notes: *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Numbers in 
parentheses show asymptotic standard errors. Constant and year-fixed effects are included but not 
reported here. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, categories of the summary index of economic 
freedom that affect non-life insurance expenditure are size of government (SOG), 
property rights and legal system (PRI), sound money (SMO), freedom to trade 
                                                 
21 Schlesinger (1981) stated that a deductible policy of insurance would be the optimal contract of any 
type. Further, Mossin (1968) claimed that the price of insurance depends on the deductible amount 
chosen. A policy without a deductible will have a higher price than one with a deductible.  
 Pooled 
OLS  
(1) 
Pooled OLS  
(Robustness) 
(2) 
Pooled 
FGLS  
(3) 
Random-
effects GLS  
(4) 
IV  
 
(5) 
lnEFI 0.941*** 
(0.264) 
0.766***  
(0.273) 
0.941*** 
(0.257) 
2.064*** 
(0.197) 
3.990***  
(0.603) 
lnINC 1.200*** 
(0.042) 
1.237***  
(0.043) 
1.200*** 
(0.041) 
1.395*** 
(0.075) 
1.034***  
(0.055) 
BDV 0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.003***  
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.000) 
0.003***  
(0.001) 
EDU 0.002  
(0.001) 
0.002  
(0.001) 
0.002  
(0.001) 
0.003**  
(0.001) 
0.003  
(0.002) 
URB 0.004** 
(0.002) 
0.002  
(0.002) 
0.004**  
(0.002) 
0.0001  
(0.004) 
0.005**  
(0.002) 
IND -0.094  
(0.160) 
-0.125  
(0.165) 
-0.094  
(0.156) 
-0.623  
(0.456) 
-0.025  
(0.202) 
IDV 0.003  
(0.137) 
-0.097  
(0.141) 
0.003  
(0.133) 
-0.472  
(0.414) 
-0.118  
(0.166) 
LTO -0.245** 
(0.109) 
-0.233**  
(0.112) 
-0.245**  
(0.106) 
-0.478  
(0.353) 
-0.350***  
(0.128) 
MAS -0.287*** 
(0.088) 
-0.204**  
(0.091) 
-0.287*** 
(0.086) 
-0.090  
(0.293) 
-0.266***  
(0.107) 
UAI 0.021  
(0.121) 
0.119  
(0.125) 
0.021  
(0.117) 
-0.220  
(0.385) 
-0.062  
(0.142) 
PDI 0.300** 
(0.136) 
0.201  
(0.141) 
0.300**  
(0.132) 
0.744*  
(0.432) 
0.715***  
(0.172) 
HPM 0.024  
(0.022) 
0.030  
(0.023) 
0.024  
(0.021) 
0.088  
(0.068) 
-0.037  
(0.031) 
ISL -0.315*** 
(0.107) 
-0.247***  
(0.111) 
-0.315*** 
(0.105) 
-0.462  
(0.348) 
-0.557***  
(0.131) 
CML 0.112* 
(0.063) 
0.166***  
(0.065) 
0.112*  
(0.061) 
0.083  
(0.195) 
-0.024  
(0.079) 
Obs. 504 504 504 504 488 
R-squared 0.957 0.954 0.957 0.949 0.944 
Adjusted R-squared 0.955 0.952 0.955 0.946 0.941 
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internationally (FTT) and regulation (REG). To check the effects of these categories 
separately on non-life insurance expenditure, the chapter considers them separately in 
IV regressions. The results in Table 3-3, as per columns (1), (2), (3) and (5), suggest 
that SOG, PRI, SMO and REG have a significantly positive effect on non-life 
insurance expenditure. These findings support the positive effect of the summary index 
of economic freedom on non-life insurance expenditure in column (6). 
Table 3-3. Determinants of non-life insurance expenditure in all sample countries 
(categories of economic freedom index, IV) 
Notes: *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Numbers in 
parentheses show asymptotic standard errors. Constant and year-fixed effects are included but not 
reported here. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
LnSOG 0.291** 
(0.149 
     
LnPRL  1.942*** 
(0.347) 
    
LnSMO   1.666*** 
(0.320) 
   
LnFTT    0.012 
(0.368) 
  
LnREG     2.624*** 
(0.352) 
 
LnEFI      3.990***  
(0.603) 
LnINC 1.268*** 
(0.043) 
0.949*** 
(0.065) 
1.155*** 
(0.048) 
1.247*** 
(0.052) 
1.080*** 
(0.046) 
1.034***  
(0.055) 
BDV 0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.003***  
(0.001) 
EDU 0.001 
(0.002) 
0.009*** 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.005*** 
(0.002) 
0.003  
(0.002) 
URB 0.004* 
(0.002) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.006*** 
(0.002) 
0.004** 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.005**  
(0.002) 
IND -0.118 
(0.189) 
0.169 
(0.205) 
-0.023 
(0.200) 
-0.122 
(0.183) 
-0.028 
(0.170) 
-0.025  
(0.202) 
IDV 0.105 
(0.141) 
-0.517*** 
(0.182) 
0.024 
(0.150) 
0.054 
(0.130) 
0.068 
(0.137) 
-0.118  
(0.166) 
LTO -0.173 
(0.118) 
-0.304*** 
(0.101) 
-0.122 
(0.139) 
-0.185 
(0.119) 
-0.531*** 
(0.125) 
-0.350***  
(0.128) 
MAS -0.302*** 
(0.101) 
0.311*** 
(0.122) 
-0.484 
(0.110) 
-0.272*** 
(0.095) 
-0.309*** 
(0.091) 
-0.266***  
(0.107) 
UAI -0.082 
(0.146) 
0.015 
(0.145) 
0.103 
(0.143) 
0.016 
(0.132) 
0.209* 
(0.118) 
-0.062  
(0.142) 
PDI 0.192* 
(0.118) 
0.583*** 
(0.120) 
0.473*** 
(0.152) 
0.175 
(0.116) 
0.421*** 
(0.130) 
0.715***  
(0.172) 
HPM 0.037 
(0.024) 
0.130*** 
(0.025) 
-0.006 
(0.028) 
0.050** 
(0.024) 
-0.038 
(0.025) 
-0.037  
(0.031) 
ISL -0.295*** 
(0.097) 
-0.361*** 
(0.079) 
-0.343*** 
(0.105) 
-0.271*** 
(0.085) 
-0.586*** 
(0.092) 
-0.557***  
(0.131) 
CML 0.106 
(0.078) 
-0.096 
(0.085) 
0.359*** 
(0.073) 
0.181*** 
(0.061) 
-0.117* 
(0.071) 
-0.024  
(0.079) 
Obs. 488 488 488 488 488 488 
R-squared 0.954 0.946 0.949 0.956 0.960 0.944 
Adjusted R2 0.951 0.943 0.946 0.953 0.958 0.941 
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Following Park and Lemaire (2012), for a robustness check, the chapter replaces non-
life insurance density by penetration and density adjusted by PPP. The results in 
columns (1b), (2b) and (3b) in Table 3-4 indicate that most of the coefficient estimates 
are robust. The adjusted R-square based on the regressions that contain penetration and 
the PPP factor are lower than that containing the density of non-life insurance. This 
implies that using non-life insurance density as a main proxy for non-life insurance 
expenditure is preferable (while also being consistent with previous papers). 
Table 3-4. Determinants of non-life insurance expenditure in all sample countries 
(using various measurements) 
Notes: *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Numbers in 
parentheses show asymptotic standard errors. Constant and year-fixed effects are included but not 
reported here. 
Together with a number of cultural variables and Common Law, education does not 
explain non-life insurance expenditure. A natural question arises in this context: Does 
heterogeneity between the two groups of countries play a role in the model? That is, 
 Density (Premiums per 
capita) 
Density (Premiums per 
capita at PPP) 
Penetration (Premiums per 
GDP) 
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) 
lnEFI 0.941*** 
(0.264) 
3.990*** 
(0.603) 
-0.122 
(0.266) 
3.496*** 
(0.613) 
0.293 
(0.250) 
3.482*** 
(0.542) 
lnINC 1.200*** 
(0.042) 
1.034*** 
(0.055) 
0.967*** 
(0.042) 
0.771*** 
(0.057) 
0.298*** 
(0.039) 
0.126** 
(0.052) 
BDV 0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
EDU 0.002 
(0.001) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.0002 
(0.001) 
0.004 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
URB 0.004** 
(0.002) 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
0.003** 
(0.002) 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.004 
(0.002) 
(P-value=0.110) 
IND -0.094 
(0.160) 
-0.025 
(0.202) 
-0.376** 
(0.161) 
-0.296 
(0.203) 
-0.197 
(0.151) 
-0.122 
(0.197) 
IDV 0.003 
(0.137) 
-0.118 
(0.166) 
-0.003 
(0.138) 
-0.148 
(0.186) 
0.102 
(0.129) 
-0.030 
(0.165 
LTO -0.245** 
(0.109) 
-0.350*** 
(0.128) 
-0.041 
(0.110) 
-0.156 
(0.131) 
-0.153 
(0.103) 
-0.266** 
(0.124) 
MAS -0.287*** 
(0.088) 
-0.266*** 
(0.107) 
-0.399*** 
(0.089) 
-0.366*** 
(0.116) 
-0.250*** 
(0.083) 
-0.229** 
(0.107) 
UAI 0.021 
(0.121) 
-0.062 
(0.142) 
0.158 
(0.122) 
0.055 
(0.144) 
0.063 
(0.114) 
0.024 
(0.137) 
PDI 0.300** 
(0.136) 
0.715*** 
(0.172) 
0.321** 
(0.137) 
0.814*** 
(0.184) 
0.301** 
(0.129) 
0.734*** 
(0.163) 
HPM 0.024 
(0.022) 
-0.037 
(0.031) 
0.047** 
(0.022) 
-0.025 
(0.031) 
0.045** 
(0.021) 
-0.019 
(0.029) 
ISL -0.315*** 
(0.107) 
-0.557*** 
(0.131) 
-0.120 
(0.109) 
-0.412*** 
(0.145) 
-0.344*** 
(0.102) 
-0.593*** 
(0.121) 
CML 0.112* 
(0.063) 
-0.024 
(0.079) 
0.348*** 
(0.064) 
0.197*** 
(0.086) 
0.173*** 
(0.060) 
0.027 
(0.074) 
Obs. 504 488 504 488 504 488 
R-squared 0.957 0.944 0.917 0.885 0.674 0.558 
Adjusted R2 0.955 0.941 0.913 0.879 0.657 0.534 
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to what degree do the variables in question explain non-life insurance expenditure in 
developed countries and developing countries? The next section explores this 
question.  
3.4.3 Determinants of non-life insurance expenditure in developed countries 
This section analyses the results for developed countries only.22 As shown in Table 3-
5, based on the system GMM estimator, economic freedom, per capita income, bank 
development, education, urbanisation, individualism, masculinity, power distance and 
hypometropia are the drivers of non-life insurance expenditure for this sample. The 
significantly positive coefficients of economic freedom and per capita income 
variables support hypothesis H3-1 and are consistent with the case of all sample 
countries. These results again emphasise that higher economic freedom may increase 
non-life insurance expenditure through channels such as investment and regulation of 
business and trade barriers. However, the significant negative effects of bank 
development, education and urbanisation on non-life insurance expenditure do not 
support hypothesis H3-1. The level of bank development, education and urbanisation 
in developed countries might have already been matured. Therefore, wealthier and 
more educated people may want to handle risks themselves rather than rely on non-
life insurance companies. For instance, Kohara (2001) showed that individuals living 
in urban areas suffer less from loss-of-income risks than rural residents; thus, 
expenditure for related non-life insurance products, such as optional packages against 
income loss of an insurance product, may decrease over time in developed regions (see 
also Outreville 1990; Browne, Chung and Frees 2000).  
Other interesting findings from Table 3-5 are those concerning the positive effect of 
power distance and the negative effect of hypometropia on non-life insurance 
expenditure. The positive effect of power distance is consistent with results for all 
sample countries and was explained earlier. Additionally, Hofstede (1983, 2001, 2006) 
stated that in high power distance countries, the degree of centralisation of authority 
and autocratic leadership, as well as the amount of inequality between a superior and 
a subordinate in wealth and power, may grow over time. That is, dependence of 
subordinates on their superiors in low power distance countries is less than in high-
                                                 
22 Similar to the case of all sample countries, this chapter uses non-life insurance density adjusted by 
PPP factor and penetration to replace non-life insurance density measured by premiums per capita for 
the robustness check. The results are displayed in Table A3-8.  
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power distance countries and subordinates may not expect their superiors to provide 
more protection to take care of their families. As a result, buying non-life insurance 
policies to protect dependants is relevant for subordinates in low-power distance 
countries.23 For Minkov’s (2011) new cultural variables, the negative effect of 
hypometropia does not support hypothesis H3-3, and this may be because people in 
developed countries may feel more secure than in developing countries. Hence, they 
may not consider hypometropia as important while deciding the amount to spend on 
non-life insurance.24 
Table 3-5. Determinants of non-life insurance expenditure in developed countries 
Notes: *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Numbers in 
parentheses show asymptotic standard errors. Constant and year-fixed effects are included but not 
reported here.  
                                                 
23 In the sample countries in this chapter, non-life insurance expenditure in some developed countries 
with low power distance indexes, such as Austria and Australia, was several times higher than that of 
developing countries with high power distance indexes, such as China and Vietnam. For example, 
Austria has a power distance index that was seven times lower than that of China, but Austria’s non-life 
insurance expenditure was 24.5 times higher than that of China in 2011. 
24 The mean of the individualism index of developed countries is 0.60 while that of developing countries 
is 0.27. The mean of the hypometropia index of developed countries is 1.20, while that of developing 
countries is 2.92. 
 Pooled 
OLS  
(1) 
Pooled OLS 
(Robustness) 
(2) 
Pooled 
FGLS  
(3) 
Random-
effects GLS  
(4) 
IV 
 
(5) 
lnEFI 1.799*** 
(0.596) 
1.485*** 
(0.497) 
1.799*** 
(0.571) 
0.661* 
(0.355) 
12.750*** 
(2.686) 
lnINC 1.171*** 
(0.064) 
1.136*** 
(0.053) 
1.171*** 
(0.061) 
1.420*** 
(0.124) 
0.803***  
(0.124) 
BDV 0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001  
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001** 
(0.001) 
-0.003**  
(0.001) 
EDU -0.002 
(0.002) 
0.005*** 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
0.002  
(0.002) 
-0.005*  
(0.003) 
URB -0.009*** 
(0.003) 
-0.016*** 
(0.002) 
-0.009*** 
(0.003) 
-0.009 
(0.006) 
-0.015***  
(0.004) 
IND 0.807*** 
(0.223) 
1.379*** 
(0.186) 
0.807*** 
(0.213) 
0.312 
(0.618) 
0.312  
(0.352) 
IDV 0.515***  
(0.192) 
0.472*** 
(0.160) 
0.515*** 
(0.184) 
0.612 
(0.550) 
1.126***  
(0.307) 
LTO 0.553*** 
(0.171) 
0.624*** 
(0.142) 
0.553*** 
(0.163) 
0.728  
(0.476) 
-0.386  
(0.367) 
MAS -0.684*** 
(0.123) 
-0.338*** 
(0.103) 
-0.684*** 
(0.118) 
-0.473 
(0.336) 
-1.227***  
(0.212) 
UAI 0.429*** 
(0.169) 
1.185*** 
(0.141) 
0.429*** 
(0.162) 
0.599 
(0.498) 
0.162  
(0.261) 
PDI 0.445*** 
(0.142) 
0.339*** 
(0.119) 
0.445*** 
(0.136) 
0.548 
(0.454) 
0.734***  
(0.216) 
HPM -0.139* 
(0.078) 
-0.057  
(0.065) 
-0.139* 
(0.075) 
0.014 
(0.208) 
-0.988***  
(0.225) 
ISL      
CML 0.366*** 
(0.105) 
0.416*** 
(0.088) 
0.366*** 
(0.101) 
0.461* 
(0.274) 
-0.317  
(0.253) 
Obs 309 309 309 309 293 
R-squared 0.897 0.924 0.897 0.886 0.772 
Adjusted R-squared 0.888 0.917 0.888 0.876 0.751 
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3.4.4 Determinants of non-life insurance expenditure in developing countries 
A similar analysis to the one conducted for all sample countries and developed 
countries is undertaken to investigate the determinants of non-life insurance 
expenditure in developing countries.25 As reported in Table 3-6, economic freedom, 
per capita income, bank development, education, urbanisation and hypometropia show 
a significant positive effect, whereas indulgence, long-term orientation, uncertainty 
avoidance and Islamic Law show a significant negative effect. Except for uncertainty 
avoidance, these are all consistent with hypotheses H3-1, H3-2, H3-3, H3-4 and previous 
studies, such as those by Outreville (1990), Esho et al. (2004) and Park and Lemaire 
(2012). The positive effect of urbanisation is in sharp contrast to that for developed 
countries. According to Swiss Re (2013), in 2011, about 74% of the world’s urban 
population lived in emerging markets such as China and India. Of these, about 87% 
lived in coastal megacities, which are exposed to multi-natural catastrophes and risks 
to human life. One therefore might expect a high level of spending on non-life 
insurance products in developing countries following the urbanisation process. 
Compared with the findings for all sample countries and developed countries, it is 
noted that the effects of hypometropia and uncertainty avoidance on non-life insurance 
expenditure in developing countries deserve some discussion. The positive coefficient 
on hypometropia for this group is consistent with hypothesis H3-3 and suggests that 
non-life insurance expenditure in countries with high violence is higher than that in 
other countries, holding other factors constant. Berger and Messer (2002) also found 
that higher insurance coverage may lead to reduced mortality rates. The negative 
coefficient on uncertainty avoidance does not support hypothesis H3-2. A possible 
explanation is that people in developing countries may be more willing to accept the 
risk and may not choose non-life insurance policies. For instance, Shaw (2006) argued 
that people in developing countries often think about positive, rather than negative, 
aspects of floodsfor example, floods bring fish and new fertile soil for agriculture. 
Local government and social workers in developing countries often help people 
control floods with community work such as building dykes and floodwalls and 
modifying river channels. Therefore, the notion of ‘living with the flood’ or ‘coping 
with the flood’ may be present among the local people and communities. Another 
                                                 
25   Similar to the cases of all sample countries and developed countries, this chapter also uses non-life 
insurance density adjusted by the PPP factor and penetration to replace non-life insurance density 
measured by premiums per capita for the robustness check. The findings are presented in Table A3-9. 
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potential reason is that individuals in developing countries are often affected by a 
shortage of risk-sharing mechanisms and effective insurance instruments (Jung and 
Tran 2012). 
Table 3-6. Determinants of non-life insurance expenditure in developing countries 
Notes: *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Numbers in 
parentheses show asymptotic standard errors. Constant and year-fixed effects are included but not 
reported here.  
Table 3-7 summarises the results of the determinants of non-life insurance expenditure 
in all sample countries, developed countries and developing countries. Overall, the 
results provide important insights into the determinants of non-life insurance 
expenditure across countries. The findings in Table 3-7 indicate that per capita income 
and economic freedom have a significantly positive effect on non-life insurance 
expenditure, while the effects of other determinants vary significantly among these 
groups due to their heterogeneity. 
 
 Pooled   
OLS  
(1) 
Pooled OLS 
(Robustness) 
(2) 
Pooled 
FGLS  
(3) 
Random-
effects GLS  
(4) 
IV                                            
 
(5) 
lnEFI 1.753*** 
(0.291) 
1.196*** 
(0.156) 
1.753*** 
(0.271) 
1.753*** 
(0.291) 
1.390***  
(0.492) 
lnINC 1.764*** 
(0.092) 
1.969*** 
(0.049) 
1.764*** 
(0.085) 
1.764*** 
(0.092) 
1.741***  
(0.073) 
BDV 0.007*** 
(0.001) 
0.008*** 
(0.001) 
0.007*** 
(0.001) 
0.007*** 
(0.001) 
0.007***  
(0.001) 
EDU 0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.012*** 
(0.001) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.007***  
(0.003) 
URB 0.009*** 
(0.002) 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.009*** 
(0.002) 
0.009*** 
(0.002) 
0.009***  
(0.002) 
IND -2.085*** 
(0.282) 
-1.701*** 
(0.151) 
-2.085*** 
(0.263) 
-2.085*** 
(0.282) 
-1.981***  
(0.206) 
IDV 0.045 
(0.245) 
0.805*** 
(0.131) 
0.045 
(0.228) 
0.045 
(0.245) 
0.070  
(0.294) 
LTO -1.824*** 
(0.228) 
-3.310*** 
(0.122) 
-1.824*** 
(0.213) 
-1.824*** 
(0.228) 
-1.795***  
(0.304) 
MAS -0.290 
(0.395) 
-2.553*** 
(0.211) 
-0.290 
(0.368) 
-0.290 
(0.395) 
-0.447  
(0.393) 
UAI -2.636*** 
(0.488) 
-4.976*** 
(0.260) 
-2.636*** 
(0.454) 
-2.636*** 
(0.488) 
-2.546***  
(0.639) 
PDI 0.298 
(0.310) 
2.789*** 
(0.166) 
0.298 
(0.289) 
0.298 
(0.310) 
0.255  
(0.380) 
HPM 0.281*** 
(0.030) 
0.368*** 
(0.016) 
0.281*** 
(0.028) 
0.281*** 
(0.030) 
0.274***  
(0.026) 
ISL -1.168*** 
(0.179) 
-2.253*** 
(0.096) 
-1.168*** 
(0.167) 
-1.168*** 
(0.179) 
-1.103***  
(0.254) 
CML -0.101 
(0.097) 
-0.605*** 
(0.052) 
-0.101 
(0.090) 
-0.101 
(0.097) 
-0.111  
(0.107) 
Obs 195 195 195 195 195 
R-squared 0.956 0.988 0.956 0.956 0.955 
Adjusted R-squared 0.949 0.986 0.949 0.949 0.948 
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Table 3-7. Summary of results of the determinants of non-life insurance expenditure 
(IV) 
Notes: *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Numbers in 
parentheses show asymptotic standard errors. Constant and year-fixed effects are included but not 
reported here.  
3.4.5 Determinants of non-life insurance expenditure during the Global Financial 
Crisis 
Finally, this chapter investigates how the GFC has changed the ways in which socio-
economic factors of interest affect non-life insurance expenditure. To this end, the 
chapter divides the data into sub-periods before the GFC (20002006) and during the 
GFC (20072011) and conducts an IV analysis for all sample countries, developed 
countries and developing countries. Tables A3-10A3-12 in the Appendix show the 
respective regression results for these groups, and Table 3-8 summarises the results. 
Table 3-8 shows that the positive effects of economic freedom and per capita income 
for the three groups of countries across the two sub-periods are consistent with 
 All sample 
countries 
Developed 
countries 
Developing 
countries 
lnEFI 3.482*** 
(0.542) 
12.750***  
(2.686) 
1.390***  
(0.492) 
lnINC 0.126** 
(0.052) 
0.803***  
(0.124) 
1.741***  
(0.073) 
BDV 0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003**  
(0.001) 
0.007***  
(0.001) 
EDU 0.002  
(0.002) 
-0.005*  
(0.003) 
0.007***  
(0.003) 
URB 0.004  
(0.002)  
(P-value=0.110) 
-0.015***  
(0.004) 
0.009***  
(0.002) 
IND -0.122  
(0.197) 
0.312  
(0.352) 
-1.981***  
(0.206) 
IDV -0.030 
(0.165 
1.126***  
(0.307) 
0.070  
(0.294) 
LTO -0.266** 
(0.124) 
-0.386  
(0.367) 
-1.795***  
(0.304) 
MAS -0.229** 
(0.107) 
-1.227***  
(0.212) 
-0.447  
(0.393) 
UAI 0.024 
(0.137) 
0.162  
(0.261) 
-2.546***  
(0.639) 
PDI 0.734*** 
(0.163) 
0.734***  
(0.216) 
0.255  
(0.380) 
HPM -0.019 
(0.029) 
-0.988***  
(0.225) 
0.274***  
(0.026) 
ISL -0.593*** 
(0.121) 
 -1.103***  
(0.254) 
CML 0.027 
(0.074) 
-0.317  
(0.253) 
-0.111  
(0.107) 
Obs 488 293 195 
R-squared 0.558 0.772 0.955 
Adjusted R-squared 0.534 0.751 0.948 
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hypothesis H3-1. The results indicate that these factors are not affected by the GFC, and 
non-life insurance policies are still chosen as a safe solution to avoid risks during the 
GFC. Further, urbanisation, indulgence, long-term orientation and Islamic Law in 
developing countries have consistent estimates with hypotheses H3-1, H3-2 H3-3 and H3-
4 across the two sub-periods, whereas higher education in developing countries 
increases non-life insurance expenditure before the GFC but decreases it thereafter. 
Additionally, results at the aggregate level (all sample countries) tend to be driven by 
the results of developed countriesin particular, the effects of bank development, 
education, urbanisation and long-term orientation. This is not surprising, as the GFC 
has affected developed countries much more than developing countries. For instance, 
Naude (2009) pointed out that the US and European Union member countries 
experienced the most substantial economic slowdown during the GFC. 
Table 3-8. Determinants of non-life insurance expenditure before and during the GFC 
(IV) 
 
 
All sample countries 
(1) 
Developed countries 
(2) 
Developing countries  
(3) 
20002006 20072011  20002006 20072011  20002006 20072011  
lnEFI 3.709*** 
(0.706) 
2.417*** 
(0.769) 
15.782*** 
(4.720) 
16.670*** 
(4.257) 
2.433*** 
(0.458) 
1.147* 
(0.608) 
lnINC 1.036*** 
(0.056) 
1.251*** 
(0.104) 
0.700*** 
(0.181) 
1.290*** 
(0.157) 
2.032*** 
(0.115) 
1.446*** 
(0.114) 
BDV 0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.002*  
(0.001) 
-0.010** 
(0.004) 
-0.003** 
(0.002) 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.012*** 
(0.002) 
EDU 0.002  
(0.002) 
0.001  
(0.003) 
-0.017*** 
(0.006) 
0.004  
(0.005) 
0.011*** 
(0.003) 
-0.006** 
(0.003) 
URB 0.008*** 
(0.003) 
0.001  
(0.003) 
0.006 
(0.007) 
-0.042*** 
(0.009) 
0.010*** 
(0.003) 
0.012*** 
(0.002) 
IND -0.106 
(0.247) 
-0.162  
(0.324) 
0.458 
(0.431) 
-0.827 
(0.674) 
-2.725*** 
(0.380) 
-1.963*** 
(0.313) 
IDV -0.129 
(0.203) 
-0.123  
(0.263) 
0.081 
(0.374) 
2.702*** 
(0.654) 
0.234 
(0.289) 
-1.451*** 
(0.318) 
LTO -0.421*** 
(0.155) 
0.231  
(0.191) 
-1.141* 
(0.628) 
-0.268 
(0.505) 
-2.100*** 
(0.277) 
-1.274*** 
(0.236) 
MAS -0.132 
(0.122) 
-0.690*** 
(0.170) 
-0.980 
(0.265) 
-2.199*** 
(0.402) 
-0.076 
(0.503) 
-0.285 
(0.393) 
UAI -0.046 
(0.168) 
-0.221  
(0.230) 
-0.419 
(0.393) 
1.100** 
(0.465) 
-4.039*** 
(0.624) 
0.135 
(0.514) 
PDI 0.758*** 
(0.235) 
0.378*  
(0.205) 
0.959*** 
(0.311) 
0.351  
(0.302) 
0.050 
(0.367) 
1.134*** 
(0.349) 
HPM -0.033 
(0.040) 
-0.002  
(0.039) 
-1.218*** 
(0.385) 
-1.315*** 
(0.337) 
0.353*** 
(0.039) 
0.205*** 
(0.028) 
ISL -0.628*** 
(0.161) 
-0.326*  
(0.194) 
  -1.478*** 
(0.229) 
-0.830*** 
(0.203) 
CML 0.029  
(0.086) 
-0.008  
(0.134) 
-0.782* 
(0.475) 
-0.258 
(0.318) 
-0.149 
(0.114) 
0.195* 
(0.121) 
Obs. 310 178 188 105 122 73 
R-squared 0.949 0.979 0.767 0.714 0.950 0.980 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.946 0.943 0.741 0.659 0.940 0.973 
CHAPTER THREE 
48 
 
Notes: *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Numbers in 
parentheses show asymptotic standard errors. Constant and year-fixed effects are included but not 
reported here.  
 
In summary, the results in this section have shown that economic freedom, income, 
bank development, urbanisation and a number of cultural and law factors explain 
changes in non-life insurance expenditure. However, the effects vary significantly 
between developed and developing countries, especially in the presence of the GFC. 
3.4.6 Implications 
Some of the findings emerging from this chapter have important implications for both 
governments and multinational non-life insurance companies. The results make it clear 
that in developing countries, a higher level of bank development, education and 
urbanisation is conducive to higher demand for non-life insurance products. Hence, 
multinational non-life insurance companies should consider these factors if they want 
to expand the market for their products in developing countries. This is especially 
relevant given that the market for non-life insurance products has entered a mature 
stage in many developed countries. Among other things, multinational companies may 
increase their sales of non-life insurance policies through banks’ bancassurance 
departments by selling their products to existing bank customers. Additionally, 
multinational non-life insurance companies should examine the cultural factors of 
potential marketsin particular, indulgence, long-term orientation, uncertainty 
avoidance and hypometropiaas these may greatly influence their sales outcomes and 
profitability. 
For governments around the world, the first important policy implication of this 
analysis refers to the regulation of law, trade and commerce. The positive effect of 
economic freedom on non-life insurance expenditure in both developed and 
developing countries illustrates that policies that support improvements in the 
economic freedom index (e.g., low tariffs, high effective enforcement of the law and 
security of property rights, and high personal choice) will promote non-life insurance 
expenditure. The second policy implication is related to urbanisation policies in 
developing countries. Given that urbanisation not only enhances economic growth by 
increasing productivity, income and employment, but also affects the risk landscape, 
governments in developing countries should encourage the development of the non-
life insurance sector to handle risks. Finally, governments in both developed and 
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developing countries should assist in the development of the non-life insurance sector 
with policies that enhance income, bank development, education and cultural 
advantageous characteristics. Such policies will help sustain the development of the 
sector in the long term. 
In summary, this chapter has identified important socio-economic factors that affect 
non-life insurance expenditure across countries. It has also compared the results 
between developed countries and developing countries both before and during the 
GFC sub-periods. This analysis has provided a better understanding of the 
determinants of non-life insurance expenditure, and it has generated recommendations 
that may be useful for governments and multinational non-life insurance companies in 
developing the non-life insurance sector. 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has contributed to the existing literature by developing a simple 
theoretical model that incorporates socio-economic factors as determinants of non-life 
insurance expenditure, thereby producing a number of testable hypotheses. The 
hypotheses were tested in a panel dataset covering 36 developed and 31 developing 
countries in the period 20002011. A comprehensive empirical analysis of the 
determinants of non-life insurance expenditure using IV model has been adopted to 
resolve the endogeneity problem associated with the economic freedom indexan 
issue that has been neglected in previous studies on the same topic. 
This chapter has shown that economic freedom, income, bank development, 
urbanisation, long-term orientation, masculinity, power distance and Islamic Law are 
the key drivers of non-life insurance expenditure. However, the effects of these factors 
vary significantly between developed and developing countries, suggesting that the 
heterogeneity among countries plays an important role in terms of the level of 
development. Further, the results of this study are robust to two alternative measures 
of non-life insurance expenditurenamely, non-life insurance penetration and density 
adjusted by PPP. 
This chapter has also captured the effect of the GFC by disaggregating the data into 
two sub-periods: before the crisis and during the crisis. It has been shown that a number 
of factors emerge (e.g., urbanisation, masculinity in developed countries and power 
distance in developing countries), while other factors (e.g., education in developed 
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countries and uncertainty avoidance in developing countries) disappear as significant 
drivers of non-life insurance expenditure during the GFC. At the aggregate level, the 
effects of various socio-economic factors on non-life insurance expenditure in 
developed countries tend to overshadow those in developing countries during the GFC, 
thereby strengthening the widely held view in the economics literature that the GFC 
has affected developed countries more than developing countries. 
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Appendix 
Table A3-1. Definitions and sources of data 
Variable Hypothesis Description Abbreviation Sources of data 
Density of non-life insurance  Log of direct domestic premiums per capita, US$. lnINS Sigma (Swiss Re, 
2014) 
Density of non-life insurance 
adjusted by PPP factor 
 Log of the non-life insurance density adjusted by purchasing power parity (PPP) factors lnINS Sigma (Swiss Re, 
2014), IMF 
(2014) 
Penetration of non-life 
insurance 
 Log of direct domestic premiums per GDP (%) lnINS Sigma (Swiss Re, 
2014) 
Economic freedom index + It is a chain-linked index of the Fraser Institute, calculated based on 5 areas: (1) size of government, (2) legal system and property rights, (3) access 
to sound money, (4) freedom to trade internationally, and (5) regulation. The index ranges from 0 to 100 with higher values indicating more freedom. 
lnEFI Fraser Institute 
(2014) 
Size of government + It includes four components which are used to measure degree to which a country relies on personal choice and markets rather than government 
budgets and political decision-making.  
lnSOG 
Legal structure and security of 
property rights 
+ It is used to measure the degree of effective enforcement of the law, security of property rights and an independent and unbiased judiciary in a 
country. 
lnPRL 
Access to sound money + It is to measure the degree of the inflation as well as regulations regarding the ability of using alternative currencies lnSMO 
Freedom to trade 
internationally 
+ It is designed to measure a wide variety of restraints that influence international exchange: tariffs, quotas, hidden administrative restraints, and 
controls on exchange rates and capital. 
lnFTT 
Regulation + It is to measure the degree of the freedom of exchange in credit, labour and product market. lnREG 
Income per capita + Log of GDP per capita, US$. lnINC World bank 
(2014a) Bank development + Deposit money banks' assets to GDP (%). BDV 
Education + School enrolment, tertiary (% gross). EDU 
Urbanisation + Urban population (% of total). URB 
Indulgence - A society in which people have the right to enjoy life and have fun. It is an index ranging from 0 to 100, with higher values indicating more happiness, 
leisure and enjoying life. 
IND Hofstede, 
Hofstede and 
Minkov (2010) 
and Minkov 
(2011) 
Individualism + A society in which the attachment between individuals is loose. It is an index ranging from 0 to 100, with higher values indicating a lower level of 
developing human relationships. 
IDV 
Long-term orientation - A positive, dynamic and future oriented culture linked with four ‘positive’ Confucian values. It is an index ranging from 0 to 100, with higher values 
indicating more national pride, preservation of family values and traditions, and saving. 
LTO 
Masculinity - A society in which social gender roles are clearly distinct. In these societies, men focus on their material success, such as career and business, whereas 
women focus on improvement the quality of their family. It is an index ranging from 0 to 100, with higher values indicating more masculinity. 
MAS 
Uncertainty avoidance + A society in which people feel threatened by uncertain situations and they want to avoid these matters. It is an index ranging from 0 to 100, with 
higher values indicating more uncertainty avoidance. 
UAI 
Power distance - Measures the interpersonal power or influence between the boss and subordinates and/or the degree of inequality among people in a society. It is an 
index ranging from 0 to 100, with higher values indicating more inequality, power distance. 
PDI 
Hypometropia + A society that has high national murder rates and acceptance of mortal risks. It is an index ranging from 0 to 1000, with higher values indicating 
more serious violence and higher murder rates. 
HPM 
Islam Law - Dummy variables with value =1 for countries with an Islam Law (Islam Law dummy) and value = 0 otherwise. ISL CIA (2014) 
Common Law + Dummy variables with value =1 for countries with a Common Law (Common Law dummy) and value = 0 otherwise. CML 
IVs: political right and civil freedom (dummy variables; data source: Freedom House 2015); the degree of trade openness (sum of export and import as a share of GDP; data source: World Bank 2014b); Human Development Index (data 
source: United Nations Development Programme 2014); life expectancy and the gross capital formation (data source: World Bank 2014b); and credit to government and state-owned enterprises to GDP (%) and financial system deposits to 
GDP (%) (Data source: World Bank 2014b).  
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Table A3-2. Descriptive statistics (all sample countries) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Log of non-life insurance density, US$ (lnINS) 804 5.05 1.85 -0.51 8.45 
Log of non-life insurance density adjusted by PPP 
factor (lnINS) 
804 5.57 1.47 0.56 8.30 
Log of non-life insurance penetration, premiums 
per GDP (lnINS) 
804 0.50 0.65 -1.71 2.25 
Log of the summary economic freedom index 
(lnEFI) 
801 1.95 0.13 1.33 2.20 
Log of size of government (lnSOG) 801 1.79 0.26 0.94 2.24 
Log of property rights & legal system (lnPRL) 801 1.82 0.35 0.37 2.26 
Log of access to sound money (lnSMO) 801 2.12 0.19 1.00 2.29 
Log of freedom to trade internationally (lnFTT) 801 2.01 0.17 1.05 2.27 
Log of the regulation (lnREG) 802 1.92 0.13 1.44 2.19 
Log of per capita income (lnINC) 797 9.14 1.31 5.86 11.38 
Bank development (BDV) 743 83.14 51.93 4.74 245.13 
Education (EDU)  649 49.61 23.49 2.61 113.98 
Urbanisation (URB) 804 68.28 18.91 10.83 100 
Indulgence (IND) 732 0.48 0.23 0.00 1.00 
Individualism (IDV) 780 0.44 0.25 0.06 0.91 
Long-term orientation (LTO) 744 0.48 0.22 0.13 1.00 
Masculinity (MAS) 792 0.49 0.19 0.08 1.10 
Uncertainty avoidance (UAI) 792 0.67 0.23 0.08 1.12 
Power distance (PDI) 792 0.60 0.21 0.11 1.04 
Hypometropia (HPM) 660 1.92 1.72 0 10 
Islam Law (ISL) 804 0.10 0.31 0 1 
Common Law (CML) 804 0.25 0.44 0 1 
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Table A3-3. Descriptive statistics (developed countries) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Log of non-life insurance density, US$ (lnINS) 432 6.36 0.97 3.18 8.45 
Log of non-life insurance density adjusted by 
PPP factor (lnINS) 
432 6.56 0.68 4.24 8.31 
Log of non-life insurance penetration, premiums 
per GDP (lnINS) 
432 0.85 0.47 -0.97 2.25 
Log of the summary economic freedom index 
(lnEFI) 
432 2.03 0.07 1.81 2.20 
Log of size of government (lnSOG) 432 1.69 0.26 0.94 2.24 
Log of property rights & legal system (lnPRL) 432 2.03 0.16 1.55 2.26 
Log of access to sound money (lnSMO) 432 2.23 0.06 1.85 2.29 
Log of freedom to trade internationally (lnFTT) 432 2.11 0.08 1.79 2.27 
Log of the regulation (lnREG) 432 1.97 0.11 1.63 2.19 
Log of per capita income (lnINC) 432 10.13 0.63 8.43 11.38 
Bank development (BDV) 394 112.21 49.27 18.11 245.13 
Education (EDU)  366 62.37 18.49 3.06 113.98 
Urbanisation (URB) 432 74.82 16.12 10.83 100 
Indulgence (IND) 420 0.49 0.20 0.13 0.80 
Individualism (IDV) 420 0.60 0.21 0.16 0.91 
Long-term orientation (LTO) 420 0.55 0.21 0.13 1.00 
Masculinity (MAS) 432 0.50 0.23 0.08 1.10 
Uncertainty avoidance (UAI) 432 0.64 0.24 0.08 1.12 
Power distance (PDI) 432 0.49 0.19 0.11 1.04 
Hypometropia (HPM) 384 1.20 0.50 0.00 2.38 
Common Law (CML) 432 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 
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Table A3-4. Descriptive statistics (developing countries) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Log of non-life insurance density, US$ (lnINS) 372 3.53 1.42 -0.51 6.07 
Log of non-life insurance density adjusted by 
PPP factor (lnINS) 
372 4.43 1.30 0.57 6.76 
Log of non-life insurance penetration, premiums 
per GDP (lnINS) 
372 0.11 0.60 -1.71 1.32 
Log of the summary economic freedom index 
(lnEFI) 
369 1.87 0.12 1.33 2.09 
Log of size of government (lnSOG) 369 1.91 0.21 1.17 2.23 
Log of property rights & legal system (lnPRL) 369 1.56 0.33 0.37 2.06 
Log of access to sound money (lnSMO) 369 2.00 0.21 1.00 2.28 
Log of freedom to trade internationally (lnFTT) 369 1.90 0.18 1.05 2.18 
Log of the regulation (lnREG) 370 1.85 0.13 1.44 2.12 
Log of per capita income (lnINC) 365 7.96 0.83 5.86 9.34 
Bank development (BDV) 349 50.33 31.15 4.74 136.66 
Education (EDU)  283 33.12 18.49 2.61 78.63 
Urbanisation (URB) 372 60.70 19.10 23.59 93.50 
Indulgence (IND) 312 0.47 0.26 0.00 1.00 
Individualism (IDV) 360 0.27 0.14 0.06 0.65 
Long-term orientation (LTO) 324 0.39 0.21 0.13 0.87 
Masculinity (MAS) 360 0.48 0.12 0.21 0.73 
Uncertainty avoidance (UAI) 360 0.71 0.21 0.30 1.01 
Power distance (PDI) 360 0.73 0.15 0.35 1.04 
Hypometropia (HPM) 276 2.92 2.24 0.49 10.00 
Islam Law (ISL) 372 0.19 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Common Law (CML) 372 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 
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Table A3-5. Correlations matrix (all sample countries) 
 lnINS lnEFI lnINC BDV EDU URB IND IDV LTO MAS UAI PDI HPM ISL CML 
lnINS 1.00               
lnEFI 0.73 1.00              
lnINC 0.96 0.71 1.00             
BDV 0.65 0.47 0.60 1.00            
EDU 0.68 0.49 0.69 0.26 1.00           
URB 0.60 0.44 0.62 0.45 0.22 1.00          
IND 0.36 0.37 0.35 -0.00 0.19 0.43 1.00         
IDV 0.65 0.60 0.67 0.45 0.38 0.48 0.17 1.00        
LTO 0.12 0.01 0.15 0.23 0.17 0.04 -0.52 0.06 1.00       
MAS 0.02 0.03 0.05 -0.26 0.13 -0.04 0.12 0.11 -0.00 1.00      
UAI -0.00 -0.19 0.01 0.08 -0.20 0.23 -0.10 -0.32 -0.03 -0.13 1.00     
PDI -0.61 -0.62 -0.63 -0.51 -0.38 -0.43 -0.33 -0.64 0.03 0.10 0.19 1.00    
HPM -0.30 -0.06 -0.33 -0.24 -0.46 0.03 0.43 -0.25 -0.43 -0.12 0.10 0.09 1.00   
ISL -0.22 -0.08 -0.23 -0.21 0.00 -0.12 0.03 -0.19 -0.14 0.05 -0.29 0.39 0.03 1.00  
CML 0.11 0.29 0.06 0.05 0.24 -0.11 0.27 0.31 -0.34 0.14 -0.57 -0.18 -0.02 0.21 1.00 
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Table A3-6. Correlations matrix (developed countries) 
 lnINS lnEFI lnINC EDU BDV URB IND IDV LTO MAS UAI PDI HPM CML 
lnINS 1.00              
lnEFI 0.62 1.00             
lnINC 0.90 0.61 1.00            
EDU 0.63 0.39 0.57 1.00           
BDV 0.19 0.13 0.14 -0.14 1.00          
URB 0.38 0.38 0.40 0.26 0.06 1.00         
IND 0.73 0.61 0.77 0.46 0.02 0.47 1.00        
IDV 0.30 0.45 0.33 0.04 -0.09 0.42 0.45 1.00       
LTO -0.25 -0.22 -0.27 -0.09 -0.04 0.09 -0.48 -0.33 1.00      
MAS 0.03 0.09 0.09 0.12 -0.39 -0.10 0.06 0.12 0.02 1.00     
UAI -0.28 -0.52 -0.32 -0.01 -0.14 -0.08 -0.39 -0.62 0.17 -0.04 1.00    
PDI -0.35 -0.51 -0.41 -0.20 -0.24 -0.27 -0.47 -0.45 0.23 0.18 0.50 1.00   
HPM 0.08 0.47 0.06 -0.15 0.13 0.08 0.18 0.53 -0.31 -0.31 -0.59 -0.40 1.00  
CML 0.36 0.60 0.34 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.54 0.55 -0.58 0.23 -0.59 -0.42 0.42 1.00 
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Table A3-7. Correlations (developing countries) 
  lnINS lnEFI lnINC BDV EDU URB IND IDV LTO MAS UAI PDI HPM ISL CML 
lnINS 1.00               
lnEFI 0.24 1.00              
lnINC 0.91 0.11 1.00             
BDV 0.10 -0.11 -0.07 1.00            
EDU 0.59 0.07 0.59 -0.13 1.00           
URB 0.58 0.09 0.66 -0.41 0.46 1.00          
IND 0.24 0.28 0.29 -0.28 -0.15 0.43 1.00         
IDV 0.03 -0.13 0.03 -0.04 0.16 0.08 -0.36 1.00        
LTO -0.12 -0.34 -0.06 0.24 0.18 -0.31 -0.67 0.00 1.00       
MAS -0.28 -0.27 -0.24 0.11 -0.51 -0.03 0.32 -0.01 -0.17 1.00      
UAI 0.51 0.16 0.59 -0.66 0.55 0.65 0.25 0.11 -0.29 -0.46 1.00     
PDI -0.09 -0.11 -0.01 0.23 -0.06 -0.22 -0.24 -0.01 0.41 0.16 -0.43 1.00    
HPM 0.02 0.28 0.01 -0.58 0.00 0.32 0.67 -0.31 -0.45 -0.02 0.44 -0.22 1.00   
ISL -0.05 0.17 -0.04 0.33 -0.08 -0.02 0.07 -0.03 -0.10 0.20 -0.49 0.64 -0.08 1.00  
CML -0.15 0.09 -0.26 0.56 -0.13 -0.48 -0.07 0.08 -0.02 -0.10 -0.52 0.23 -0.23 0.36 1.00 
CHAPTER THREE 
58 
 
Table A3-8. Determinants of non-life insurance expenditure in developed countries 
(using various measurements) 
 Density (Premiums per 
capita) 
Density (Premiums per 
capita at PPP) 
Penetration (Premiums 
per GDP) 
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) 
LnEFI 1.799*** 12.750*** 1.008* 11.187*** 0.893 9.984*** 
 (0.596) (2.267) (0.602) (2.245) (0.581) (2.140) 
LnINC 1.171*** 0.803*** 0.764*** 0.416*** 0.179*** -0.130 
 (0.064) (0.114) (0.064) (0.107) (0.062) (0.102) 
BDV 0.001 -0.003** 0.000 -0.003** 0.001* -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
EDU -0.002 -0.005 -0.004** -0.007** -0.002 -0.005 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
URB -0.009*** -0.015*** -0.009*** -0.014*** -0.009*** -0.013*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
IND 0.807*** 0.312 0.817*** 0.389 0.880*** 0.487 
 (0.223) (0.353) (0.225) (0.331) (0.217) (0.317) 
IDV 0.515*** 1.126*** 0.399** 0.989*** 0.335* 0.844*** 
 (0.192) (0.303) (0.193) (0.292) (0.187) (0.275) 
LTO 0.553*** -0.386 0.542*** -0.279 0.600*** -0.166 
 (0.171) (0.294) (0.172) (0.283) (0.166) (0.270) 
MAS -0.684*** -1.227*** -0.636*** -1.151*** -0.568*** -1.018*** 
 (0.123) (0.225) (0.124) (0.221) (0.120) (0.207) 
UAI 0.429** 0.162 0.345** 0.072 0.258 0.012 
 (0.169) (0.275) (0.171) (0.261) (0.165) (0.251) 
PDI 0.445*** 0.734*** 0.456*** 0.742*** 0.535*** 0.782*** 
 (0.142) (0.237) (0.144) (0.232) (0.139) (0.218) 
HPM -0.139* -0.988*** -0.056 -0.852*** -0.074 -0.783*** 
 (0.078) (0.198) (0.079) (0.197) (0.076) (0.187) 
CML 0.366*** -0.317 0.401*** -0.198 0.406*** -0.154 
 (0.105) (0.203) (0.107) (0.199) (0.103) (0.187) 
Obs 309 293 309 293 309 293 
R-squared 0.897 0.772 0.783 0.571 0.464 0.002 
Adjusted R-squared 0.888 0.752 0.765 0.532 0.419 -0.087 
Notes: *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Numbers in 
parentheses show asymptotic standard errors. Constant and year-fixed effects are included but not 
reported here.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
59 
 
Table A3-9. Determinants of non-life insurance expenditure in developing countries 
(using various measurements) 
 Density (Premiums per 
capita) 
Density (Premiums 
per capita at PPP) 
Penetration 
(Premiums per GDP) 
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) 
LnEFI 1.753*** 1.390*** -0.163 -0.740 0.281 -0.262 
 (0.291) (0.492) (0.318) (0.524) (0.276) (0.483) 
LnINC 1.764*** 1.741*** 1.300*** 1.264*** 0.729*** 0.695*** 
 (0.092) (0.073) (0.100) (0.084) (0.087) (0.075) 
BDV 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
EDU 0.007*** 0.007** 0.007*** 0.007** -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
URB 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.005*** 0.005** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
IND -2.085*** -1.981*** -1.635*** -1.471*** -1.900*** -1.745*** 
 (0.282) (0.206) (0.308) (0.246) (0.267) (0.234) 
IDV 0.045 0.070 -0.452* -0.414 0.100 0.137 
 (0.245) (0.294) (0.267) (0.331) (0.232) (0.260) 
LTO -1.824*** -1.795*** -1.459*** -1.413*** -1.374*** -1.331*** 
 (0.228) (0.304) (0.249) (0.364) (0.216) (0.306) 
MAS -0.290 -0.447 -1.297*** -1.546*** -0.355 -0.590 
 (0.395) (0.393) (0.431) (0.435) (0.374) (0.362) 
UAI -2.636*** -2.544*** -1.859*** -1.713** -1.440*** -1.302** 
 (0.488) (0.639) (0.532) (0.747) (0.462) (0.612) 
PDI 0.298 0.255 0.661* 0.593 -0.051 -0.116 
 (0.310) (0.380) (0.338) (0.463) (0.294) (0.405) 
HPM 0.281*** 0.274*** 0.201*** 0.189*** 0.252*** 0.241*** 
 (0.030) (0.026) (0.032) (0.030) (0.028) (0.027) 
ISL -1.168*** -1.103*** -0.801*** -0.697** -0.705*** -0.607** 
 (0.179) (0.254) (0.195) (0.306) (0.170) (0.263) 
CML -0.101 -0.111 0.136 0.120 0.045 0.029 
 (0.097) (0.107) (0.106) (0.121) (0.092) (0.098) 
Obs 195 195 195 195 195 195 
R-squared 0.956 0.955 0.917 0.915 0.746 0.740 
Adjusted R-squared 0.949 0.948 0.905 0.903 0.708 0.701 
Weakness of 
instruments (1st F) 
 Not weak 
(14.05) 
 Not weak 
(14.05) 
 Not weak 
(14.05) 
Notes: *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Numbers in 
parentheses show asymptotic standard errors. Constant and year-fixed effects are included but not 
reported here.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
60 
 
Table A3-10. Determinants of non-life insurance expenditure before and during the GFC in all sample countries 
Notes: *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Numbers in parentheses show asymptotic standard errors. Constant and year-fixed effects are 
included but not reported here.  
 
 Pooled OLS Pooled OLS (Robustness) Pooled FGLS Random-effects GLS IV  
20002006 20072011  20002006 20072011  20002006 20072011  20002006 20072011  20002006 20072011  
lnEFI 1.033*** 
(0.310) 
-0.321 
(0.543) 
0.911*** 
(0.319) 
-0.423 
(0.535) 
1.033*** 
(0.300) 
-0.321 
(0.515) 
2.326*** 
(0.237) 
0.018  
(0.434) 
3.701*** 
(0.706) 
2.417*** 
(0.769) 
lnINC 1.158*** 
(0.047) 
1.420*** 
(0.089) 
1.163*** 
(0.048) 
1.563*** 
(0.088) 
1.158*** 
(0.045) 
1.420*** 
(0.085) 
1.156*** 
(0.093) 
0.157*** 
(0.109) 
1.036*** 
(0.056) 
1.251*** 
(0.104) 
BDV 0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.001  
(0.001) 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.001  
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.0003 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.002*  
(0.001) 
EDU 0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.003* 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.002  
(0.002) 
0.001  
(0.003) 
URB 0.006*** 
(0.002) 
0.001  
(0.003) 
0.006*** 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.006*** 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
0.007  
(0.006) 
0.008*** 
(0.003) 
0.001  
(0.003) 
IND -0.194 
(0.197) 
-0.305 
(0.273) 
-0.223 
(0.203) 
-0.902*** 
(0.268) 
-0.194 
(0.190) 
-0.305 
(0.258) 
-0.098 
(0.497) 
-0.983* 
(0.535) 
-0.106 
(0.247) 
-0.162  
(0.324) 
IDV 0.029 
(0.168) 
-0.100 
(0.230) 
-0.0004 
(0.174) 
-0.715*** 
(0.227) 
0.029 
(0.163) 
-0.100 
(0.218) 
-0.036 
(0.441) 
-0.539 
(0.472) 
-0.129 
(0.203) 
-0.123  
(0.263) 
LTO -0.353*** 
(0.135) 
-0.173 
(0.178) 
-0.302** 
(0.139) 
-0.424** 
(0.175) 
-0.353*** 
(0.131) 
-0.173 
(0.168) 
-0.370 
(0.359) 
-0.434 
(0.424) 
-0.421*** 
(0.155) 
0.231  
(0.191) 
MAS -0.108 
(0.108) 
-0.773*** 
(0.151) 
-0.018 
(0.111) 
-0.377*** 
(0.149) 
-0.108 
(0.104) 
-0.773*** 
(0.143) 
-0.101 
(0.292) 
-0.634* 
(0.337) 
-0.132 
(0.122) 
-0.690*** 
(0.170) 
UAI 0.058 
(0.146) 
-0.193 
(0.204) 
0.165 
(0.151) 
-0.065 
(0.201) 
0.058 
(0.141) 
-0.193 
(0.193) 
0.055 
(0.399) 
-0.545 
(0.454) 
-0.046 
(0.168) 
-0.221  
(0.230) 
PDI 0.301* 
(0.171) 
0.109 
(0.215) 
0.181 
(0.176) 
-0.1844 
(0.212) 
0.301* 
(0.165) 
0.109 
(0.204) 
0.612 
(0.436) 
0.343 
(0.489) 
0.758*** 
(0.235) 
0.378*  
(0.205) 
HPM 0.039 
(0.028) 
0.033 
(0.035) 
0.049* 
(0.029) 
0.045 
(0.034) 
0.039 
(0.027) 
0.033 
(0.033) 
0.019 
(0.069) 
0.060 
(0.079) 
-0.033 
(0.040) 
-0.002  
(0.039) 
ISL -0.378*** 
(0.132) 
-0.215 
(0.177) 
-0.298** 
(0.136) 
-0.183 
(0.174) 
-0.378*** 
(0.127) 
-0.215 
(0.167) 
-0.484 
(0.345) 
-0.436 
(0.384) 
-0.628*** 
(0.161) 
-0.326*  
(0.194) 
CML 0.154** 
(0.076) 
0.088 
(0.109) 
0.182** 
(0.078) 
0.329*** 
(0.107) 
0.154** 
(0.074) 
0.088 
(0.103) 
0.075 
(0.192) 
0.198  
(0.230) 
0.029  
(0.086) 
-0.008  
(0.134) 
Obs. 319 185 319 185 319 185 319 185 310 178 
R-squared 0.960 0.956 0.958 0.956 0.960 0.956 0.957 0.951 0.949 0.949 
Adjusted R-squared 0.958 0.951 0.955 0.951 0.958 0.951 0.954 0.945 0.946 0.943 
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Table A3-11. Determinants of non-life insurance expenditure before and during the GFC in developed countries 
Notes: *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Numbers in parentheses show asymptotic standard errors. Constant and year-fixed effects are 
included but not reported here.  
 
 
 Pooled OLS Pooled OLS (Robustness) Pooled FGLS Random-effects GLS IV 
20002006 200720011  20002006 200720011  20002006 200720011  20002006 200720011  20002006 200720011  
lnEFI 2.139*** 
(0.782) 
3.191** 
(1.481) 
1.817*** 
(0.597) 
4.609*** 
(0.934) 
2.139*** 
(0.741) 
3.191** 
(1.357) 
1.122*** 
(0.356) 
0.106 
(0.737) 
15.782*** 
(4.720) 
16.670*** 
(4.257) 
lnINC 1.123*** 
(0.075) 
1.308*** 
(0.120) 
1.054*** 
(0.057) 
1.386*** 
(0.076) 
1.123*** 
(0.071) 
1.308*** 
(0.110) 
1.050*** 
(0.149) 
1.294*** 
(0.197) 
0.700*** 
(0.181) 
1.290*** 
(0.157) 
BDV 0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.0004 
(0.001) 
-0.010** 
(0.004) 
-0.003** 
(0.002) 
EDU -0.004* 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.012*** 
(0.002) 
-0.004* 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.017*** 
(0.006) 
0.004  
(0.005) 
URB -0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.017*** 
(0.005) 
-0.015*** 
(0.003) 
-0.016*** 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.017*** 
(0.005) 
-0.013 
(0.008) 
-0.002 
(0.010) 
0.006 
(0.007) 
-0.042*** 
(0.009) 
IND 0.657*** 
(0.265) 
0.438 
(0.409) 
1.516*** 
(0.202) 
0.400 
(0.258) 
0.657*** 
(0.251) 
0.438 
(0.375) 
1.321* 
(0.738) 
0.304 
(0.836) 
0.458 
(0.431) 
-0.827 (0.674) 
IDV 0.261 
(0.225) 
0.994*** 
(0.372) 
0.415** 
(0.172) 
0.718*** 
(0.234) 
0.261 
(0.213) 
0.994*** 
(0.341) 
0.639 
(0.642) 
0.408 
(0.722) 
0.081 
(0.374) 
2.702*** 
(0.654) 
LTO 0.334* 
(0.210) 
0.416 
(0.296) 
0.569*** 
(0.161) 
-0.061 
(0.187) 
0.334* 
(0.199) 
0.416 
(0.271) 
0.701 
(0.566) 
0.238 
(0.679) 
-1.141* 
(0.628) 
-0.268 (0.505) 
MAS -0.536*** 
(0.143) 
-1.225*** 
(.0240) 
-0.402*** 
(0.109) 
-0.615*** 
(0.151) 
-0.536*** 
(0.135) 
-1.225*** 
(0.220) 
-0.469 
(0.388) 
-0.807* 
(0.430) 
-0.980 
(0.265) 
-2.199*** 
(0.402) 
UAI 0.272 
(0.197) 
0.384 
(0.334) 
1.050*** 
(0.150) 
0.817*** 
(0.210 
0.272 
(0.186) 
0.384 
(0.306) 
0.542 
(0.577) 
-0.027 
(0.685) 
-0.419 
(0.393) 
1.100** (0.465) 
PDI 0.493*** 
(0.174) 
0.249 
(0.231) 
0.394*** 
(0.133) 
0.080 
(0.146) 
0.493*** 
(0.165) 
0.249 
(0.212) 
0.507 
(0.527) 
0.222 
(0.565) 
0.959*** 
(0.311) 
0.351  
(0.302) 
HPM -0.151* 
(0.096) 
-0.360** 
(0.153) 
-0.147** 
(0.074) 
-0.180* 
(0.096) 
-0.151* 
(0.091) 
-0.360** 
(0.140) 
-0.069 
(0.236) 
-0.121 
(0.263) 
-1.218*** 
(0.385) 
-1.315*** 
(0.337) 
ISL           
CML 0.401*** 
(0.128) 
0.157  
(0.185) 
0.421*** 
(0.098) 
-0.217* 
(0.117) 
0.401*** 
(0.121) 
0.157 
(0.170) 
0.447 
(0.313) 
0.187 
(0.378) 
-0.782* 
(0.475) 
-0.258 (0.318) 
Obs. 197 112 197 112 197 112 197 112 188 105 
R-squared 0.914 0.848 0.948 0.936 0.914 0.848 0.908 0.830 0.767 0.714 
Adjusted R-squared 0.905 0.820 0.942 0.924 0.905 0.820 0.897 0.797 0.741 0.659 
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Table A3-12. Determinants of non-life insurance expenditure before and during the GFC in developing countries 
Notes: *,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Numbers in parentheses show asymptotic standard errors. Constant and year-fixed effects are 
included but not reported here. 
 
 
 
 Pooled OLS Pooled OLS (Robustness) Pooled FGLS Random-effects GLS IV 
20002006 20072011 20002006 20072011 20002006 20072011 20002006 20072011 20002006 20072011 
lnEFI 2.105*** 
(0.361) 
0.425 
(0.573) 
1.422*** 
(0.206) 
0.364 
(0.326) 
2.105*** 
(0.329) 
0.425 
(0.493) 
2.653*** 
(0.280) 
0.425  
(0.573) 
2.433*** 
(0.458) 
1.147* 
(0.608) 
lnINC 1.999*** 
(0.121) 
1.488*** 
(0.128) 
2.085*** 
(0.069) 
1.698*** 
(0.073) 
1.999*** 
(0.110) 
1.488*** 
(0.110) 
2.394*** 
(0.224) 
1.488*** 
(0.128) 
2.032*** 
(0.115) 
1.446*** 
(0.114) 
BDV 0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.011*** 
(0.002) 
0.007*** 
(0.001) 
0.008*** 
(0.001) 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.011*** 
(0.002) 
0.004*** 
(0.002) 
0.011*** 
(0.002) 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.012*** 
(0.002) 
EDU 0.010*** 
(0.003) 
-0.009** 
(0.004) 
0.018*** 
(0.002) 
-0.005*** 
(0.002) 
0.010*** 
(0.003) 
-0.009** 
(0.003) 
0.008* 
(0.004) 
-0.009** 
(0.004) 
0.011*** 
(0.003) 
-0.006** 
(0.003) 
URB 0.010*** 
(0.003) 
0.011*** 
(0.002) 
0.008*** 
(0.002) 
0.009*** 
(0.001) 
0.010*** 
(0.003) 
0.011*** 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.010) 
0.011*** 
(0.002) 
0.010*** 
(0.003) 
0.012*** 
(0.002) 
IND -2.596*** 
(0.393) 
-2.042*** 
(0.356) 
-1.855*** 
(0.224) 
-2.390*** 
(0.203) 
-2.596*** 
(0.357) 
-2.042*** 
(0.306) 
-3.453*** 
(1.143) 
-2.042*** 
(0.356) 
-2.725*** 
(0.380) 
-1.963*** 
(0.313) 
IDV 0.273 
(0.314) 
-1.601*** 
(0.355) 
1.361*** 
(0.179) 
-1.706*** 
(0.202) 
0.273 
(0.285) 
-1.601*** 
(0.305) 
0.205 
(1.346) 
-1.601*** 
(0.355) 
0.234 
(0.289) 
-1.451*** 
(0.318) 
LTO -2.056*** 
(0.300) 
-1.233*** 
(0.269) 
-3.596*** 
(0.171) 
-2.035*** 
(0.153) 
-2.056*** 
(0.273) 
-1.233*** 
(0.231) 
-2.013** 
(0.958) 
-1.233*** 
(0.269) 
-2.100*** 
(0.277) 
-1.274*** 
(0.236) 
MAS -0.228 
(0.527) 
-0.436 
(0.442) 
-2.726*** 
(0.300) 
-0.699*** 
(0.252) 
-0.228 
(0.479) 
-0.436 
(0.380) 
1.059 
(2.162) 
-0.436 
(0.442) 
-0.076 
(0.503) 
-0.285 
(0.393) 
UAI -3.912*** 
(0.670) 
0.283 
(0.583) 
-6.335*** 
(0.381) 
-0.870*** 
(0.332) 
-3.912*** 
(0.609) 
0.283 
(0.502) 
-3.805** 
(1.688) 
0.283  
(0.583) 
-4.039*** 
(0.624) 
0.135 
(0.514) 
PDI -0.008 
(0.397) 
1.009*** 
(0.394) 
2.289*** 
(0.226) 
1.656*** 
(0.225) 
-0.008 
(0.361) 
1.009*** 
(0.339) 
-0.983 
(1.558) 
1.009*** 
(0.394) 
0.050 
(0.367) 
1.134*** 
(0.349) 
HPM 0.344*** 
(0.041) 
0.200*** 
(0.032) 
0.394*** 
(0.023) 
0.222*** 
(0.018) 
0.344*** 
(0.037) 
0.200*** 
(0.028) 
0.437*** 
(0.124) 
0.200*** 
(0.032) 
0.353*** 
(0.039) 
0.205*** 
(0.028) 
ISL -1.400*** 
(0.236) 
-0.713*** 
(0.224) 
-2.482*** 
(0.135) 
-1.118*** 
(0.128) 
-1.400*** 
(0.215) 
-0.713*** 
(0.193) 
-1.157 
(0.745) 
-0.713*** 
(0.224) 
-1.478*** 
(0.229) 
-0.830*** 
(0.203) 
CML -0.153 
(0.125) 
0.237* 
(0.137) 
-0.721*** 
(0.071) 
0.155** 
(0.078) 
-0.153 
(0.113) 
0.237* 
(0.118) 
-0.087 
(0.502) 
0.237* 
(0.137) 
-0.149 
(0.114) 
0.195* 
(0.121) 
Obs. 122 73 122 73 122 73 122 73 122 73 
R-squared 0.951 0.981 0.984 0.994 0.951 0.981 0.934 0.981 0.950 0.980 
Adjusted R-squared 0.941 0.974 0.981 0.992 0.941 0.974 0.920 0.974 0.940 0.973 
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Table A3-13. A summary of results of the determinants of the non-life insurance expenditure 
Notes: Insig. indicates insignificant; (*) Elango and Jones (2011) used six indicators of the economic freedom index of heritage rather than its summary; (**) Park, Borde and Choi 
(2002) used the summary economic freedom of heritage in 1997, where the lower score of the economic freedom index, the higher the degree of economic freedom. Therefore, negative 
effect of the economic freedom index on insurance consumption is comparable to a positive effect if the new construction of the economic freedom index is used, where higher scores 
indicate more economic freedom.
 Hyp
othe
sis 
Our results                                                  
(20002011) 
Non-life insurance Both life & non-
life insurance 
Life insurance 
All 
sample 
countries 
Developed 
countries 
Developing 
countries 
Park and 
Lemaire 
(2012) 
Elango 
and Jones 
(2011) 
Esho et al 
(2004) 
Browne, 
Chung and 
Frees (2000) 
Outreville 
(1990) 
Lee and 
Chiu 
(2012) 
Park, Borde and 
Choi (2002)  
Park and 
Lemaire 
(2011) 
Chui and 
Kwok 
(2008) 
lnEFI + + + +  +/-(*)     + (**)   
lnGDP
P 
+ + + + + + + + + + + + + 
BANK + + - +        - + 
EDU + Insig. - + Insig. Insig. + - - +  Insig.  
URB + + - + Insig  + Insig.    Insig.  
INDUL - Insig. Insig. -          
IDV + Insig. + Insig. +      Insig. + + 
LTO - - Insig. -        +  
MAS - - - Insig. Insig.      + - - 
UAI + Insig. Insig. - +  Insig.    Insig. + + 
PDI - + + Insig. -      Insig. + - 
HPM + Insig. - +          
ISL - -  - -       -  
CL + Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig.  Insig.     +  
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Table A3-14. A summary of statistic tests 
Test Heteroskedasticity 
test 
Endogeneity test Underidentification 
test 
Overidentification 
test 
Weak 
Instruments 
test 
Pagan-Hall 
general test 
statistic 
Ho: Disturbance is 
homoscedastic. 
Reject Ho: p-value 
<10%. 
    
Durbin-Wu-
Hansman 
 Ho: EF variable is 
exogenous. 
Reject Ho: p-
value<10% 
   
Hausman   Ho: difference in 
coefficients is not 
systematic. 
Reject Ho: p-
value <10% 
   
Anderson 
canon. corr. 
LM statistic 
  Ho: Instruments is 
underidentified. 
Reject Ho: p-
value<10% 
  
Sargan 
statistic 
   Ho: all instruments 
are valid. Reject Ho: 
p-value<10% 
 
F-statistic     Ho: 
instruments 
are weak. 
Reject Ho: 
F>10 
Table A3-15. List of developed and developing economies 
Developed countries Developing countries 
Australia Luxembourg Argentina Nigeria 
Austria Malta Bangladesh Pakistan 
Belgium Netherlands Brazil Panama 
Canada New Zealand Bulgaria Peru 
Czech Rep. Norway Chile (*) Philippines 
Denmark Poland China Romania 
Estonia Portugal Colombia Russia (*) 
Finland Singapore Costa Rica South Africa 
France Slovakia Croatia (*) Thailand 
Germany Slovenia Ecuador Turkey 
Greece South Korea El Salvador Uruguay (*) 
Hong Kong Spain Guatemala Venezuela 
Hungary Sweden India Vietnam 
Ireland Switzerland Indonesia  
Italy Trinidad Iran  
Japan United Arab Malaysia  
Latvia United Kingdom Mexico  
Lithuania United States Morocco  
Sources: World Bank (2014c) and IMF (2014).  
Note: (*) indicates countries that are not in list of developing regions of the World Bank but in the list 
of developing regions of the IMF. 
Table A3-16. The panel error-correction–based cointegration tests of Westelund 
Statistic Value Z-value P-value 
Gt -1.243** -2.098 0.018 
Ga -2.030 3.189 0.999 
Pt -8.199*** -3.445 0.000 
Pa -1.641** -1.737 0.041 
Notes: **, *** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. The null hypothesis is no 
cointegration. 
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Chapter 4: Economic Freedom, Culture and Non-life 
Insurance Expenditure: A System GMM Approach26 
4.1 Introduction 
The analysis in Chapter 3 has filled some of the existing gaps in the literaturein 
particular, the use of the instrumental variables (IV) model to address the endogeneity 
problem. We now extend the analysis by noting that the IV model used in Chapter 3 
may not work as well in overcoming the endogeneity problem caused by the reverse 
causality between per capita income and non-life insurance expenditure. A system 
generalised method of moments (GMM) estimator, which includes a one-year-lagged 
dependent variable as an explanatory variable, may overcome this limitation of IVs 
and generate more robust coefficients, largely because spending on non-life insurance 
in the previous period should have a significant effect on non-life insurance 
expenditure in the current period. At the same time, the determinants of non-life 
insurance expenditure in Chapter 3 may change across countries over the long term so 
a comparison between the short run and long run may be meaningful. Finally, the 
socio-economic factors chosen in the regression models may also vary across the 
groups of countries based on differing national and per capita income levels over the 
long term. 
As mentioned in previous chapters, earlier studies (e.g., Outreville 1990; Browne, 
Chung and Frees 2000; Esho et al. 2004; Elango and Jones 2011; Lee and Chiu 2012; 
Park and Lemaire 2012; Trinh, Nguyen and Sgro 2016) have shown that income per 
capita has a significant positive effect on non-life insurance expenditure. However, in 
reality, among countries with a similar level of per capita income, the level of spending 
on non-life insurance products varies greatly. For example, Canada and the United 
Arab Emirates have a similar level of income and living standards. Based on 
calculations using the dataset provided by Swiss Re, non-life insurance density, which 
is the direct domestic premiums per capita (US dollars) and represents non-life 
insurance expenditure, was (on average) three times higher in Canada than it was in 
                                                 
26 Major empirical results of this chapter formed a working paper that was presented and selected as the 
second-best paper for the best paper award at the 19th Eurasia Business and Economic Society 
Conference in Turkey. It was also presented and discussed at the Insurance Risk Research Conference 
2016 at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. Subsequently, it was submitted to Economic 
Modelling. At the time of this thesis submission, it is under revised and resubmitted upon invitation 
from the journal. 
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the United Arab Emirates in the period 19802009. Likewise, some countries with a 
high level of per capita income possessed low non-life insurance density, whereas a 
number of countries with a low level of per capita income possessed high non-life 
insurance density. For instance, based on calculations, Hong Kong had a higher per 
capita income than New Zealand, but New Zealand had an average non-life insurance 
density that was 3.5 times higher than that of Hong Kong in the period 19802009. 
Figure 4-1 below depicts the average premium per capita for non-life insurance 
expenditure in three groups of selected countries based on income levels (high, upper-
middle-income and lower-middle-income; see Table A4-24 for the list of these 
countries). It further shows that the patterns of spending on non-life insurance over 
time in these three groups of countries are also different, particularly before 2000. 
Figure 4-1. Average non-life insurance expenditure in three groups of income level-based economies, 
19802009 
Source: Computed by the author based on Sigma (Swiss Re 2014) 
In addition to income, education promotes the understanding of risk; thus, as argued 
in a number of previous papers (Esho et al. 2004; Lee and Chiu 2012; Trinh, Nguyen 
and Sgro 2016), a higher level of education is expected to increase non-life insurance 
expenditure. However, some countries with a high level of education have low non-
life insurance expenditure. For example, in the period 19802009, Russia had a higher 
percentage of school enrolments in tertiary education than the Netherlands, but the 
non-life insurance density of the Netherlands was, on average, 33 times higher than 
that of Russia (based on data of Swiss Re). 
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Heterogeneities associated with income and education in their effects on non-life 
insurance expenditure, as pointed out above, can be attributed to other drivers of non-
life insurance expenditure, which may include levels of economic freedom, bank 
development, urbanisation, legal system and cultural dimensions. Among these 
factors, economic freedom has recently attracted the attention of researchers because 
of its strong correlation with non-life insurance expenditure in many developing 
countries (Park, Borde and Choi 2002; Elango and Jones 2011). For example, the 
economic freedom index in India increased considerably from 5.8 in 1995 to 6.6 in 
2005 (Fraser Institute 2014). This may lead to an increase in competition among non-
life insurers, and individuals may therefore receive more benefits, such as low prices 
and high quality. In reality, non-life insurance expenditure in India increased sharply 
in the same period, from US$2.14 per capita to US$5.85 per capita, as evidenced in 
the database of Swiss Re.27 This study uses the Fraser Institute’s economic freedom 
index, which is more valuable to researchers in analysing the effect of changing 
economic freedom across time periods. This has largely been ignored by previous 
papers (e.g., Park, Borde and Choi 2002; Elango and Jones 2011). As mentioned in the 
previous chapters, the Fraser Institute’s economic freedom index has been widely used 
by researchers studying topics other than non-life insurance because it covers a large 
number of countries over a long period and has clear descriptions (Doucouliagos and 
Ulubasoglu 2006; De Haan, Lundström and Sturm 2006; Justesen 2008). 
Cultural factorsin particular, the latest cultural dimensions of Hofstede, Hofstede 
and Minkov (2010) and Minkov (2011)have also been ignored in previous studies 
on the same topic. Together with other socio-economic factors, cultural factors should 
explain differences in non-life insurance expenditure across countries in the long term. 
This is because culture represents specific characteristics of individuals that vary 
greatly from one country to another and in turn influence perceptions of risks and thus 
the demand for non-life insurance. In this regard, the need for a comprehensive study 
into the relationship between cultural factors and non-life insurance expenditure in the 
long term is warranted. Figures 4-2 and 4-3 below, which show average non-life 
insurance expenditure and cultural indexes across three groups of countries in the 
period 19802009, further illustrate this point. As shown, average non-life insurance 
                                                 
27 It should be noted that from 2000, the Indian government allowed private players into the non-life 
insurance industry by reducing regulations. Given the competitiveness of the private firms, this might 
affect non-life insurance expenditure. 
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expenditure across the three groups of countries based on income levels trends in the 
same direction as masculinity, but contrasts with the hypometropia index.28 
 
Figure 4-2. Average non-life insurance expenditure and masculinity index across three groups of 
countries, 19802009 
Sources: Computed by the author based on Sigma (Swiss Re 2014) and Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov 
(2010) 
 
Figure 4-3. Average non-life insurance expenditure and hypometropia index across three groups of 
countries, 19802009 
Sources: Computed by the author based on Sigma (Swiss Re 2014) and Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov 
(2010) 
                                                 
28 Masculinity measures the degree of distinctness of social gender roles in a society. In a high 
masculinity society, men focus on their material success, such as career and business, whereas women 
focus on improvements in the quality of their family. Countries with high masculinity are Japan, 
Slovakia, Austria and the UK, whereas Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway have low masculinity. 
Likewise, hypometropia refers to a society that has high violence and high national murder rates. This 
variable is used to help explain why some ethnic group or nations have more serious violence among 
their own members than other populations (Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov 2010) 
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Finally, spending on non-life insurance products in the prior year may induce people 
to increase expenditure on these products in later stage because policyholders may 
receive further benefits, such as reduced renewal costs and waived waiting periods 
when using non-life insurance products continuously. Bolhaar, Lindeboom and Van 
Der Klaauw (2012) illustrated this argument using individual-level data, finding that 
spending on private health insurance in an earlier year is a key driver in explaining it 
in a later year. 
The aim of this chapter is to extend Chapter 3 and hence make further contributions to 
the literature by examining the effects of the determinants on non-life insurance 
expenditure using the same sample countries in the short term (20002011) and over 
the long term (19802009). In particular, the system GMM estimator is applied to 
address the endogeneity problem that may persist in many earlier studies due to either 
omitted variables or reverse causality between per capita income and non-life 
insurance expenditure. Additionally, adopting a dynamic panel data analysis may have 
some advantages: estimating both time-variant and time-invariant factors, such as 
cultural variables and legal system variables, and understanding more about the 
dynamics of individual behaviour than from a single cross country (Bond 2002; 
Cameron and Trivedi 2005). It is noted that the main objective of using the short-term 
sample is to compare results based on the system GMM estimator with those based on 
IVs presented in Chapter 3; thus, results will be provided for all countries, developed 
countries and developing countries separately, whereas the analysis of the long-term 
sample is carried out for three groups of countries according to income level: high-
income, upper-middle-income, and lower-middle-income.29 
For the short-term sample that covers the period 20002011, the findings based on the 
system GMM estimator show that the effect of the previous year’s non-life insurance 
expenditure and per capita income on the current year’s non-life insurance expenditure 
in all sample countries is positive, and this may dominate the effects of factors such as 
economic freedom and urbanisation. A positive effect of long-term orientation on non-
life insurance expenditure, which contrasts with the finding of Chapter 3, is found. 
Coefficient estimates for developed countries are mostly consistent with the findings 
in Chapter 3. In contrast, for developing countries, insignificant effects of economic 
                                                 
29 It is possible to divide the short-term dataset into the three groups of countries based on income levels, 
but it does not allow a comparison of results with the literature, including that in Chapter 3. Hence, I 
leave that for future research. 
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freedom, bank development and education, as well as the positive effect of Common 
Law, have been labelled. 
With regard to the long term (19802009), this chapter finds that, along with the 
traditional determinants of non-life insurance expenditurenamely, economic 
freedom and per capita incomemany cultural factors, such as indulgence, 
individualism, masculinity and hypometropia explain spending on non-life insurance 
across countries. Disaggregating the data into three groups of countries based on levels 
of income further reveals that indulgence, individualism and long-term orientation 
explain non-life insurance expenditure in upper-middle-income countries, whereas 
uncertainty avoidance does so in high-income countries, and these cultural factors 
mostly do not affect non-life insurance expenditure in lower-middle-income countries 
over the long term. These findings uncover some important yet unexplored linkages 
between cultural factors and non-life insurance expenditure across countries. 
The remaining sections of this chapter are organised as follows. The model and 
estimation approach is outlined in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 introduces the data and 
hypotheses, followed by empirical results and discussions of results in Section 4.4. 
Section 4.5 offers some concluding remarks. 
4.2 Model and estimation approach 
4.2.1 Theory of the system GMM estimation 
This chapter uses the system GMM estimator developed by Holtz-Eakin, Newey and 
Rosen (1988), Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and 
Bond (1998). The regression equation is considered as follows: 
yi,t  = αyi,t-1 + βXit + t + i + i,t      
 = αyi,t-1 + βXit + t + i,t                (13) 
where y is the logarithm of non-life insurance expenditure, which is measured by 
premium per capita; X is the set of explanatory variables other than lagged non-life 
insurance expenditure;  denotes unobserved time-specific effects;  represents an 
unobserved country-specific effect;  is the error term; and i =1,…, N and t =2,…, T 
represent country and time period, respectively, and  =i + i,t is an error term 
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capturing all other omitted factors. α and β are the vectors of coefficients to be 
estimated, and E(i) = E(i,t) = E(ii,t) = 0 is assumed to hold. 
Since yi,t-1 may correlate with the error term i,t, estimating (1) by the OLS estimator 
may yield biased coefficient estimates. To deal with this problem, Arellano and Bond 
(1991) proposed using the first-difference transformation to (13) to remove the fixed 
effects in the error term and obtain the following equation: 
yi,t - yi,t-1 = α(yi,t-1 - yi,t-2) + β(Xit – Xi,t-1) + (t - t-1) + (i,t  - i,t-1) 
yi,t = αyi,t-1 + βXit + t + i,t                             (14) 
The system GMM estimator developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell 
and Bond (1998) includes both (13) and (14), in which the instruments are the lagged 
differences-related variables for (13) in levels and are lagged levels of yi,t  for (14) in 
first differences, respectively. Note that the errors are assumed to be homoskedastic 
and under the assumption that the error term, , is not serially correlated, the 
explanatory variables are exogenous using the following moment conditions: 
E[yi,t-s (ɛi,t - ɛi,t-1 )] = 0 for s≥2 and t=3,…, T (15) 
E[Xi,t-s (ɛi,t - ɛi,t-1 )] = 0 for s≥2 and t=3,…, T (16) 
Note that moment conditions (15) and (16) mean that the lagged values of the 
dependent variable and the lagged values of the explanatory variables are used as the 
instruments in this chapter. As the main purpose of this research is to estimate the 
effects of both time-variant and time-invariant factors such as cultural variables and 
the Common Law variable, the evident shortcoming of estimating (14) by using the 
two moment conditions (15) and (16) is that regression (14) in differences already 
eliminates these time-invariant explanatory variables. Another shortcoming of using 
the two moment conditions (15) and (16) to estimate (13), which is also pointed out 
by Blundell and Bond (1998), is that lagged levels of explanatory variables can be 
weak instruments for the regression in differences. 
To address these shortcomings, this chapter follows Arellano and Bover (1995) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998) to combine the two moment conditions (15) and (16) from 
regression (14) in differences with the following two moment conditions from 
regression (13) in levels:  
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E[(yi,t-s – yi,t-2)(at + i + ɛi,t)]= 0 for s=1 (17) 
E[(Xi,t-s – Xi,t-2)(at + i + ɛi,t)]= 0 for s=1 (18) 
Moment conditions (15)(18) are used in the system GMM procedure to obtain 
consistent estimates of the coefficients of both time-variant and time-invariant 
explanatory variables of X and i. 
4.2.2 A model for estimation  
Following the system GMM estimator discussed above, this chapter considers the 
dynamic panel data model of the following form: 
lnINSi,t  = αlnINSi,t-1 + β1lnINCit + β2EFIit + β3BDVit + β4EDUit + β5URBit + β6CULi  
+ β7LSYi + at + i,t                             (20) 
where lnINSit is the natural logarithm of non-life insurance expenditure (density) for 
country i in year t; EFIit is the Index of Economic Freedom for country i in year t;
30 
lnINCit is the natural logarithm of per capita GDP for country i in year t; BDVit is the 
level of bank development for country i in year t; EDUit is school enrolment, tertiary 
(% gross), for country i in year t; URBit is the level of urbanisation for country i in year 
t; CULi is an array of cultural variables (Hofstede and Minkov) that are time-invariant 
and only vary across countries; LSYi is an array of dummy variables (Common Law 
and Islamic Law) that vary across countries; at is a year-fixed effect; α is a constant 
term; β1 to β7 are vectors of coefficients; and  it is the error term for country i in year 
t. 
4.2.3 Estimation strategy and specification tests 
4.2.3.1 Estimation strategy 
This study adopts the system GMM estimator to overcome the disadvantages of OLS, 
random effect and IV regressions in dealing with the endogeneity problem caused by 
                                                 
30 This chapter takes the original value of EFI rather than the logarithm value of EFI used in Chapter 3 
because EFI’s original value is quite small (<10). Investigating based on these values results in similar 
estimates, but using the original value of EFI may yield smaller asymptotic standard errors, indicating 
a more accurate reliability of the mean. 
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reverse causality and omitted variables.31 Using too many lagged instruments in the 
system GMM estimator may cause biased coefficient estimates and fail to check the 
validity of the instruments. To overcome this problem, the instruments need to be 
reduced (Bowsher 2002; Roodman 2009b; Silaghi et al. 2014; Lee et al. 2016). The 
system GMM estimator using xtabond2 in Stata software designed by Roodman 
(2009a) is used as the benchmark model for the analysis.32 In addition to the system 
GMM estimation, to show the differences among estimators, the current chapter 
follows Chapter 3 to run the following three regressions: (1) the pooled OLS estimator; 
(2) the random-effect model; and (3) the 2SLS_IV estimator using trade openness and 
life expectancy variables as the main IVs to account for endogeneity.33 
4.2.3.2 Specification tests 
This chapter employs the test of the over-identifying restrictions and the test of second-
order serial correlation to evaluate the consistency of the system GMM estimator. To 
support the estimated model, these two tests should fail to reject the null hypotheses.34 
For IV estimation, this study uses the test of the over-identifying restrictions and the 
test of weak identification. Instruments are weak if the first F-value of this test is 
smaller than 10. 
4.3 Data and hypotheses 
4.3.1 Description of data 
This chapter uses a panel dataset covering 67 countries for the period 20002011 (short 
term) and 19802009 (long term). See Table A4-24 for the list of these countries. Data 
in the period 20002011 are yearly, while data in the period 19802009 are divided 
into five-year intervals; hence, there are six time periods: 19801984, 19851989, 
                                                 
31 Ward and Zurbreuugg (2000) and Lee (2011) found that there is a bi-directional causal relationship 
between non-life insurance expenditure and per capita GDP. In addition, Chang et al. (2013) found that 
globalisation, which includes economic factors, has a causal relationship with insurance activity across 
countries under different conditions. 
32 The one-step system GMM estimator is used because it can help to examine time-invariant variables 
such as culture and legal system. 
33 This research followed Nelson and Singh (1998), Carlsson and Lundström (2002) and Rode and Coll 
(2012), who also use these instruments. In this chapter, we only use two IVs as the main instruments, 
as using many instruments may cause a biased estimate.  
34 The Sargan test is chosen for the test of over-identifying restrictions (Baum, Schaffer and Stillman 
2003). In term p-value of Sargan test is close to 1 due to too many lagged instruments, which may lead 
to accepting the null hypothesis implausibly. The number of lags of instruments needs to be reduced to 
deal with this issue (Bowsher 2002; Roodman 2009b). 
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19901994, 19951999, 20002004 and 20052009. These data are chosen because 
of their availability.35 A large number of explanatory variables are used in this study. 
Table A4-1 in the Appendix presents the definitions and sources of the data. 
4.3.2 Variables  
4.3.2.1 Dependent variables 
This chapter follows Chapter 3 to use non-life insurance density, which is measured 
by direct domestic premiums per capita in US dollar, provided by Sigma (Swiss Re) 
as a main proxy for non-life insurance expenditure.36 
4.3.2.2 Independent variables 
The Fraser Institute’s economic freedom index (EFW), which measures the size of 
government (SOG), legal system and property rights (PRI), sound money (SMO), 
freedom to trade internationally (FTT) and regulation (REG), is used as a proxy for 
the value of the property at risk for reasons discussed in Chapter 2. Other independent 
variables, including income per capita, bank development, education, urbanisation, 
cultural dimensions and legal system, are used and described in Table A4-1. 
4.3.3 Hypotheses 
Following the previous chapter and the literature, this chapter proposes a number of 
testable hypotheses: 
H4-1: The higher the level of the initial non-life insurance expenditure, per capita 
income, economic freedom, education, bank development, and urbanisation in a 
country, the higher the non-life insurance expenditure. 
H4-2: The lower the degree of indulgence, long-term orientation, masculinity, and 
power distance in a country, the higher the non-life insurance expenditure. 
                                                 
35 The economic freedom index is only available as a five-year average before 2000 (Lee et al. 2016). 
Although there are six periods, data used in the paper actually cover 30 years (from 1980 to 2009). 
36 According to Swiss Re (2014), non-life insurance in their dataset is categorised according to standard 
European Union and OECD conventions. Non-life insurance provided by Swiss Re includes the 
following products: accident, sickness, land vehicles, railway rolling stock, aircraft, ships, goods in 
transit, fire and natural forces, other damage to property, motor vehicle liability, aircraft liability, 
liability for ships, general liability, credit, suretyship, miscellaneous financial loss, and legal expenses. 
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H4-3: The higher the degree of individualism, uncertainty avoidance, and 
hypometropia in a country, the higher the non-life insurance expenditure. 
H4-4: Islamic Law has a negative effect on non-life insurance expenditure, whereas 
Common Law has a positive effect on non-life insurance expenditure. 
4.4 Results and discussion 
4.4.1 Statistical tests 
Table 4-1 summaries the statistic tests of the system GMM estimator and IV regression 
models.37 For the system GMM estimator, tests of second-order autocorrelation fail to 
reject the null hypotheses for all sample countries and for all groups of countries in 
both the short- and long-term samples and show that the errors in the difference 
equation do not display the second-order autocorrelation. Results of the Sargan test in 
the system GMM estimator in three groups of countries in the long term fail to reject 
the null hypotheses, suggesting that the instruments are jointly uncorrelated with the 
error term.38 The p-values of the Sargan test in the short term and in all sample 
countries in the long term help to reject the null hypothesis, suggesting that not all 
instruments are valid and that at least one instrument is not valid.39 Regarding the IV 
regression model, the p-values of the over-identification and weakness of instruments 
tests for both the short- and long-term samples reveal that the instruments are valid but 
weak. Therefore, the system GMM estimator is chosen as a baseline estimator in this 
chapter to tackle the endogeneity problem caused by omitted variables and reverse 
causality between per capita income and non-life insurance expenditure.40 
 
 
                                                 
37 Tests for endogeneity for all sample countries in the short term and long term reject the null hypothesis 
and show that the variables are endogenous. 
38 Roodman (2009b) mentioned that a high p-value of the Sargan test needs to be considered with 
concern. A high p-value may be caused by too many instruments and lead to accepting the null 
hypothesis implausibly. If the p-value of the Sargan test is close to 1, the number of instruments should 
be reduced. 
39 Failure to reject the null hypothesis of the Sargan test does not guarantee that all instruments are valid 
(Cameron and Trivedi 2009). 
40 This study follows Vaona (2008) to apply the RoyZeller test for the poolability of data across 
countries to check whether the coefficients of variables are equal to each other. Rejecting the poolability 
hypothesis of the RoyZeller test indicates that the explanatory variables may vary greatly across 
countries. This finding supports the use of the system GMM estimator, as it can estimate the effects of 
factors both across countries and over time. 
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Table 4-1. Summary of statistic tests 
 Short term (20002011) Long term (19802009) 
Tests All 
sample 
countries 
Developed 
countries 
Developing 
countries 
All 
sample 
countries 
High-
income 
countries 
Upper-
middle-
income 
countries 
Lower-
middle-
income 
countries 
 (1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c) (2d) 
The system GMM estimator 
Sargan test (p-
value) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.132 0.104 0.127 
Arellano-Bond test 
for AR(2) (p-value) 
0.762 0.445 0.960 0.615 0.501 0.782 0.634 
The IV regression model 
Weakness of 
instruments (1st F) 
8.262 0.383 36.34 0.940 5.340 2.613 0.891 
Sargan test (p-
value) 
0.210 0.162 0.000 0.126 0.646 0.475 0.407 
4.4.2 Determinants of non-life insurance expenditure in the short term (20002011) 
Results in Table 4-2 below show the effect of the determinants on non-life insurance 
expenditure for all countries, developed countries, and developing countries in the 
short term of the chosen variables based on the system GMM dynamic panel data 
estimators, the benchmark model in this chapter.41 The findings in regard to all sample 
countries in Table 4.2 show that the initial non-life insurance expenditure and per 
capita income have a highly significant effect on non-life insurance expenditure. A 
significant positive coefficient of the initial non-life insurance expenditure indicates 
that spending on non-life insurance in the previous period plays an important role in 
developing non-life insurance expenditure in the stage of interest. This finding is 
consistent with hypothesis H4-1 and supports the finding of Esho et al. (2004), who 
found a positive (but insignificant) effect of the initial non-life insurance expenditure. 
The significant positive coefficient of per capita income supports hypothesis H4-1 and 
confirms the prediction that a higher per capita income may lead to an increase in non-
life insurance expenditure. This finding is also consistent with the findings in Chapter 
3 and previous papers (e.g., Outreville 1990; Browne, Chung and Frees 2000; Esho et 
al. 2004; Elango and Jones 2011; Park and Lemaire 2012; Trinh, Nguyen and Sgro 
2016). The insignificant effects of economic freedom and urbanisation compared with 
Chapter 3 may be due to the dominant effect of the initial non-life insurance 
expenditure. 
                                                 
41 This research also examines the effect of the categories of the summary index of economic freedom 
on non-life insurance expenditure for all sample countries and for developed countries and developing 
countries in the short term using the system GMM estimator. The results are presented in Tables A4-8, 
A4-9 and A4-10.   
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For the four former cultural variables of Hofstede, the results based on the system 
GMM estimator show that masculinity has a significant effect on non-life insurance 
expenditure. This result supports hypothesis H4-2 and is consistent with the finding of 
Chapter 3. It also supports the findings of previous papers (Chui and Kwok 2008; Park 
and Lemaire 2011). In a high masculinity society, men focus on their material success, 
such as career and business, whereas women focus on improvements in the quality of 
their family. Dermott (2008) also claimed that men in the UK contribute a larger 
proportion of the total family income than women. Therefore, people in high masculine 
countries may spend less on non-life insurance, as their income may be decreased due 
to the different roles between men and women. The weakly significant positive effect 
of long-term orientation on non-life expenditure does not support hypothesis H4-2 and 
is inconsistent with the results of the previous chapter. This surprising result might be 
due to the heterogeneity among countries in our sample. Another possible explanation 
may be that individuals in some countries may spend on non-life insurance covering 
health, accidents and all damages or loss of property to protect their family and support 
their optimistic outlook oriented towards the future. 
The results in Table 4-2 also show the effects of the two legal system variables on non-
life insurance expenditure in the short term. Islamic Law has a negative effect, thereby 
supporting hypothesis H4-4. This finding is consistent with the results in Chapter 3 and 
the study by Park and Lemaire (2012). Meanwhile, there is a weakly significant 
positive effect of Common Law on non-life insurance expenditure, thereby supporting 
hypothesis H4-4. This finding provides evidence that creditors’ rights or shareholders 
may be protected better in Common Law countries than in other countries. 
For developed countries, the empirical results presented in Table 4-2 based on the 
system GMM estimator show that economic freedom, per capita income, bank 
development, education, urbanisation, masculinity and hypometropia are the drivers 
of non-life insurance expenditure and these findings are consistent with the results of 
Chapter 3. The significant negative coefficient of hypometropia indicates that 
individuals in developed countries may feel more secure than in developing countries; 
hence, spending on non-life insurance may decrease. The positive effect of the initial 
non-life insurance expenditure supports hypothesis H4-1 and the finding in the case of 
all sample countries. 
Finally, the results in Table 4-2 with regard to developing countries show that per 
capita income, urbanisation and hypometropia have a significant positive influence, 
whereas indulgence, long-term orientation, uncertainty avoidance and Islamic Law 
have a significant negative effect. These results are consistent with the findings of 
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Chapter 3. However, a number of the findings that are different to those in Chapter 3 
have been found in the dynamic panel data model as follows. The initial non-life 
insurance expenditure has a positive effect on non-life insurance expenditure, while 
the effects of economic freedom, bank development and education are insignificant. 
This may be due to the dominant effect of the initial non-life insurance expenditure. 
Finally, the finding based on the system GMM estimator also proves that Common 
Law is a key factor in explaining spending on non-life insurance. 
Table 4-2. Determinants of non-life insurance expenditure in the short-term (system 
GMM) 
 All sample 
countries 
Developed 
countries 
Developing 
countries 
Lagged lnINS 0.8445*** 0.8901*** 0.7056*** 
 (0.0396) (0.0359) (0.0643) 
EFI 0.0141 0.0733 
(p-value=0.112) 
0.0251 
 (0.0323) (0.0461) (0.0364) 
lnINC 0.1950*** 0.1325** 0.6644*** 
 (0.0542) (0.0604) (0.1333) 
BDV -0.0001 -0.0006** 0.0002 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0009) 
EDU -0.0002 -0.0012 
(p-value=0.109) 
0.0006 
 (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0011) 
URB 0.0002 -0.0019** 0.0024** 
 (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0011) 
IND -0.0445 0.0170 -1.0534*** 
 (0.0867) (0.0885) (0.2260) 
IDV 0.0122 0.0977 -0.2664** 
 (0.0669) (0.0694) (0.1142) 
LTO 0.0678* 0.0846 -0.5829*** 
 (0.0401) (0.0632) (0.1842) 
MAS -0.1160*** -0.1861*** 0.0316 
 (0.0321) (0.0524) (0.1906) 
UAI -0.0246 0.0032 -1.0594*** 
 (0.0440) (0.0599) (0.3702) 
PDI 0.0582 0.0402 0.0154 
 (0.0549) (0.0500) (0.1502) 
HPM 0.00004 -0.0603* 0.1141*** 
 (0.0102) (0.0331) (0.0270) 
ISL -0.0895**  -0.3943*** 
 (0.0396)  (0.1229) 
CML 0.0402 
(p-value=0.145) 
0.0300 0.0797* 
 (0.0276) (0.0444) (0.0468) 
Observations 460 280 180 
R-squared 0.995 0.988 0.986 
Sargan test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-value) 0.762 0.445 0.960 
Notes: *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Numbers in 
parentheses show asymptotic standard errors. Constant and year-fixed effects are included but not 
reported here. 
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4.4.3 Determinants of non-life insurance expenditure in the long term (19802009) 
4.4.3.1 Determinants of non-life insurance expenditure in all sample countries 
This chapter next investigates the determinants on non-life insurance expenditure in 
the long-term sample (19802009). The findings based on the system GMM estimator, 
as presented in Table 4-3, show that the initial non-life insurance expenditure, 
economic freedom, per capita income, education and urbanisation have a highly 
significant effect on non-life insurance expenditure. A significant positive coefficient 
of the initial non-life insurance expenditure is in line with the results based on the 
short-term sample, indicating that spending on non-life insurance in the previous 
period plays an important role in developing non-life insurance expenditure in the later 
stage. Significant effects of per capita income, masculinity, Islamic Law and Common 
Law are found, and they are consistent with the findings in the short term. A number 
of interesting results have been captured in the long term. The positive coefficient of 
economic freedom supports hypothesis H4-1 and provides evidence that higher 
economic freedom may lead to an increase in non-life insurance expenditure in the 
long term. This finding is also consistent with the findings of Chapter 3 and previous 
papers (e.g., Outreville 1990; Browne, Chung and Frees 2000; Esho et al. 2004; Elango 
and Jones 2011; Park and Lemaire 2012). The negative effect of education on non-life 
insurance expenditure does not support hypotheses H4-1. This may be because highly 
educated people may avoid risks in the long term by having good risk management 
and being self-insured rather than choosing fully non-life insurance policies. 
Interestingly, indulgence and hypometropia, the later cultural variables of Hofstede, 
Hofstede and Minkov (2010) and Minkov (2011) that have been mostly ignored in 
other related papers, have a significant influence on non-life insurance expenditure in 
the long term, while an insignificant effect of these two variables on non-life insurance 
expenditure has been found in the short term and in Chapter 3. These findings support 
hypotheses H4-2 and H4-3 and can be explained as follows. Non-life insurance 
expenditure in countries with high indulgence may be low due to the optimistic nature 
of individuals. A higher degree of hypometropia index for a country can result in more 
spending on non-life insurance due to increased national murder rates and violence. 
People in such a society may want to take non-life insurance policies to cover risks. 
For the four former cultural variables of Hofstede, the negative effects of uncertainty 
avoidance and individualism on non-life expenditure do not support hypothesis H4-3.
42 
These surprising results might be due to the heterogeneity among the countries in our 
sample. Another possible explanation is that individuals living in countries with a high 
                                                 
42 The significantly negative coefficients of these variables may be due to high correlations among 
independent variables such as education and individualism causing the collinearity problem. The study 
has analysed this problem by dropping the education variable, and the results in Table A4-22 show that 
the sign of the significant variables is unchanged after dropping the education variable; hence, 
collinearity may not be an issue in the sample dataset of this chapter. 
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degree of uncertainty avoidance and individualism may not always use non-life 
insurance to cover their risks; For example, Wong (2012) showed that a regret-averse 
producer never fully covers the revenue risk, regardless of whether the insurance 
contract is actuarially fair. 
Table 4-3. Determinants of non-life insurance expenditure in all sample countries 
(long term) 
 Pooled OLS Random-
effect GLS 
IV System 
GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lagged lnINS 0.6650*** 0.6149*** 0.5533*** 0.4655*** 
 (0.0346) (0.0381) (0.1121) (0.0544) 
EFI 0.0607** 0.1007*** 0.5187 0.1395*** 
 (0.0275) (0.0278) (0.4087) (0.0339) 
lnINC 0.4155*** 0.4628*** 0.4220*** 0.7511*** 
 (0.0504) (0.0573) (0.0762) (0.0959) 
BDV 0.0003 0.0004 -0.0008 0.0002 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0014) (0.0006) 
EDU -0.0008 -0.0015 -0.0021 -0.0024* 
 (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0024) (0.0013) 
URB 0.0045** 0.0051** 0.0086* 0.0068*** 
 (0.0019) (0.0022) (0.0046) (0.0014) 
IND -0.6456*** -0.6800*** -1.1264** -0.9711*** 
 (0.1611) (0.1934) (0.4910) (0.1806) 
IDV -0.1399 -0.1006 -0.3606 -0.4378** 
 (0.1499) (0.1832) (0.2991) (0.1773) 
LTO 0.0955 0.0729 -0.1648 -0.1944 
 (0.1238) (0.1496) (0.2970) (0.1235) 
MAS -0.2295** -0.2379** -0.1057 -0.1649** 
 (0.0954) (0.1164) (0.1810) (0.0682) 
UAI -0.1625 -0.1365 -0.1696 -0.3860*** 
 (0.1344) (0.1642) (0.2027) (0.1369) 
PDI -0.0113 0.0190 0.3049 0.0416 
 (0.1414) (0.1725) (0.3525) (0.1108) 
HPM 0.0194 0.0202 0.0384 0.0415*** 
 (0.0158) (0.0181) (0.0292) (0.0143) 
ISL -0.2391** -0.2567* -0.5862* -0.2694*** 
 (0.1070) (0.1342) (0.3479) (0.0789) 
CML 0.0959 0.0869 -0.1214 0.1017** 
 (0.0616) (0.0757) (0.2141) (0.0462) 
Observations 202 202 202 202 
R-squared 0.985 0.984 0.962 0.980 
Weakness of instruments (1st F)   0.94  
Sargan test (p-value)   0.126 0.008 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-value)    0.615 
Notes: *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Numbers in 
parentheses show asymptotic standard errors. Constant and year-fixed effects are included but not 
reported here. 
This chapter also examines the effects on non-life insurance spending of the categories 
of economic freedom, including SOG, PRI, SMO, FTT and REG, using the system 
GMM estimator. As shown in columns (1), (3), (4) and (5) in Table 4-4, SOG, SMO, 
FTT and REG have a significantly positive effect on non-life insurance expenditure in 
the long term. These results clearly support the result of the positive effect of the 
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summary index of economic freedom (EFI) on non-life insurance expenditure in the 
long term in column (6), and they are also consistent with the findings of Chapter 3. 
Table 4-4. Determinants of non-life insurance expenditure in all sample countries 
(long term, categories of economic freedom index) 
 SGO PRI SMO FTT REG EFI 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lagged lnINS 0.4502*** 0.4539*** 0.3165*** 0.5700*** 0.4583*** 0.4655*** 
 (0.0532) (0.0563) (0.0668) (0.0520) (0.0536) (0.0544) 
SGO 0.0795*** − − − − − 
 (0.0208)      
PRI − 0.0268 − − − − 
  (0.0320)     
SMO − − 0.0553*** − − − 
   (0.0157)    
FTT − − − 0.0760*** − − 
    (0.0223)   
REG − − − − 0.1553*** − 
     (0.0332)  
EFI − − − − − 0.1395*** 
      (0.0339) 
lnINC 0.8604*** 0.8650*** 0.8940*** 0.5935*** 0.6721*** 0.7511*** 
 (0.0940) (0.1054) (0.1150) (0.1056) (0.0906) (0.0959) 
BDV 0.0005 0.0001 0.0014** 0.0003 0.0010 0.0002 
 (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0006) 
EDU -0.0022* -0.0027* -0.0018 -0.0020 -0.0013 -0.0024* 
 (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0013) 
URB 0.0045*** 0.0059*** 0.0093*** 0.0052*** 0.0049*** 0.0068*** 
 (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) 
IND -0.8969*** -1.0005*** -0.8319*** -0.8078*** -0.7477*** -0.9711*** 
 (0.1698) (0.2062) (0.2047) (0.2021) (0.1697) (0.1806) 
IDV -0.2688 -0.5956*** -0.3045 -0.3808* -0.1303 -0.4378** 
 (0.1686) (0.2261) (0.2073) (0.2082) (0.1757) (0.1773) 
LTO -0.1532 -0.2117* -0.2811** -0.0907 -0.1244 -0.1944 
 (0.1155) (0.1252) (0.1367) (0.1269) (0.1183) (0.1235) 
MAS -0.2049*** -0.1473* -0.2153*** -0.1744** -0.1875*** -0.1649** 
 (0.0680) (0.0835) (0.0696) (0.0728) (0.0714) (0.0682) 
UAI -0.5099*** -0.4851*** -0.3401** -0.3341** -0.1544 -0.3860*** 
 (0.1378) (0.1521) (0.1552) (0.1556) (0.1397) (0.1369) 
PDI -0.0275 0.0014 -0.0941 0.0027 -0.0431 0.0416 
 (0.1085) (0.1228) (0.1154) (0.1180) (0.1117) (0.1108) 
HPM 0.0206 0.0551*** 0.0408*** 0.0269* 0.0166 0.0415*** 
 (0.0140) (0.0192) (0.0158) (0.0154) (0.0143) (0.0143) 
ISL -0.2198*** -0.1542** -0.1678** -0.2672*** -0.2992*** -0.2694*** 
 (0.0773) (0.0784) (0.0772) (0.0837) (0.0845) (0.0789) 
CML 0.0806 0.1829*** 0.1693*** 0.1480*** -0.0032 0.1017** 
 (0.0494) (0.0462) (0.0451) (0.0476) (0.0591) (0.0462) 
Observations 201 202 198 202 202 202 
R-squared 0.977 0.989 0.975 0.983 0.980 0.980 
Sargan test (p-value) 0.021 0.038 0.004 0.003 0.014 0.008 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) 
(p-value) 
0.606 0.998 0.950 0.184 0.768 0.615 
Notes: *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Numbers in 
parentheses show asymptotic standard errors. Constant and year-fixed effects are included but not 
reported here.  
Similar to Chapter 3, this chapter replaces non-life insurance density by penetration 
and density adjusted by PPP for the robustness check. The results based on non-life 
insurance density and density adjusted by PPP in columns (1) and (2) in Table 4-5 
prove that most determinants are robust. However, the results based on the non-life 
insurance penetration in column (3) are slightly different to the other indicators of non-
life insurance measurement. This may be because the non-life insurance penetration 
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measured by the ratio of direct premiums to GDP is used to proxy for the degree of 
non-life insurance activities, which are relative to the size of the economy rather than 
individual spending on non-life insurance. Additionally, the adjusted R-square based 
on the regressions that contain penetration and the PPP factor are lower than that 
containing the density of non-life insurance. This finding is consistent with the result 
of Chapter 3 and supports the evidence that using non-life insurance density as a main 
proxy for non-life insurance expenditure is preferable. 
Table 4-5. Determinants of non-life insurance expenditure in all sample countries 
(long term, using alternative measurements) 
 Density 
(Premiums per 
capita) 
Density (Premiums 
per capita at PPP) 
Penetration 
(Premiums per 
GDP) 
 System GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Lagged lnINS 0.4655*** 0.3202*** 0.6120*** 
 (0.0544) (0.0535) (0.0557) 
EFI 0.1395*** 0.0538** 0.0052 
 (0.0339) (0.0267) (0.0251) 
lnINC 0.7511*** 0.8123*** 0.1148* 
 (0.0959) (0.0970) (0.0658) 
BDV 0.0002 0.0002 0.0010** 
 (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0004) 
EDU -0.0024* -0.0013 0.0004 
 (0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0010) 
URB 0.0068*** 0.0054*** 0.0031*** 
 (0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0010) 
IND -0.9711*** -1.0361*** -0.3263** 
 (0.1806) (0.1793) (0.1576) 
IDV -0.4378** -0.5344*** -0.0360 
 (0.1773) (0.1702) (0.1417) 
LTO -0.1944 -0.2963*** -0.0174 
 (0.1235) (0.1081) (0.0956) 
MAS -0.1649** -0.1679*** -0.1369*** 
 (0.0682) (0.0571) (0.0518) 
UAI -0.3860*** -0.4503*** -0.1621 
 (0.1369) (0.1270) (0.1136) 
PDI 0.0416 0.2411** 0.0666 
 (0.1108) (0.0985) (0.0867) 
HPM 0.0415*** 0.0626*** 0.0265** 
 (0.0143) (0.0147) (0.0126) 
ISL -0.2694*** -0.1521** -0.2090*** 
 (0.0789) (0.0672) (0.0608) 
CML 0.1017** 0.2503*** 0.1065*** 
 (0.0462) (0.0408) (0.0363) 
Observations 202 199 202 
R-squared 0.980 0.956 0.881 
Sargan test (p-value) 0.008 0.000 0.004 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-value) 0.615 0.498 0.249 
Notes: *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Numbers in 
parentheses show asymptotic standard errors. Constant and year-fixed effects are included but not 
reported here.  
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To examine how much variation is explained by economic, cultural and legal factors, 
this study ran four regressions. The results in Table 4-6 show that the group including 
all of these factors yields the highest R-squared coefficient: 0.980 in column (4). The 
increasing of the adjusted R-square shows that cultural and legal factors, along with 
economic factors, are also key drivers in explaining their effect on non-life insurance 
expenditure. 
Table 4-6. Determinants of non-life insurance expenditure in all sample countries 
(long term, three groups of factors, system GMM) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lagged lnINS 0.3820*** 0.4028*** 0.4762*** 0.4655*** 
 (0.0501) (0.0504) (0.0554) (0.0544) 
EFI 0.0231 0.0336 0.1399*** 0.1395*** 
 (0.0319) (0.0322) (0.0346) (0.0339) 
lnINC 0.7866*** 0.7511*** 0.7317*** 0.7511*** 
 (0.0736) (0.0746) (0.0963) (0.0959) 
BDV 0.0011** 0.0008* 0.0001 0.0002 
 (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
EDU 0.0028*** 0.0020** -0.0023* -0.0024* 
 (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0013) 
URB 0.0014 0.0008 0.0051*** 0.0068*** 
 (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0014) 
IND − − -0.9140*** -0.9711*** 
   (0.1800) (0.1806) 
IDV − − -0.3291* -0.4378** 
   (0.1727) (0.1773) 
LTO − − -0.1736 -0.1944 
   (0.1147) (0.1235) 
MAS − − -0.1537** -0.1649** 
   (0.0685) (0.0682) 
UAI − − -0.3107** -0.3860*** 
   (0.1291) (0.1369) 
PDI − − -0.1131 0.0416 
   (0.0925) (0.1108) 
HPM − − 0.0422*** 0.0415*** 
   (0.0145) (0.0143) 
ISL − -0.2767*** − -0.2694*** 
  (0.0506)  (0.0789) 
CML − 0.0382 − 0.1017** 
  (0.0348)  (0.0462) 
Observations 257 257 202 202 
R-squared 0.976 0.978 0.979 0.980 
Sargan test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.008 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-value) 0.636 0.613 0.573 0.615 
Notes: *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Numbers in 
parentheses show asymptotic standard errors. Constant and year-fixed effects are included but not 
reported here. (1): economic factor; (2): economic and legal system factors; (3) economic and cultural 
factors; (4) full factors. 
As discussed in Section 4.1, the effects of various socio-economic factors on non-life 
insurance may be different across groups of countries based on income levels over the 
long term. For further investigation, this chapter classifies all sample economies into 
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three groups based on levels of income: high-income, upper-middle-income and 
lower-middle-income countries.43 The results are discussed in turn. 
4.4.3.2 Determinants of non-life insurance expenditure in high-income countries 
The likewise regressions as those reported in Table 4-3 but concentrating on 43 high-
income countries44 (see Table A4-24 in the Appendix for these countries) are carried 
out and reported in Table 4-7. Results based on the system GMM estimator show that 
masculinity and uncertainty avoidance have a negative effect on non-life insurance 
expenditure in the long term. These findings are consistent with those in the case of all 
sample countries. The negative effect of uncertainty avoidance may be because people 
with a high degree of uncertainty avoidance may find ways to avoid risks other than 
insurance products. For example, Ballie, Basher and Balli (2011) argued that 
individuals’ income, which can be affected by risks, can be ensured by investing in 
foreign assets and domestic channels such as the tax transfer system, cross-ownership 
of productive assets and lending or borrowing on national credit markets. Further, 
those concerned people may know the probability of loss better than the insurance 
companies in some cases, as they may possess superior information and can therefore 
push insurers to receive a low non-life insurance price (Wu and Yang 2012). In turn, 
premiums on non-life insurance in the economy would decline. 
The results based on Table 4-7 also indicate that spending on non-life insurance in the 
previous year, economic freedom and per capita income all have a positive effect on 
non-life insurance expenditure in the current year, thereby supporting hypothesis H4-1. 
The negative influence of education on non-life insurance expenditure does not 
support hypothesis H4-1; however, this finding is consistent with that of Outreville 
(1990) and Browne, Chung and Frees (2000). An explanation for this is that 
individuals in countries with a higher level of education may find other ways to hedge 
risks other than purchasing non-life insurance products. Finally, the effects of bank 
                                                 
43 According to the World Bank (2016), the definition of the various income levels is as follows: 
‘middle-income economies are those with a GNI per capita of more than US$1,045 but less than 
US$12,746; high-income economies are those with a GNI per capita of US$12,746 or more. Lower-
middle-income and upper-middle-income economies are separated at a GNI per capita of US$4,125’ 
(see Table A4-24 in the Appendix for a list of these economies).  
44 Similar to the case of all sample countries, for the robustness check, this chapter uses non-life 
insurance density adjusted by PPP and penetration to replace non-life insurance density in cases of three 
groups of countries based on income levels. The results are displayed in Tables A4-19, A4-20 and A4-
21. 
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development and urbanisation on non-life insurance expenditure in high-income 
countries are both insignificant. 
Table 4-7. Determinants of non-life insurance expenditure in high-income countries 
(long term) 
 Pooled OLS Random-
effect GLS 
IV System 
GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lagged lnINS 0.7147*** 0.6890*** 0.7986*** 0.5717*** 
 (0.0373) (0.0404) (0.0595) (0.0772) 
EFI 0.0750** 0.0862** -0.1915 0.1204** 
 (0.0361) (0.0363) (0.1404) (0.0479) 
lnINC 0.1297** 0.1564** 0.1808** 0.3969*** 
 (0.0645) (0.0699) (0.0768) (0.1141) 
BDV 0.0010* 0.0010 0.0017** 0.0003 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0006) 
EDU -0.0008 -0.0011 -0.0000 -0.0024* 
 (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0013) 
URB -0.0036 -0.0032 -0.0048* 0.0002 
 (0.0023) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0024) 
IND -0.2384 -0.2045 -0.2870 -0.2924 
 (0.2070) (0.2336) (0.2335) (0.1927) 
IDV 0.1694 0.1567 0.2899 -0.0476 
 (0.1549) (0.1747) (0.1840) (0.1509) 
LTO 0.2991** 0.2771* 0.5433*** 0.1134 
 (0.1380) (0.1555) (0.1979) (0.1506) 
MAS -0.3346*** -0.3419*** -0.3563*** -0.2594*** 
 (0.0941) (0.1055) (0.1062) (0.0849) 
UAI -0.2076 -0.2131 -0.1515 -0.2332* 
 (0.1481) (0.1678) (0.1686) (0.1194) 
PDI 0.0033 0.0114 -0.1273 0.0048 
 (0.1282) (0.1441) (0.1582) (0.1041) 
HPM -0.0110 -0.0183 0.0605 -0.0025 
 (0.0398) (0.0443) (0.0574) (0.0339) 
CML 0.1124 0.1065 0.3100** 0.0785 
 (0.0777) (0.0870) (0.1324) (0.0755) 
Observations 138 138 138 138 
R-squared 0.976 0.976 0.966 0.972 
Weakness of instruments (1st F)   5.34  
Sargan test (p-value)   0.646 0.132 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-value)    0.501 
Notes: *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Numbers in 
parentheses show asymptotic standard errors. Constant and year-fixed effects are included but not 
reported here.  
4.4.3.3 Determinants of non-life insurance expenditure in upper-middle-income 
countries 
This study turns next to the determinants on non-life insurance expenditure in the long 
term for the 14 upper-middle-income countries, using the same analysis with all 
sample countries and high-income countries. Table 4-8 presents the results. As shown, 
one-year-lagged non-life insurance expenditure, economic freedom and per capita 
income all have a positive effect on non-life insurance expenditure, thereby supporting 
the hypotheses. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
86 
 
The effect of indulgence and long-term orientation on non-life insurance expenditure 
is positive and does not support hypothesis H4-2. It is possible that individuals in upper-
middle-income countries with a higher degree of indulgence (e.g., Bulgaria and 
Turkey) may increase non-life insurance expenditure as a way to hedge risks. 
Meanwhile, people living in countries with a higher degree of long-term orientation 
may spend more on non-life insurance products to protect their family from risks. 
Undoubtedly, people living in countries with a higher degree of violence and murder 
rates may feel unsafe and pessimistic; thus, they may increase their spending on non-
life insurance, leading to the positive sign of the coefficient on hypometropia in Table 
4-8. The negative effects of individualism and masculinity support hypothesis H4-2 and 
are consistent with the result of all sample countries. 
Table 4-8. Determinants of non-life insurance expenditure in upper-middle-income 
countries (long term) 
 Pooled OLS Random-
effect GLS 
IV System 
GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lagged lnINS 0.2289 0.2289 0.1839 0.2289* 
 (0.1610) (0.1610) (0.1448) (0.1360) 
EFI 0.3436*** 0.3436*** 0.6041*** 0.3436*** 
 (0.0775) (0.0775) (0.1511) (0.0655) 
lnINC 0.6103** 0.6103** 0.5172** 0.6103** 
 (0.2905) (0.2905) (0.2623) (0.2454) 
BDV 0.0029 0.0029 0.0023 0.0029 
 (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0027) (0.0025) 
EDU 0.0076 0.0076 0.0193** 0.0076 
 (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0085) (0.0057) 
URB 0.0028 0.0028 0.0199 0.0028 
 (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0167) (0.0135) 
IND 4.8634** 4.8634** 9.0376*** 4.8634*** 
 (2.1115) (2.1115) (2.8568) (1.7837) 
IDV -3.5231** -3.5231** -5.0532*** -3.5231*** 
 (1.3689) (1.3689) (1.4495) (1.1564) 
LTO 6.6462** 6.6462*** 10.6233*** 6.6462*** 
 (2.4438) (2.4438) (2.9875) (2.0645) 
MAS -5.7637*** -5.7637*** -9.0139*** -5.7637*** 
 (1.7207) (1.7207) (2.2696) (1.4536) 
UAI 0.5576 0.5576 -1.2593 0.5576 
 (1.2702) (1.2702) (1.4670) (1.0731) 
PDI -0.8763 -0.8763 -5.6569 -0.8763 
 (4.3144) (4.3144) (4.5566) (3.6447) 
HPM 0.3730** 0.3730*** 0.3554*** 0.3730*** 
 (0.1339) (0.1339) (0.1192) (0.1131) 
ISL 0.6488 0.6488 1.4622 0.6488 
 (1.0400) (1.0400) (1.0142) (0.8786) 
CML 0.0441 0.0441 -0.1767 0.0441 
 (0.5533) (0.5533) (0.5042) (0.4674) 
Observations 41 41 41 41 
R-squared 0.986 0.986 0.978 0.986 
Weakness of instruments (1st F)   2.613  
Sargan test (p-value)   0.475 0.104 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-value)    0.782 
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Notes: *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Numbers in 
parentheses show asymptotic standard errors. Constant and year-fixed effects are included but not 
reported here.  
4.4.3.4 Determinants of non-life insurance expenditure in lower-middle-income 
countries 
Finally, this chapter explores the determinants of non-life insurance expenditure in the 
long term in 10 lower-middle-income countries in all sample countries. Table 4-9 
reports the results. From the system GMM estimator, it can be stated that in contrast 
to the remaining groups, the previous year’s non-life insurance expenditure in lower-
middle-income countries does not explain subsequent spending. This may be attributed 
to the low level of development of the non-life insurance market in those countries. 
Nevertheless, the effects of economic freedom, per capita income and urbanisation on 
non-life insurance expenditure are all significantly positive, which is consistent with 
the results for all sample countries and supports the hypotheses. Notably, the positive 
effect of urbanisation emphasises that urbanisation in lower-middle-income 
economies fosters greater non-life insurance expenditure than that of high-income and 
upper-middle-income economies. 
Table 4-9 also reveals a negative effect of hypometropia on non-life insurance 
expenditure. Valid explanations for this are that individuals in under-developed 
countries might accept risks caused by unsafe circumstances due to their optimistic 
nature (Shaw 2006) and there is a lack of effective insurance instruments in those 
countries (Jung and Tran 2012). For legal system variables, the positive effect of 
Common Law on non-life insurance expenditure supports hypothesis H4-4 and 
confirms the role played by Common Law in non-life insurance expenditure in lower-
middle-income countries. Some coefficients of cultural variables based on the system 
GMM estimator in column (4), such as indulgence, individualism, masculinity, 
uncertainty avoidance and power distance, are dropped due to collinearity. 
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Table 4-9. Determinants of non-life insurance expenditure in lower-middle-income 
countries (long term) 
 Pooled OLS Random-
effect GLS 
IV System 
GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lagged lnINS 0.2501 0.2501** 0.4168** 0.2501 
 (0.2060) (0.1215) (0.2007) (0.1643) 
EFI 0.3012*** 0.3012*** 0.4234*** 0.3012*** 
 (0.0806) (0.0476) (0.1198) (0.0643) 
lnINC 1.1339* 1.1339*** 1.1914*** 1.1339** 
 (0.5556) (0.3277) (0.3751) (0.4432) 
BDV 0.0055 0.0055** 0.0036 0.0055 
 (0.0043) (0.0026) (0.0033) (0.0035) 
EDU -0.0212 -0.0212 -0.0281* -0.0212 
 (0.0223) (0.0132) (0.0161) (0.0178) 
URB 0.0557*** 0.0557*** 0.0568*** 0.0557*** 
 (0.0153) (0.0090) (0.0103) (0.0122) 
IND − 0.1309 0.3456 − 
  (0.5008) (0.5984)  
IDV − 3.5592*** 4.3064*** − 
  (0.8113) (1.1290)  
LTO 0.4714 2.4539** 3.5047** 0.4714 
 (1.0629) (1.1912) (1.6345) (0.8478) 
MAS − -1.0067 0.2472 − 
  (1.7936) (2.3118)  
UAI − − − − 
     
PDI − − − − 
     
HPM -0.1051* − − -0.1051** 
 (0.0526)   (0.0420) 
ISL -0.1231 − − -0.1231 
 (0.4800)   (0.3829) 
CML 0.8830 − − 0.8830** 
 (0.5167)   (0.4122) 
Observations 23 23 23 23 
R-squared 0.993 0.993 0.991 0.993 
Weakness of instruments (1st F)   0.891 − 
Sargan test (p-value)   0.407 0.127 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-value)    0.634 
Notes: *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Numbers in 
parentheses show asymptotic standard errors. Constant and year-fixed effects are included but not 
reported here. 
Table 4-10 summarises the findings of the determinants of non-life insurance 
expenditure in the long term in all cases discussed above. Apart from the positive effect 
of economic freedom and per capita income on non-life insurance expenditure, the 
effects of the other socio-economic factors on non-life insurance expenditure vary 
significantly across the three groups of countries. For example, education has a 
negative effect on non-life insurance expenditure in both high-income and all sample 
countries, but not in the remaining groups. In contrast, the effect of indulgence on non-
life insurance expenditure is negative in all sample countries, but positive in upper-
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middle-income economies. Interestingly, hypometropia has a positive effect on non-
life insurance in upper-middle-income countries, but a negative effect on lower-
middle-income countries. 
Table 4-10. Determinants of non-life insurance expenditure across three groups of 
countries (long term, system GMM) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lagged lnINS 0.4655*** 0.5717*** 0.2289* 0.2501 
 (0.0544) (0.0772) (0.1360) (0.1643) 
EFI 0.1395*** 0.1204** 0.3436*** 0.3012*** 
 (0.0339) (0.0479) (0.0655) (0.0643) 
lnINC 0.7511*** 0.3969*** 0.6103** 1.1339** 
 (0.0959) (0.1141) (0.2454) (0.4432) 
BDV 0.0002 0.0003 0.0029 0.0055 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0025) (0.0035) 
EDU -0.0024* -0.0024* 0.0076 -0.0212 
 (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0057) (0.0178) 
URB 0.0068*** 0.0002 0.0028 0.0557*** 
 (0.0014) (0.0024) (0.0135) (0.0122) 
IND -0.9711*** -0.2924 4.8634*** − 
 (0.1806) (0.1927) (1.7837)  
IDV -0.4378** -0.0476 -3.5231*** − 
 (0.1773) (0.1509) (1.1564)  
LTO -0.1944 0.1134 6.6462*** 0.4714 
 (0.1235) (0.1506) (2.0645) (0.8478) 
MAS -0.1649** -0.2594*** -5.7637*** − 
 (0.0682) (0.0849) (1.4536)  
UAI -0.3860*** -0.2332* 0.5576 − 
 (0.1369) (0.1194) (1.0731)  
PDI 0.0416 0.0048 -0.8763 − 
 (0.1108) (0.1041) (3.6447)  
HPM 0.0415*** -0.0025 0.3730*** -0.1051** 
 (0.0143) (0.0339) (0.1131) (0.0420) 
ISL -0.2694*** − 0.6488 -0.1231 
 (0.0789)  (0.8786) (0.3829) 
CML 0.1017** 0.0785 0.0441 0.8830** 
 (0.0462) (0.0755) (0.4674) (0.4122) 
Observations 202 138 41 23 
R-squared 0.980 0.972 0.986 0.9928 
Sargan test (p-value) 0.008 0.132 0.104 0.127 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-value) 0.615 0.501 0.782 0.634 
Notes: *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Numbers in 
parentheses show asymptotic standard errors. Constant and year-fixed effects are included but not 
reported here. (1): all sample countries; (2): high-income countries; (3): upper-middle-income countries; 
(4): lower-middle-income countries. 
Finally, Table 4-11 summarises the coefficients’ signs of results of the determinants 
of non-life insurance expenditure in the short term and long term based on the system 
GMM estimator for comparison purposes. As shown, factors such as initial non-life 
insurance expenditure, per capita income and legal system have a significant effect in 
both the short term and long term. Factors such as economic freedom, education, 
urbanisation, indulgence, individualism, uncertainty avoidance and hypometropia 
have an insignificant effect on non-life insurance expenditure in the short term, but a 
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significant effect in the long term. However, the effect of long-term orientation on non-
life insurance expenditure is significant in the short term but, insignificant in the long 
term. The significance level of the effect of Common Law on non-life insurance 
expenditure in the short term is lower than that in the long term. 
Table 4-11. Summary of the determinants of non-life insurance expenditure in the 
short term and long term (system GMM, all sample countries) 
 Short-term Long-term 
 (1) (2) 
Initial non-life insurance expenditure + + 
Economic freedom Insig. + 
Income per capita + + 
Bank development Insig. Insig. 
Education Insig. - 
Urbanisation Insig. + 
Indulgence Insig. - 
Individualism Insig. - 
Long-term orientation + Insig. 
Masculinity - - 
Uncertainty avoidance Insig. - 
Power distance Insig. Insig. 
Hypometropia Insig. + 
Islamic Law - - 
Common Law + * + 
Notes: +, -, insig. indicate positive or negative or insignificant effect of the related coefficients, 
respectively. * indicates significance at the 15% level (p-value=0.145). 
4.4.4 Implications 
Similar to the previous chapter, the findings of the current chapter can lead to useful 
implications for both non-life insurance companies and policymakers. The economic 
implication of the analysis relates to choosing potential markets. Multinational non-
life insurance companies can expand their business by setting up branches in upper-
middle-income countries that have a higher degree of hypometropia (e.g., South Africa 
and Colombia) and a lower degree of masculinity (e.g., Costa Rica and Thailand). 
Similarly, potential markets should be those in lower-middle-income countries with a 
lower degree of hypometropia (e.g., Morocco and Indonesia) and in high-income 
countries with a higher degree of uncertainty avoidance and masculinity (e.g., Japan 
and Hungary). In addition to these factors, non-life insurance companies can use the 
results regarding the effects of other socio-economic factors, such as economic 
freedom, per capita income, education and urbanisation, to support their decision-
making process with regard to what drives spending on non-life insurance products. 
For example, high-income countries with a high degree of economic freedom and a 
low degree of education (e.g., Luxembourg and Hong Kong) and lower-middle-
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income countries with a high degree of urbanisation (e.g., El Salvador and Morocco) 
would be potential markets for non-life insurance products. 
The analysis in this study also yields a number of policy implications. Notably, 
governments of lower-middle-income countries can develop the non-life insurance 
sector through policies that support urbanisation. Similarly, providing an environment 
that promotes economic freedom (e.g., low tariff, high personal choice, low 
government spending and high security of property rights) could be an effective way 
to develop the non-life insurance sector in all countries. 
This chapter has empirically investigated the key drivers of spending on non-life 
insurance in the short term and long term using the system GMM estimator approach. 
The analysis complements that of Chapter 3 and provides a better understanding of the 
determinants of non-life insurance expenditure in the short term and long term, and it 
generates useful policy and economic implications. 
4.5 Conclusion 
The current chapter has extended the previous chapter by using the system GMM 
estimator to examine the determinants of non-life insurance expenditure using the 
same sample countries in the short term (20002011) and the long term (19802009). 
The latest available dataset from the Fraser Institute, which contains updated data on 
the economic freedom index, as well as the latest cultural datasets of Hofstede, 
Hofstede and Minkov (2010) and Minkov (2011) have also been used in the analysis. 
By applying the system GMM estimator, this study has overcome the endogeneity 
problem caused by omitted variables of economic freedom and the reverse causality 
between per capita income and non-life insurance expenditure.  
For the short term (20002011), based on the system GMM estimator, it has been 
found that the effects of the one-year-lagged non-life insurance expenditure and per 
capita income on non-life insurance expenditure in all sample countries are positive, 
while the effects of economic freedom and urbanisation are insignificant. A positive 
effect of long-term orientation on non-life insurance expenditure has also been found, 
which contrasts with the finding of Chapter 3. Focusing on developed countries, 
coefficient estimates are generally consistent with their counterparts in Chapter 3. 
However, a number of interesting and different results have been found when focusing 
on developing countries. In particular, the previous year’s non-life insurance 
CHAPTER FOUR 
92 
 
expenditure and Common Law both play an important role in spending on non-life 
insurance, whereas the effects of economic freedom, bank development and education 
are all insignificant. 
For the long term (19802009), the effects of economic freedom, per capita income 
and urbanisation on non-life insurance expenditure in all sample countries have been 
found to be positive, which is consistent with the hypotheses and the findings of the 
previous chapter. In contrast, education has a negative effect on non-life insurance 
expenditure. In regard to culture, the results indicate that individualism and indulgence 
both have a negative effect on non-life insurance expenditure, while the effect of 
hypometropia is positive, as expected. The effect of Islamic Law on non-life insurance 
expenditure is negative, but that of Common Law is positive. 
Additionally, the effects of socio-economic factors on non-life insurance expenditure 
in the long-term in upper-middle-income economies have been found to be more 
significant than those in other groups (i.e., upper-middle-income and lower-middle-
income countries). Notably, indulgence, individualism and long-term orientation 
explain spending on non-life insurance in upper-middle-income countries, whereas 
uncertainty avoidance does so in the high-income countries, while these cultural 
factors mostly do not affect non-life insurance expenditure in lower-middle-income 
countries. For other factors, the empirical findings have illustrated that the effect of 
urbanisation on expenditure of non-life insurance is positive in the group of lower-
middle-income countries, while the effect of education is negative in the group of high-
income countries. Finally, the effect of Common Law on non-life insurance 
expenditure in lower-middle-income economies is found to be negative. 
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Appendix 
Table A4-1. Definition and sources of data 
Variable Hypothesis Description Abbrev. Sources of data 
Density of non-life 
insurance 
 Log of direct domestic premiums per capita, US dollars. lnINS Swiss Re (2014) 
Penetration of non-life 
insurance 
 Log of direct domestic premiums per GDP. lnINS Swiss Re (2014) 
Density of non-life 
insurance at PPP prices 
 Log of direct domestic premiums per capita, adjusted by PPP factors. lnINS Swiss Re (2014); 
IMF (2014) 
Economic freedom index + It is a chain-linked index of the Fraser Institute, calculated based on 5 areas: (1) size of government, (2) legal system and property rights, 
(3) access to sound money, (4) freedom to trade internationally, and (5) regulation. The index ranges from 0 to 100 with higher values 
indicating more freedom. 
EFI Fraser Institute 
(2014) 
Per capita GDP + Log of GDP per capita, US dollars lnINC World Bank 
(2014a) 
Bank development sector + Deposit money banks' assets to GDP (%). BDV World Bank 
(2014a) 
Education + School enrolment, tertiary (% gross). EDU World Bank 
(2014b) 
Urbanisation + Urban population (% of total). URB World Bank 
(2014b) 
Indulgence - A society in which people have the right to enjoy life and have fun. It is an index ranging from 0 to 100, with higher values indicating more 
happiness, leisure and enjoying life. 
IND Hofstede, 
Hofstede and 
Minkov (2010); 
and Minkov 
(2011) 
Individualism + A society in which the attachment between individuals is loose. It is an index ranging from 0 to 100, with higher values indicating a lower 
level of developing human relationships.  
IDV 
Long-term orientation - A positive, dynamic and future-oriented culture linked with four ‘positive’ Confucian values. It is an index ranging from 0 to 100, with 
higher values indicating more national pride, preservation of family values and traditions, and saving. 
LTO 
Masculinity - A society in which social gender roles are clearly distinct. In these societies, men focus on their material success, such as career and business, 
whereas women focus on improving the quality of their family. It is an index ranging from 0 to 100, with higher values indicating more 
masculinity. 
MAS 
Uncertainty avoidance + A society in which people feel threatened by uncertain situations and they want to avoid these matters. It is an index ranging from 0 to 100, 
with higher values indicating more uncertainty avoidance. 
UAI 
Power distance - Measures the interpersonal power or influence between the boss and subordinates and/or the degree of inequality among people in a society. 
It is an index ranging from 0 to 100, with higher values indicating more inequality, power distance. 
PDI 
Hypometropia + A society in that has high national murder rates and acceptance of mortal risks. It is an index ranging from 0 to 1000, with higher values 
indicating more serious violence and higher murder rates. 
HPM 
Islam law - Dummy variables with value = 1 for countries with an Islam Law (Islam Law dummy) and value = 0 otherwise. ISL Central 
Intelligence 
Agency (2014) Common Law + Dummy variables with value = 1 for countries with a Common Law (Common Law dummy) and value = 0 otherwise. CML 
IVs: the degree of trade openness (sum of export and import as a share of GDP; data source: World Bank 2014b; and life expectancy; data source: World Bank 2014b).  
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Table A4-2. Descriptive statistics in all sample countries (short term) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Logarithm of Density (lnINS) 804 5.05 1.85 -0.51 8.45 
Lagged logarithm of Density (lagged lnINS) 737 5.01 1.86 -0.51 8.43 
Logarithm of Density_PPP (lnINS) 804 5.57 1.47 0.56 8.30 
Lagged logarithm of Density_PPP (lagged lnINS) 737 5.55 1.48 0.56 8.28 
Logarithm of Penetration (lnINS) 804 0.50 0.65 -1.71 2.25 
Lagged logarithm of Penetration (lagged lnINS) 737 0.50 0.65 -1.71 2.25 
Summary economic freedom index (EFI) 801 7.12 0.85 3.78 9.07 
Size of government 801 6.18 1.48 2.56 9.41 
Legal system and property rights 801 6.48 1.89 1.45 9.62 
Access to sound money 801 8.48 1.37 2.71 9.89 
Freedom to trade internationally 801 7.58 1.14 2.85 9.72 
Regulation 802 6.86 0.87 4.23 8.95 
Logarithm of Income (per capita GDP) (lnINC) 797 9.14 1.31 5.86 11.38 
Deposit money banks' assets to GDP (BDV) (%) 743 83.14 51.93 4.74 245.13 
Education (EDU) (%) 649 49.61 23.49 2.61 113.98 
Urbanisation (URB) (%) 804 68.28 18.91 10.83 100.00 
Indulgence/100 (IND) 732 0.48 0.23 0.00 1.00 
Individualism/100 (IDV) 780 0.44 0.24 0.06 0.91 
Long-term orientation/100 (LTO) 744 0.48 0.22 0.13 1.00 
Masculinity/100 (MAS) 792 0.49 0.19 0.08 1.10 
Uncertainty avoidance/100 (UAI) 792 0.67 0.23 0.08 1.12 
Power distance/100 (PDI) 792 0.60 0.21 0.11 1.04 
Hypometropia/100 (HPM) 660 1.92 1.72 0.00 10.00 
Islam law (ISL) 804 0.10 0.31 0.00 1.00 
Common Law (CML) 804 0.25 0.44 0.00 1.00 
 
Table A4-3. Descriptive statistics in developed countries (short term) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Logarithm of Density (lnINS) 432 6.36 0.97 3.18 8.45 
Lagged logarithm of Density (lagged lnINS) 396 6.33 0.97 3.18 8.43 
Logarithm of Density_PPP (lnINS) 432 6.56 0.68 4.23 8.30 
Lagged logarithm of Density_PPP (lagged lnINS) 396 6.55 0.68 4.23 8.28 
Logarithm of Penetration (lnINS) 432 0.85 0.47 -0.97 2.25 
Lagged logarithm of Penetration (lagged lnINS) 396 0.85 0.46 -0.97 2.25 
Summary economic freedom index (EFI) 432 7.62 0.55 6.13 9.07 
Size of government 432 5.60 1.39 2.56 9.41 
Legal system and property rights 432 7.74 1.18 4.73 9.62 
Access to sound money 432 9.30 0.53 6.38 9.89 
Freedom to trade internationally 432 8.25 0.67 5.97 9.72 
Regulation 432 7.21 0.77 5.11 8.95 
Logarithm of Income (per capita GDP) (lnINC) 432 10.13 0.63 8.43 11.38 
Deposit money banks' assets to GDP (BDV) (%) 394 112.21 49.27 18.11 245.13 
Education (EDU) (%) 366 62.37 18.49 6.06 113.98 
Urbanisation (URB) (%) 432 74.82 16.12 10.83 100.00 
Indulgence/100 (IND) 420 0.49 0.20 0.13 0.80 
Individualism/100 (IDV) 420 0.60 0.21 0.16 0.91 
Long-term orientation/100 (LTO) 420 0.55 0.21 0.13 1.00 
Masculinity/100 (MAS) 432 0.50 0.23 0.08 1.10 
Uncertainty avoidance/100 (UAI) 432 0.64 0.24 0.08 1.12 
Power distance/100 (PDI) 432 0.49 0.19 0.11 1.04 
Hypometropia/100 (HPM) 384 1.20 0.50 0.00 2.38 
Islam law (ISL) 432 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00 
Common Law (CML) 432 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 
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Table A4-4. Descriptive statistics in developing countries (short term) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Logarithm of Density (lnINS) 372 3.53 1.42 -0.51 6.07 
Lagged logarithm of Density (lagged lnINS) 341 3.47 1.41 -0.51 6.07 
Logarithm of Density_PPP (lnINS) 372 4.43 1.30 0.56 6.76 
Lagged logarithm of Density_PPP (lagged lnINS) 341 4.39 1.30 0.56 6.76 
Logarithm of Penetration (lnINS) 372 0.11 0.60 -1.71 1.32 
Lagged logarithm of Penetration (lagged lnINS) 341 0.10 0.60 -1.71 1.32 
Summary economic freedom index (EFI) 369 6.53 0.74 3.78 8.05 
Size of government 369 6.86 1.27 3.23 9.28 
Legal system and property rights 369 5.00 1.45 1.45 7.82 
Access to sound money 369 7.52 1.43 2.71 9.75 
Freedom to trade internationally 369 6.79 1.07 2.85 8.86 
Regulation 370 6.44 0.81 4.23 8.29 
Logarithm of Income (per capita GDP) (lnINC) 365 7.96 0.83 5.86 9.34 
Deposit money banks' assets to GDP (BDV) (%) 349 50.33 31.15 4.74 136.66 
Education (EDU) (%) 283 33.12 18.49 2.61 78.63 
Urbanisation (URB) (%) 372 60.70 19.10 23.59 93.50 
Indulgence/100 (IND) 312 0.47 0.26 0.00 1.00 
Individualism/100 (IDV) 360 0.27 0.14 0.06 0.65 
Long-term orientation/100 (LTO) 324 0.39 0.21 0.13 0.87 
Masculinity/100 (MAS) 360 0.48 0.12 0.21 0.73 
Uncertainty avoidance/100 (UAI) 360 0.71 0.21 0.30 1.01 
Power distance/100 (PDI) 360 0.73 0.15 0.35 1.04 
Hypometropia/100 (HPM) 276 2.92 2.24 0.49 10.00 
Islam law (ISL) 372 0.19 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Common Law (CML) 372 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 
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Table A4-5. Correlations matrix in all sample countries (short term) 
 
LnINS 
Lagged 
lnINS 
EFI LnINC BDV EDU URB IND IDV LTO MAS UAI PDI HPM ISL CML 
LnINS 1.00                
Lagged lnINS 1.00 1.00               
EFI 0.72 0.73 1.00              
LnINC 0.97 0.96 0.71 1.00             
BDV 0.65 0.66 0.48 0.61 1.00            
EDU 0.68 0.67 0.49 0.69 0.26 1.00           
URB 0.60 0.60 0.44 0.62 0.22 0.45 1.00          
IND 0.35 0.36 0.37 0.35 0.18 -0.01 0.44 1.00         
IDV 0.65 0.65 0.62 0.68 0.40 0.45 0.48 0.17 1.00        
LTO 0.14 0.12 0.02 0.17 0.17 0.24 0.04 -0.51 0.06 1.00       
MAS 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.11 -0.26 -0.04 0.12 0.12 0.00 1.00      
UAI 0.00 0.00 -0.20 0.01 -0.21 0.09 0.23 -0.10 -0.31 -0.03 -0.14 1.00     
PDI -0.61 -0.61 -0.63 -0.63 -0.40 -0.51 -0.43 -0.33 -0.64 0.02 0.10 0.18 1.00    
HPM -0.30 -0.30 -0.06 -0.33 -0.46 -0.25 0.02 0.43 -0.25 -0.44 -0.12 0.10 0.09 1.00   
ISL -0.23 -0.23 -0.10 -0.24 -0.01 -0.21 -0.12 0.03 -0.19 -0.14 0.05 -0.29 0.40 0.04 1.00  
CML 0.11 0.11 0.30 0.06 0.24 0.04 -0.11 0.26 0.30 -0.34 0.15 -0.57 -0.18 -0.02 0.21 1.00 
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Table A4-6. Correlations matrix in developed countries (short term) 
  
LnINS 
Lagged 
lnINS 
EFI LnINC BDV EDU URB IND IDV LTO MAS UAI PDI HPM CML 
LnINS 1.00                             
Lagged lnINS 0.99 1.00                           
EFI 0.60 0.59 1.00                         
LnINC 0.90 0.90 0.58 1.00                       
BDV 0.62 0.64 0.37 0.57 1.00                     
EDU 0.14 0.14 0.08 0.11 -0.17 1.00                   
URB 0.38 0.38 0.37 0.40 0.26 0.04 1.00                 
IND 0.73 0.73 0.61 0.77 0.47 0.00 0.47 1.00               
IDV 0.31 0.30 0.46 0.33 0.05 -0.11 0.42 0.45 1.00             
LTO -0.25 -0.25 -0.22 -0.26 -0.11 -0.03 0.09 -0.48 -0.33 1.00           
MAS 0.03 0.04 0.11 0.09 0.09 -0.40 -0.09 0.06 0.13 0.02 1.00         
UAI -0.29 -0.28 -0.55 -0.32 -0.03 -0.13 -0.07 -0.39 -0.62 0.17 -0.05 1.00       
PDI -0.36 -0.35 -0.51 -0.41 -0.22 -0.23 -0.27 -0.47 -0.45 0.23 0.17 0.50 1.00     
HPM 0.09 0.08 0.49 0.06 -0.14 0.12 0.07 0.19 0.53 -0.31 -0.31 -0.58 -0.39 1.00   
CML 0.37 0.37 0.62 0.35 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.53 0.55 -0.58 0.23 -0.59 -0.42 0.42 1.00 
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Table A4-7. Correlations matrix in developing countries (short term) 
  
LnINS 
Lagged 
lnINS 
EFI LnINC BDV EDU URB IND IDV LTO MAS UAI PDI HPM ISL CML 
LnINS 1.00                               
Lagged lnINS 0.99 1.00                             
EFI 0.19 0.22 1.00                           
LnINC 0.91 0.90 0.09 1.00                         
BDV 0.10 0.11 -0.18 -0.06 1.00                       
EDU 0.59 0.58 0.06 0.59 -0.12 1.00                     
URB 0.57 0.58 0.09 0.65 -0.41 0.45 1.00                   
IND 0.22 0.25 0.26 0.28 -0.30 -0.16 0.44 1.00                 
IDV 0.03 0.03 -0.17 0.03 -0.02 0.16 0.06 -0.36 1.00               
LTO -0.09 -0.13 -0.31 -0.04 0.26 0.19 -0.31 -0.66 0.01 1.00             
MAS -0.30 -0.28 -0.32 -0.25 0.11 -0.52 -0.03 0.31 -0.01 -0.16 1.00           
UAI 0.52 0.51 0.19 0.59 -0.66 0.55 0.65 0.25 0.10 -0.29 -0.47 1.00         
PDI -0.08 -0.10 -0.07 -0.01 0.24 -0.06 -0.21 -0.23 0.00 0.40 0.18 -0.44 1.00       
HPM 0.01 0.03 0.31 0.00 -0.59 -0.01 0.32 0.67 -0.31 -0.45 -0.01 0.43 -0.22 1.00     
ISL -0.08 -0.06 0.15 -0.06 0.32 -0.09 -0.02 0.06 -0.03 -0.11 0.22 -0.49 0.65 -0.08 1.00   
CML -0.15 -0.14 0.07 -0.25 0.55 -0.13 -0.48 -0.07 0.08 -0.02 -0.10 -0.52 0.23 -0.22 0.35 1.00 
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Table A4-8. Determinants of non-life insurance expenditure in all sample countries 
(short term, categories of economic freedom index, system GMM) 
 SGO PRI SMO FTT REG EFI 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lagged lnINS 0.8362*** 0.8908*** 0.8229*** 0.8576*** 0.7802*** 0.8445*** 
 (0.0404) (0.0387) (0.0388) (0.0427) (0.0449) (0.0396) 
SGO -0.0304**  − − − − 
 (0.0145)      
PRI − 0.0467** − − − − 
  (0.0194)     
SMO − − 0.0015 − − − 
   (0.0120)    
FTT − − − 0.0359 − − 
    (0.0239)   
REG − − − − 0.0995*** − 
     (0.0326)  
EFI − − − −  0.0141 
      (0.0323) 
lnINC 0.1885*** 0.0788 0.2311*** 0.1100* 0.2260*** 0.1950*** 
 (0.0624) (0.0670) (0.0535) (0.0648) (0.0598) (0.0542) 
BDV -0.0000 -0.0003 0.0000 0.0002 0.0005 -0.0001 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
EDU 0.0002 0.0013 -0.0003 0.0009 0.0010 -0.0002 
 (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
URB 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 -0.0004 0.0002 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
IND -0.0234 0.0159 -0.0576 0.0798 0.0047 -0.0445 
 (0.0811) (0.0850) (0.0825) (0.0840) (0.0817) (0.0867) 
IDV 0.0080 -0.0273 0.0099 0.0958 0.0532 0.0122 
 (0.0661) (0.0685) (0.0655) (0.0658) (0.0651) (0.0669) 
LTO 0.0694* 0.0781* 0.0648* 0.0792* -0.0282 0.0678* 
 (0.0395) (0.0403) (0.0383) (0.0417) (0.0494) (0.0401) 
MAS -0.0919*** -0.0090 -0.1237*** -0.0982*** -0.1399*** -0.1160*** 
 (0.0346) (0.0512) (0.0344) (0.0333) (0.0326) (0.0321) 
UAI 0.0319 0.0054 -0.0240 0.0156 0.0364 -0.0246 
 (0.0493) (0.0459) (0.0436) (0.0449) (0.0476) (0.0440) 
PDI 0.0376 0.1093** 0.0514 0.0726 0.1223** 0.0582 
 (0.0445) (0.0534) (0.0475) (0.0480) (0.0498) (0.0549) 
HPM 0.0101 0.0077 0.0037 -0.0159 -0.0180* 0.0000 
 (0.0094) (0.0093) (0.0088) (0.0111) (0.0109) (0.0102) 
ISL -0.0717** -0.0921** -0.0877** -0.0945*** -0.1798*** -0.0895** 
 (0.0362) (0.0365) (0.0355) (0.0364) (0.0470) (0.0396) 
CML 0.0790*** 0.0005 0.0515** 0.0188 -0.0311 0.0402 
 (0.0297) (0.0291) (0.0252) (0.0248) (0.0354) (0.0276) 
Observations 460 460 460 460 460 460 
R-squared 0.994 0.994 0.994 0.994 0.994 0.957 
Sargan test 
(p-value) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Arellano-
Bond test for 
AR(2) (p-
value) 
0.791 0.850 0.773 0.762 0.665 0.762 
Notes: *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Numbers in 
parentheses show asymptotic standard errors. Constant and year-fixed effects are included but not 
reported here. 
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Table A4-9. Determinants of non-life insurance expenditure in developed countries 
(short term, categories of economic freedom index, system GMM) 
 SGO PRI SMO FTT REG EFI 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lagged lnINS 0.9055*** 0.8796*** 0.8510*** 0.8969*** 0.8142*** 0.8901*** 
 (0.0365) (0.0332) (0.0361) (0.0360) (0.0394) (0.0359) 
SGO -0.0151      
 (0.0148)      
PRI  0.0196     
  (0.0329)     
SMO   -0.0136    
   (0.0229)    
FTT    0.0526   
    (0.0327)   
REG     0.1522***  
     (0.0394)  
EFI      0.0733 
(p-value=0.112) 
      (0.0461) 
lnINC 0.1284** 0.1866*** 0.2153*** 0.1211** 0.2358*** 0.1325** 
 (0.0607) (0.0610) (0.0645) (0.0615) (0.0617) (0.0604) 
BDV -0.0004 -0.0006** -0.0004* -0.0007** -0.0003 -0.0006** 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
EDU -0.0010 -0.0011 -0.0012 -0.0013* -0.0008 -0.0012 
(p-value=0.109) 
 (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
URB -0.0013 -0.0020* -0.0019** -0.0007 -0.0042*** -0.0019** 
 (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0010) 
IND 0.0190 -0.0653 0.0490 0.0487 0.0394 0.0170 
 (0.0921) (0.1259) (0.0891) (0.0884) (0.0854) (0.0885) 
IDV 0.0154 0.0752 0.0704 0.0094 0.0858 0.0977 
 (0.0762) (0.0737) (0.0630) (0.0719) (0.0623) (0.0694) 
LTO 0.1402** 0.1404** 0.1600*** 0.0922 0.0311 0.0846 
 (0.0624) (0.0578) (0.0586) (0.0635) (0.0625) (0.0632) 
MAS -0.1306** -0.1662*** -0.1767*** -0.1690*** -0.2768*** -0.1861*** 
 (0.0510) (0.0497) (0.0490) (0.0487) (0.0546) (0.0524) 
UAI 0.0190 0.0433 0.0411 -0.0021 0.1202* 0.0032 
 (0.0631) (0.0670) (0.0614) (0.0606) (0.0642) (0.0599) 
PDI 0.0304 0.0629 0.0381 0.0083 0.0613 0.0402 
 (0.0502) (0.0725) (0.0488) (0.0503) (0.0481) (0.0500) 
HPM -0.0037 -0.0275 -0.0153 -0.0527* -0.0861*** -0.0603* 
 (0.0262) (0.0256) (0.0217) (0.0298) (0.0268) (0.0331) 
ISL       
       
CML 0.0874* 0.0881** 0.0889** 0.0564 0.0053 0.0300 
 (0.0502) (0.0412) (0.0405) (0.0403) (0.0427) (0.0444) 
Observations 280 280 280 280 280 280 
R-squared 0.988 0.988 0.988 0.988 0.988 0.988 
Sargan test 
(p-value) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Arellano-
Bond test for 
AR(2) (p-
value) 
0.523 0.546 0.588 0.447 0.314 0.445 
Notes: *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Numbers in 
parentheses show asymptotic standard errors. Constant and year-fixed effects are included but not 
reported here. 
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Table A4-10. Determinants of non-life insurance expenditure in developing countries 
(short term, categories of economic freedom index, system GMM) 
 SGO PRI SMO FTT REG EFI 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lagged lnINS 0.7095*** 0.6678*** 0.7543*** 0.7190*** 0.6660*** 0.7056*** 
 (0.0568) (0.0548) (0.0628) (0.0613) (0.0570) (0.0643) 
SGO 0.0326 
(p-value=0.191) 
     
 (0.0249)      
PRI  0.0061     
  (0.0314)     
SMO   0.0072    
   (0.0134)    
FTT    -0.0469*   
    (0.0276)   
REG     0.0385 
(p-value=0.214) 
 
     (0.0310)  
EFI      0.0251 
      (0.0364) 
lnINC 0.7879*** 0.7504*** 0.6033*** 0.6911*** 0.7831*** 0.6644*** 
 (0.1396) (0.1317) (0.1295) (0.1272) (0.1118) (0.1333) 
BDV -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0008 0.0001 0.0002 
 (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
EDU -0.0001 0.0009 0.0001 -0.0000 0.0011 0.0006 
 (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
URB 0.0027** 0.0025** 0.0020* 0.0019* 0.0023** 0.0024** 
 (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0011) 
IND -1.4277*** -1.1378*** -1.0057*** -1.0685*** -1.2196*** -1.0534*** 
 (0.3099) (0.2601) (0.2120) (0.2246) (0.1898) (0.2260) 
IDV -0.4470*** -0.2852* -0.2669** -0.4373*** -0.1801 -0.2664** 
 (0.1676) (0.1619) (0.1313) (0.1447) (0.1374) (0.1142) 
LTO -0.6740*** -0.6829*** -0.5185*** -0.5057** -0.7751*** -0.5829*** 
 (0.1705) (0.2086) (0.1849) (0.2069) (0.1648) (0.1842) 
MAS 0.2938 -0.0556 0.0314 -0.0066 -0.0644 0.0316 
 (0.2986) (0.2248) (0.2033) (0.1912) (0.1819) (0.1906) 
UAI -1.3609*** -1.2314*** -1.0084*** -1.0874*** -1.3920*** -1.0594*** 
 (0.3599) (0.3970) (0.3804) (0.3792) (0.3209) (0.3702) 
PDI -0.1082 -0.0250 -0.0130 -0.2201 0.0288 0.0154 
 (0.1575) (0.1591) (0.1584) (0.1808) (0.1549) (0.1502) 
HPM 0.1474*** 0.1300*** 0.1050*** 0.1176*** 0.1350*** 0.1141*** 
 (0.0311) (0.0270) (0.0252) (0.0268) (0.0229) (0.0270) 
ISL -0.4591*** -0.4176*** -0.3495*** -0.2994** -0.5042*** -0.3943*** 
 (0.1092) (0.1147) (0.1148) (0.1242) (0.1084) (0.1229) 
CML 0.1201** 0.0674 0.0978** 0.1096** 0.0408 0.0797* 
 (0.0545) (0.0465) (0.0481) (0.0503) (0.0541) (0.0468) 
Observations 180 180 180 180 180 180 
R-squared 0.985 0.985 0.986 0.985 0.985 0.986 
Sargan test 
(p-value) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Arellano-
Bond test for 
AR(2) (p-
value) 
0.960 0.967 0.965 0.997 0.969 0.960 
Notes: *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Numbers in 
parentheses show asymptotic standard errors. Constant and year-fixed effects are included but not 
reported here. 
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Table A4-11. Descriptive statistics in all sample countries (long term) 
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Logarithm of Density (lnINS) 356 4.41 2.01 -0.94 8.22 
Lagged logarithm of Density (lagged lnINS) 289 4.22 2.00 -0.94 7.56 
Logarithm of Density_PPP (lnINS) 347 4.99 1.66 -0.58 8.07 
Lagged logarithm of Density_PPP (lagged lnINS) 280 4.83 1.66 -0.58 7.51 
Logarithm of Penetration (lnINS) 356 0.38 0.73 -2.04 2.07 
Lagged logarithm of Penetration (lagged lnINS) 289 0.34 0.75 -2.04 1.61 
Summary economic freedom index (EFI) 370 6.47 1.31 2.61 9.14 
Size of government 374 5.56 1.68 1.06 9.75 
Legal system and property rights 369 6.21 1.95 1.59 9.34 
Access to sound money 374 7.52 2.08 0.73 9.83 
Freedom to trade internationally 364 6.84 2.15 0.24 9.71 
Regulation 375 6.20 1.38 1.08 8.99 
Logarithm of Income (per capita GDP) (lnINC) 383 8.87 1.40 3.85 11.33 
Deposit money banks' assets to GDP (BDV) (%) 402 56.32 47.13 0.00 235.48 
Education (EDU) (%) 368 29.22 22.10 0.42 99.02 
Urbanisation (URB) (%) 402 64.77 20.00 8.97 100.00 
Indulgence/100 (IND) 360 0.49 0.22 0.13 1.00 
Individualism/100 (IDV) 390 0.44 0.25 0.06 0.91 
Long-term orientation/100 (LTO) 372 0.48 0.22 0.13 1.00 
Masculinity/100 (MAS) 396 0.49 0.19 0.08 1.10 
Uncertainty avoidance/100 (UAI) 396 0.67 0.23 0.08 1.12 
Power distance/100 (PDI) 396 0.60 0.21 0.11 1.04 
Hypometropia/100 (HPM) 325 1.95 1.72 0.00 10.00 
Islam Law (ISL) 402 0.10 0.31 0.00 1.00 
Common Law (CML) 402 0.25 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Table A4-12. Descriptive statistics in high-income countries (long term) 
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Logarithm of Density (lnINS) 223 5.54 1.31 0.99 8.22 
Lagged logarithm of Density (lagged lnINS) 180 5.36 1.32 0.99 7.56 
Logarithm of Density_PPP (lnINS) 216 5.92 0.96 2.61 8.07 
Lagged logarithm of Density_PPP (lagged lnINS) 173 5.77 0.96 2.61 7.51 
Logarithm of Penetration (lnINS) 223 0.71 0.54 -1.27 2.07 
Lagged logarithm of Penetration (lagged lnINS) 180 0.69 0.56 -1.27 1.61 
Summary economic freedom index (EFI) 232 6.93 1.17 3.30 9.14 
Size of government 236 5.16 1.65 1.06 9.75 
Legal system and property rights 232 7.17 1.49 1.59 9.34 
Access to sound money 242 7.91 2.11 0.73 9.83 
Freedom to trade internationally 228 7.72 1.61 1.43 9.71 
Regulation 238 6.44 1.47 1.08 8.99 
Logarithm of Income (per capita GDP) (lnINC) 239 9.70 0.86 7.07 11.33 
Deposit money banks' assets to GDP (BDV) (%) 258 65.67 51.71 0.00 235.48 
Education (EDU) (%) 237 37.49 22.29 1.24 99.02 
Urbanisation (URB) (%) 258 73.25 16.08 8.97 100.00 
Indulgence/100 (IND) 246 0.49 0.21 0.13 1.00 
Individualism/100 (IDV) 252 0.55 0.23 0.12 0.91 
Long-term orientation/100 (LTO) 252 0.53 0.22 0.13 1.00 
Masculinity/100 (MAS) 258 0.49 0.22 0.08 1.10 
Uncertainty avoidance/100 (UAI) 258 0.68 0.24 0.08 1.12 
Power distance/100 (PDI) 258 0.53 0.20 0.11 1.04 
Hypometropia/100 (HPM) 222 1.40 0.67 0.18 3.22 
Islam Law (ISL) 258 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00 
Common Law (CML) 258 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 
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Table A4-13. Descriptive statistics in upper-middle-income countries (long term) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Logarithm of Density (lnINS) 77 3.31 1.10 -0.94 5.05 
Lagged logarithm of Density (lagged lnINS) 63 3.09 1.07 -0.94 4.54 
Logarithm of Density_PPP (lnINS) 75 4.08 1.44 -4.04 5.72 
Lagged logarithm of Density_PPP (lagged 
lnINS) 61 4.01 1.10 -0.58 5.56 
Logarithm of Penetration (lnINS) 77 0.05 0.67 -2.04 2.13 
Lagged logarithm of Penetration (lagged 
lnINS) 63 -0.03 0.66 -2.04 1.04 
Summary economic freedom index (EFI) 83 5.74 1.19 2.61 7.63 
Size of government 83 5.97 1.40 2.11 8.79 
Legal system and property rights 82 5.06 1.34 1.76 8.10 
Access to sound money 77 6.75 2.06 0.78 9.79 
Freedom to trade internationally 83 5.65 2.16 0.98 8.36 
Regulation 82 5.73 1.24 2.62 8.12 
Logarithm of Income (per capita GDP) 
(lnINC) 84 8.04 0.60 5.54 8.97 
Deposit money banks' assets to GDP (BDV) 
(%) 84 47.75 35.60 0.00 152.61 
Education (EDU) (%) 73 18.85 11.78 0.99 49.02 
Urbanisation (URB) (%) 84 58.57 14.51 20.76 83.43 
Indulgence/100 (IND) 66 0.53 0.23 0.16 0.97 
Individualism/100 (IDV) 84 0.26 0.15 0.08 0.65 
Long-term orientation/100 (LTO) 66 0.39 0.22 0.13 0.87 
Masculinity/100 (MAS) 84 0.50 0.13 0.21 0.69 
Uncertainty avoidance/100 (UAI) 84 0.69 0.19 0.30 0.87 
Power distance/100 (PDI) 84 0.70 0.17 0.35 1.04 
Hypometropia/100 (HPM) 61 2.86 2.75 0.00 10.00 
Islam Law (ISL) 84 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 
Common Law (CML) 84 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 
Table A4-14. Descriptive statistics in lower-middle-income countries (long term) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Logarithm of Density (lnINS) 56 1.44 1.20 -0.82 3.86 
Lagged logarithm of Density (lagged lnINS) 46 1.28 1.16 -0.82 3.57 
Logarithm of Density_PPP (lnINS) 56 2.50 1.23 0.11 4.65 
Lagged logarithm of Density_PPP (lagged lnINS) 46 2.36 1.21 0.11 4.42 
Logarithm of Penetration (lnINS) 56 -0.49 0.56 -1.66 0.64 
Lagged logarithm of Penetration (lagged lnINS) 46 -0.51 0.55 -1.66 0.63 
Summary economic freedom index (EFI) 55 5.60 1.14 3.25 7.71 
Size of government 55 6.61 1.57 2.19 9.12 
Legal system and property rights 55 3.90 1.51 1.81 7.77 
Access to sound money 55 6.87 1.52 1.27 9.56 
Freedom to trade internationally 53 4.90 2.03 0.24 8.26 
Regulation 55 5.87 0.83 4.04 8.01 
Logarithm of Income (per capita GDP) (lnINC) 60 6.69 0.77 3.85 7.99 
Deposit money banks' assets to GDP (BDV) (%) 60 28.10 19.30 0.00 84.44 
Education (EDU) (%) 58 8.49 7.35 0.42 26.12 
Urbanisation (URB) (%) 60 36.98 11.84 15.91 62.70 
Indulgence/100 (IND) 48 0.45 0.25 0.20 0.89 
Individualism/100 (IDV) 54 0.24 0.14 0.06 0.48 
Long-term orientation/100 (LTO) 54 0.38 0.18 0.13 0.62 
Masculinity/100 (MAS) 54 0.49 0.09 0.37 0.64 
Uncertainty avoidance/100 (UAI) 54 0.62 0.23 0.30 1.01 
Power distance/100 (PDI) 54 0.76 0.12 0.55 0.95 
Hypometropia/100 (HPM) 42 3.51 2.14 0.80 6.77 
Islam Law (ISL) 60 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Common Law (CML) 60 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 
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Table A4-15. Correlations matrix in all sample countries (long term) 
  
LnINS 
Lagged 
lnINS 
EFI LnINC BDV EDU URB IND IDV LTO MAS UAI PDI HPM ISL CML 
LnINS 1.00                
Lagged lnINS 0.98 1.00               
EFI 0.71 0.71 1.00              
LnINC 0.96 0.94 0.63 1.00             
BDV 0.58 0.58 0.54 0.53 1.00            
EDU 0.66 0.63 0.56 0.62 0.22 1.00           
URB 0.68 0.68 0.39 0.68 0.17 0.49 1.00          
IND 0.34 0.40 0.29 0.35 0.11 0.00 0.42 1.00         
IDV 0.67 0.66 0.51 0.68 0.27 0.46 0.53 0.20 1.00        
LTO 0.13 0.05 0.04 0.17 0.27 0.17 0.03 -0.50 0.06 1.00       
MAS 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.22 -0.22 -0.02 0.12 0.09 -0.01 1.00      
UAI 0.03 0.02 -0.22 0.08 -0.10 0.04 0.22 -0.13 -0.32 -0.03 -0.09 1.00     
PDI -0.64 -0.63 -0.47 -0.65 -0.26 -0.47 -0.49 -0.33 -0.66 -0.03 0.07 0.16 1.00    
HPM -0.26 -0.22 -0.20 -0.28 -0.40 -0.24 -0.04 0.39 -0.16 -0.42 -0.05 0.00 0.08 1.00   
ISL -0.24 -0.20 0.00 -0.27 0.03 -0.20 -0.20 0.00 -0.21 -0.16 0.07 -0.30 0.45 0.04 1.00  
CML 0.09 0.11 0.31 0.03 0.18 0.04 -0.10 0.26 0.33 -0.33 0.13 -0.55 -0.17 0.09 0.16 1.00 
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Table A4-16. Correlations matrix in high-income countries (long term) 
  LnINS 
Lagged 
lnINS 
EFI LnINC BDV EDU URB IND IDV LTO MAS UAI PDI HPM CML 
LnINS 1.00               
Lagged lnINS 0.97 1.00              
EFI 0.80 0.77 1.00             
LnINC 0.90 0.89 0.71 1.00            
BDV 0.66 0.64 0.54 0.65 1.00           
EDU 0.32 0.29 0.44 0.20 0.01 1.00          
URB 0.32 0.37 0.32 0.22 0.14 0.16 1.00         
IND 0.64 0.69 0.50 0.60 0.31 0.05 0.53 1.00        
IDV 0.50 0.48 0.52 0.51 0.13 0.14 0.42 0.51 1.00       
LTO -0.09 -0.17 -0.07 -0.01 0.16 -0.03 -0.05 -0.46 -0.22 1.00      
MAS 0.14 0.18 0.12 0.16 0.31 -0.24 -0.02 0.11 0.16 0.01 1.00     
UAI -0.43 -0.38 -0.48 -0.42 -0.04 -0.22 -0.20 -0.49 -0.70 0.10 -0.03 1.00    
PDI -0.49 -0.48 -0.47 -0.49 -0.22 -0.18 -0.33 -0.58 -0.54 0.19 0.01 0.59 1.00   
HPM -0.15 -0.14 0.05 -0.26 -0.36 0.14 0.27 0.15 0.22 -0.36 -0.30 -0.25 -0.09 1.00  
CML 0.35 0.35 0.47 0.32 0.08 0.20 0.25 0.53 0.59 -0.49 0.22 -0.59 -0.41 0.27 1.00 
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Table A4-17. Correlations matrix in upper-middle-income countries (long term) 
  LnINS 
Lagged 
lnINS 
EFI LnINC BDV EDU URB IND IDV LTO MAS UAI PDI HPM ISL CML 
LnINS 1.00                
Lagged lnINS 0.95 1.00               
EFI 0.49 0.44 1.00              
LnINC 0.77 0.79 0.19 1.00             
BDV 0.12 0.09 0.41 -0.28 1.00            
EDU 0.47 0.42 0.36 0.26 0.00 1.00           
URB 0.51 0.55 -0.03 0.72 -0.61 0.21 1.00          
IND 0.36 0.46 0.01 0.59 -0.32 -0.19 0.51 1.00         
IDV 0.29 0.28 -0.26 0.46 -0.18 -0.16 0.13 0.04 1.00        
LTO -0.43 -0.54 -0.25 -0.53 0.29 -0.06 -0.45 -0.81 0.10 1.00       
MAS -0.11 -0.07 -0.32 0.01 -0.23 -0.40 0.18 0.51 0.03 0.00 1.00      
UAI 0.18 0.21 -0.09 0.51 -0.74 0.35 0.65 0.35 0.02 -0.53 -0.22 1.00     
PDI 0.11 0.11 0.30 0.03 0.50 -0.12 0.01 0.07 -0.24 0.20 0.21 -0.53 1.00    
HPM 0.31 0.38 -0.29 0.29 -0.38 -0.19 0.29 0.48 0.48 -0.48 0.35 0.17 -0.50 1.00   
ISL 0.34 0.37 0.44 0.15 0.57 -0.06 -0.01 0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.08 -0.54 0.83 -0.22 1.00  
CML 0.31 0.33 0.47 -0.02 0.70 0.01 -0.50 -0.06 0.16 -0.16 -0.38 -0.51 0.22 0.07 0.58 1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
107 
 
Table A4-18. Correlations matrix in lower-middle-income countries (long term)  
  LnINS 
Lagged 
lnINS 
EFI LnINC BDV EDU URB IND IDV LTO MAS UAI PDI HPM ISL CML 
LnINS 1.00                
Lagged lnINS 0.95 1.00               
EFI 0.47 0.34 1.00              
LnINC 0.94 0.94 0.51 1.00             
BDV -0.04 -0.09 0.02 -0.23 1.00            
EDU 0.37 0.44 0.51 0.53 -0.22 1.00           
URB 0.90 0.93 0.43 0.93 -0.23 0.63 1.00          
IND 0.44 0.48 0.39 0.64 -0.79 0.49 0.57 1.00         
IDV -0.16 -0.19 -0.38 -0.40 0.46 -0.43 -0.27 -0.61 1.00        
LTO -0.70 -0.76 -0.11 -0.65 0.13 -0.35 -0.78 -0.34 -0.26 1.00       
MAS -0.42 -0.37 -0.23 -0.50 0.46 0.12 -0.25 -0.60 0.59 -0.10 1.00      
UAI 0.79 0.80 0.28 0.84 -0.53 0.20 0.75 0.78 -0.30 -0.63 -0.70 1.00     
PDI -0.50 -0.43 -0.04 -0.43 0.24 0.40 -0.22 -0.33 0.03 0.17 0.82 -0.72 1.00    
HPM 0.33 0.37 0.35 0.53 -0.80 0.46 0.49 0.98 -0.49 -0.34 -0.51 0.72 -0.29 1.00   
ISL -0.17 -0.06 0.07 -0.07 0.04 0.63 0.18 -0.02 0.01 -0.27 0.75 -0.35 0.89 0.02 1.00  
CML -0.62 -0.69 -0.31 -0.74 0.13 -0.56 -0.75 -0.40 0.62 0.42 0.24 -0.46 -0.04 -0.23 -0.28 1.00 
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Table A4-19. Determinants of non-life insurance expenditure in high-income 
countries (long term, using alternative measurements, system GMM)  
 Density (Premiums 
per capita 
Density 
(Premiums per 
capita at PPP) 
Penetration 
(Premiums per GDP) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Lagged lnINS 0.5717*** 0.4447*** 0.6204*** 
 (0.0772) (0.0576) (0.0578) 
EFI 0.1204** 0.0793** 0.0568* 
 (0.0479) (0.0362) (0.0311) 
lnINC 0.3969*** 0.2859*** 0.0166 
 (0.1141) (0.0809) (0.0616) 
BDV 0.0003 0.0011** 0.0008* 
 (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
EDU -0.0024* 0.0003 -0.0002 
 (0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0010) 
URB 0.0002 -0.0027 -0.0002 
 (0.0024) (0.0017) (0.0016) 
IND -0.2924 0.1324 -0.0098 
 (0.1927) (0.1771) (0.1569) 
IDV -0.0476 0.2516** 0.0480 
 (0.1509) (0.1280) (0.1162) 
LTO 0.1134 0.1664 0.1089 
 (0.1506) (0.1057) (0.0934) 
MAS -0.2594*** -0.2249*** -0.1857*** 
 (0.0849) (0.0706) (0.0608) 
UAI -0.2332* -0.1253 -0.1141 
 (0.1194) (0.1052) (0.0942) 
PDI 0.0048 0.1501 0.1210 
 (0.1041) (0.0939) (0.0838) 
HPM -0.0025 -0.0017 -0.0025 
 (0.0339) (0.0323) (0.0280) 
CML 0.0785 0.1157** 0.1065** 
 (0.0755) (0.0575) (0.0495) 
Observations 138 135 138 
R-squared 0.972 0.926 0.815 
Sargan test (p-value) 0.132 0.001 0.027 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-
value) 
0.501 0.788 0.366 
Notes: *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Numbers in 
parentheses show asymptotic standard errors. Constant and year-fixed effects are included but not 
reported here.  
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Table A4-20. Determinants of non-life insurance expenditure in upper-middle-income 
(long term, using alternative measurements, system GMM) 
 Density (Premiums 
per capita) 
Density (Premiums 
per capita at PPP) 
Penetration 
(Premiums per GDP) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Lagged lnINS 0.2289* 0.2192** 0.3114*** 
 (0.1360) (0.0935) (0.1169) 
EFI 0.3436*** 0.1908*** 0.1408*** 
 (0.0655) (0.0516) (0.0473) 
lnINC 0.6103** 0.8976*** 0.0416 
 (0.2454) (0.1906) (0.1733) 
BDV 0.0029 0.0028 0.0030* 
 (0.0025) (0.0019) (0.0018) 
EDU 0.0076 0.0073* 0.0083** 
 (0.0057) (0.0039) (0.0039) 
URB 0.0028 -0.0115 -0.0096 
 (0.0135) (0.0095) (0.0099) 
IND 4.8634*** 1.3712 0.7847 
 (1.7837) (1.4228) (1.3897) 
IDV -3.5231*** -3.6715*** -1.2564 
 (1.1564) (0.7979) (0.8174) 
LTO 6.6462*** 3.8278** 2.0485 
 (2.0645) (1.5169) (1.4925) 
MAS -5.7637*** -3.9538*** -2.3703** 
 (1.4536) (0.9956) (1.0160) 
UAI 0.5576 1.3942* 1.0262 
 (1.0731) (0.8094) (0.7959) 
PDI -0.8763 3.6953 2.8537 
 (3.6447) (2.8438) (2.7521) 
HPM 0.3730*** 0.4511*** 0.3281*** 
 (0.1131) (0.0867) (0.0902) 
ISL 0.6488 -0.3528 -0.1896 
 (0.8786) (0.6755) (0.6580) 
CML 0.0441 0.2458 -0.1109 
 (0.4674) (0.3289) (0.3320) 
Observations 41 41 41 
R-squared 0.986 0.945 0.563 
Sargan test (p-value) 0.104 0.003 0.008 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-
value) 
0.782 0.435 0.182 
Notes: *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Numbers in 
parentheses show asymptotic standard errors. Constant and year-fixed effects are included but not 
reported here.  
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Table A4-21. Determinants of non-life insurance expenditure in (lower-middle-
income (long term, using alternative measurements, system GMM)  
 Density (Premiums 
per capita) 
Density 
(Premiums per 
capita at PPP) 
Penetration 
(Premiums per GDP) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Lagged lnINS 0.2501 0.4851*** 0.4793** 
 (0.1643) (0.1607) (0.2238) 
EFI 0.3012*** 0.3075*** 0.2037*** 
 (0.0643) (0.0870) (0.0654) 
lnINC 1.1339** 1.3501*** 0.6287 
 (0.4432) (0.3537) (0.4209) 
BDV 0.0055 0.0014 0.0014 
 (0.0035) (0.0029) (0.0032) 
EDU -0.0212 -0.0398*** -0.0240 
 (0.0178) (0.0146) (0.0159) 
URB 0.0557*** 0.0406*** 0.0285** 
 (0.0122) (0.0095) (0.0116) 
IND − − − 
    
IDV − − − 
    
LTO 0.4714 1.6455*** 0.3351 
 (0.8478) (0.5755) (0.7139) 
MAS − − − 
    
UAI − − − 
    
PDI − − − 
    
HPM -0.1051** -0.1415*** -0.0924** 
 (0.0420) (0.0346) (0.0382) 
ISL -0.1231 0.3913 0.0192 
 (0.3829) (0.2793) (0.3224) 
CML 0.8830** 1.0606*** 0.7167** 
 (0.4122) (0.3127) (0.3375) 
Observations 23 23 23 
R-squared 0.993 0.955 0.769 
Sargan test (p-value) 0.127 0.087 0.032 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-
value) 
0.634 0.868 0.987 
Notes: *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Numbers in 
parentheses show asymptotic standard errors. Constant and year-fixed effects are included but not 
reported here.  
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Table A4-22. Determinants of non-life insurance expenditure (all sample countries, 
with and without education, system GMM) 
 Full factors Dropped Education 
 (1) (2) 
Lagged lnINS  0.4655*** 0.4456*** 
 (0.0544) (0.0536) 
EFI 0.1395*** 0.1374*** 
 (0.0339) (0.0340) 
lnINC 0.7511*** 0.6994*** 
 (0.0959) (0.0924) 
BDV 0.0002 0.0009* 
 (0.0006) (0.0005) 
EDU -0.0024* − 
 (0.0013)  
URB 0.0068*** 0.0069*** 
 (0.0014) (0.0014) 
IND -0.9711*** -0.8054*** 
 (0.1806) (0.1594) 
IDV -0.4378** -0.2909* 
 (0.1773) (0.1608) 
LTO -0.1944 -0.1766 
 (0.1235) (0.1235) 
MAS -0.1649** -0.1452** 
 (0.0682) (0.0677) 
UAI -0.3860*** -0.3088** 
 (0.1369) (0.1314) 
PDI 0.0416 0.0301 
 (0.1108) (0.1110) 
HPM 0.0415*** 0.0362** 
 (0.0143) (0.0141) 
ISL -0.2694*** -0.2665*** 
 (0.0789) (0.0791) 
CML 0.1017** 0.0725* 
 (0.0462) (0.0438) 
Observations 202 202 
R-squared 0.980 0.981 
Sargan test (p-value) 0.008 0.005 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.663 0.566 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-value) 0.707 0.722 
Notes: *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Numbers in 
parentheses show asymptotic standard errors. Constant and year-fixed effects are included but not 
reported here.  
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Table A4-23. Summaries of results of determinants of non-life insurance expenditure in the short term and long term (system GMM)  
Notes: (*) Elango and Jones (2011) used six indicators of the economic freedom index of Heritage rather than its summary. (**) Park, Borde and Choi (2002) used the summary 
economic freedom of Heritage in 1997, where the lower score of the economic freedom index, the higher the degree of economic freedom. Therefore, a negative effect of the economic 
freedom index on insurance consumption is comparable to a positive effect if the new construction of the economic freedom index is used, where higher scores indicate more economic 
freedom.
 Hypo- 
thesis 
Short term (20002011) Long term (19802009) Non-life insurance Total 
insurance 
All 
sample 
countries 
Developed 
countries 
Developi
ng 
countries 
All 
sample 
countri
es 
High-
income 
countri
es 
Upper-
middle-
income 
countri
es 
Lower-
middle-
income 
countri
es 
Trinh, 
Nguyen 
and 
Sgro 
(2016) 
Park and 
Lemaire 
(2012) 
Elango 
and 
Jones 
(2011) 
Esho et 
al 
(2004) 
Browne
, Chung 
and 
Frees 
(2000) 
Outrevi
lle 
(1990) 
Park, 
Borde and 
Choi 
(2002)  
Lagged 
INS 
+ + + + + + + Insig.        
EFI + Insig. + Insig. + + + + +  +/-(*)    +(**) 
lnINC + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 
BDV + Insig. - Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. +       
EDU + Insig. - Insig. - - Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. - -  
URB + Insig. - + + Insig. Insig. + + Insig  + Insig.   
IND - Insig. Insig. - - Insig. +  Insig.       
IDV + Insig. Insig. - - Insig. -  Insig. +     Insig. 
LTO - + Insig. - Insig. Insig. + Insig. -       
MAS - - - Insig. - - -  - Insig.     + 
UAI + Insig. Insig. - - - Insig.  Insig. +  Insig.   Insig. 
PDI - Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig.  + -     Insig. 
HPM + Insig. - + + Insig. + - Insig.       
ISL - -  - -  Insig. Insig. - -      
CML + Insig. Insig. + + Insig. - + Insig. Insig.  Insig.    
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Table A4-24. List of economics (three levels of income*) 
Lower-middle-income 
economies (GNI per capita = 
US$1,046-US$4,125) 
Upper-middle-income 
economies (GNI per capita 
= US$4,126-US$12,745) 
High-income economies (GNI per 
capita = US$12,735 or more) 
Bangladesh 
El Salvador 
Guatemala 
India 
Indonesia 
Morocco 
Nigeria 
Pakistan 
Philippines 
Vietnam 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
China 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Ecuador 
Iran 
Malaysia 
Mexico 
Panama 
Peru 
South Africa 
Thailand 
Turkey 
 
Argentina 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Canada 
Chile 
Croatia 
Czech Rep. 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hong Kong 
Hungary 
Ireland 
Italy 
Japan 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
 
Malta 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Russia 
Singapore 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
South Korea 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Trinidad 
United Arab 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Source: World Bank (2016).  
Note: (*) based on World Bank Atlas method 
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Chapter 5: Determinants of Non-life Insurance Expenditure 
Across Product Lines in OECD Countries: A Dynamic Panel 
Data Assessment45 
5.1 Introduction 
The results in previous chapters, are based on aggregated data. However, using 
aggregated non-life insurance expenditure data may lead to a loss of information and 
biased conclusions regarding the economic behaviour of individuals. This chapter 
takes a step further by conducting empirical analysis of the determinants of spending 
on different non-life insurance products in OECD countries in the period 20002013. 
The coverage includes property, accident and health, motor and general liability 
insurance. The chapter also examines the effect of the global financial crisis (GFC), 
which is a relatively new factor in this literature, and it adopts a dynamic system 
generalised method of moments (GMM) estimation strategy. To the best of my 
knowledge, this is the first study to examine the drivers of expenditure on various non-
life insurance products in OECD countries through the lens of such a comprehensive 
econometric framework. This analysis provides further results at the product level for 
researchers, policymakers, firms and customers. 
To date, only Browne, Chung and Frees (2000) have examined non-life insurance 
consumption in OECD countries using disaggregated data at the product level. 
Focusing on the period 19871993, Browne, Chung and Frees studied the 
determinants (mainly economic and demographic factors) of the demand for motor 
insurance and general liability insurance. However, other important non-life insurance 
products, such as property and accident and health insurance, were not considered. As 
shown in Figure 5-1, the shares of property and accident and health insurance in the 
aggregated non-life insurance spending in OECD countries in 2013 were 48%; 
therefore, the factors that have driven the development of these markets deserve 
attention. At the same time, as depicted in Figure 5-2, the trends of spending on 
property insurance, accident and health insurance, motor insurance and general 
liability insurance in OECD countries have changed significantly since 2007, when the 
                                                 
45 Major empirical results of this chapter were presented and discussed at the 2016 American Risk and 
Insurance Association (ARIA) Annual Meeting in Boston, August 2016. 
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GFC started. It is therefore relevant to study the effect of the GFC in the development 
of the non-life insurance market. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-1. Share of premiums per capita across products in 2013 (%) 
Source: Computed by the author based on OECD Insurance Statistics (OECD 2015a) 
 
Figure 5-2. Average non-life insurance expenditure of the 19 OECD economics affected by the GFC 
across various products, 20002013 (US$) 
Source: Computed by the author based on OECD Insurance Statistics (OECD 2015a). 
The dataset obtained from OECD Insurance Statistics reveals that the trends of 
expenditure on property, accident and health, motor, and general liability insurance 
have varied widely across some OECD countriesin particular, Canada, the US, the 
UK, the Netherlands and France in the period 20002013. For example, there was a 
sharp rise in expenditure in accident and health insurance in Canada (about 27% higher 
than in 2002) due to the Etobicoke gas explosion in Ontario (Swiss Re 2016a). In 
contrast, expenditure on property insurance in the UK dropped about 3% and 10% in 
2008 and 2010, respectively, due to strong competition and softening of prices in the 
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property insurance market (Swiss Re 2016a). Figures 5-35-6, which show average 
non-life insurance expenditure across products in selected OECD countries, further 
illustrate this point and provide strong motivations for this chapter. 
 
Figure 5-3. Average property insurance expenditure across the selected OECD countries, 20002013 
(US$) 
Source: Computed by the author based on OECD Insurance Statistics (OECD 2015a). 
 
Figure 5-4. Average accident and health insurance expenditure across the selected OECD countries, 
20002013 (US$) 
Source: Computed by the author based on OECD Insurance Statistics (OECD 2015a). 
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Figure 5-5. Motor insurance expenditure across the selected OECD countries, 20002013 (US$) 
Source: Computed by the author based on OECD Insurance Statistics (OECD 2015a). 
 
Figure 5-6. General liability insurance expenditure across the selected OECD countries, 20002013 
(US$) 
Source: Computed by the author based on OECD Insurance Statistics (OECD 2015a). 
Apart from choosing specific factors and markets that have been lacking in related 
studies on the determinants of non-life insurance expenditure, this chapter contributes 
to the literature by applying a comprehensive econometric model for the dynamic 
panel data analysis at the product level. As discussed in previous chapters, most related 
papers have used either cross-sectional data models or simple panel data models 
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(Browne, Chung and Frees 2000; Elango and Jones 2011; Lee and Chiu 2012; Park 
and Lemaire 2012; Trinh, Nguyen and Sgro 2016) to identify the socio-economic 
factors that influence non-life insurance. However, a dynamic panel data model 
including one-year-lagged non-life insurance expenditure may be more appropriate in 
this context because non-life insurance expenditure arguably depends on past 
expenditure.46 Further, the endogeneity problem, which may be caused by omitted 
variables of economic freedom and reverse causality between per capita income and 
non-life insurance expenditure, has often been ignored in previous studies. In 
particular, the endogeneity problem caused by reverse causality in this study is 
empirically investigated by applying econometric models and panel causality tests. 
Only Feyen, Lester and Rocha (2011) have adopted the system GMM estimation in 
their analysis of the determinants of non-life insurance premiums. However, Feyen, 
Lester and Rocha did not treat per capita income as an endogenous regressor, and they 
did not include cultural factors or the financial crisis factor in the study.47 Additionally, 
results of the Hansen test in Feyen, Lester and Rocha’s (2011) study reject the 
conclusion that some instruments may not be valid. These limitations will be resolved 
in this chapter. 
The key findings based on the system GMM estimator in this chapter are as follows. 
First, in addition to the traditional economic and legal factors, this chapter has found 
strong evidence for the important role played by cultural characteristics such as long-
term orientation, individualism, masculinity and uncertainty avoidance in determining 
spending on property, accident and health, motor, and general liability insurance across 
OECD countries (see Table A5-1 in the Appendix for the definitions of the variables 
included in this chapter). In particular, economic freedom has a positive effect on 
property and general liability insurance expenditure, but a negative effect on accident 
and health insurance expenditure. Second, in the presence of the GFC, the effect of 
cultural factors mostly disappeared. Third, per capita income, which has long been 
regarded as one of the most important drivers of demand for non-life insurance in the 
literature, failed to explain spending on accident and health insurance during the GFC. 
Fourth, lagged insurance expenditure consistently explained current insurance 
expenditure regardless of the GFC and insurance products. These findings suggest that 
                                                 
46 Some non-life insurance products, such as accident and health insurance and property insurance, only 
waive waiting period conditions for renewals by existing policyholders. 
47 Per capita income may have reverse causality with non-life insurance expenditure. This will be 
discussed further in the next section. 
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non-life insurance policies in OECD countriesin particular, property and accident 
and health insuranceplay an important role in the development of the non-life 
insurance market. This study therefore provides valuable information not only for 
various constituents of the insurance sector, but also for policymakers in OECD 
countries. 
The rest of Chapter 5 is organised as follows. Section 5.2 presents the data and 
hypotheses. Section 5.3 introduces the methodology. Section 5.4 presents and 
discusses the results. Section 5.5 provides some concluding remarks. 
5.2 Data, variables and hypotheses 
5.2.1 Data 
This chapter uses a panel dataset covering all 34 OECD countries for the period 
20002013 (see Table A5-3 in the Appendix for the list of these countries). The non-
life insurance panel dataset, which is disaggregated into property, accident and health 
insurance, motor, and general liability insurance, is taken from various issues of OECD 
Insurance Statistics. The study also obtains annual data for a large number of 
explanatory variables from various databases, which are described in Table A5-1 in 
the Appendix. 
5.2.2 Variables 
Dependent variable: This study follows the previous chapters by using non-life 
insurance density, which is calculated as the ratio of gross written premiums to total 
population, provided by OECD Insurance Statistics as a main proxy for non-life 
insurance expenditure. This indicator is used because it reflects the spending of an 
individual’s average amount for each non-life insurance product. Further, 
disaggregating non-life insurance data into various products, including property, 
accident and health insurance, motor, and general liability insurance, which has been 
ignored in previous papers, helps to avoid a loss of information. Table A5-1 in the 
Appendix provides definitions for each non-life insurance product. 
Independent variables: This chapter uses the following independent variables: 
economic freedom, per capita income, bank development, education, urbanisation, 
GFC, culture and legal system. 
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5.2.3 Hypotheses 
Based on the literature survey and previous chapters, this research proposes a number 
of testable hypotheses: 
H5-1: The higher the degree of lagged non-life insurance expenditure across products, 
economic freedom, per capita income, education, urbanisation, bank development, 
individualism, uncertainty avoidance and hypometropia in a country, the higher the 
expenditure on non-life insurance products in OECD countries. 
H5-2: The higher the degree of indulgence, long-term orientation, masculinity and 
power distance in a country, the lower the expenditure on non-life insurance products 
in OECD countries. 
H5-3: Common Law has a positive effect on expenditure on non-life insurance products 
in OECD countries. 
H5-4: The GFC has a negative effect on expenditure on non-life insurance products in 
OECD countries. 
5.3 Methodology 
5.3.1 Reverse causality problem 
Most previous papers have found a bi-directional relationship between non-life 
insurance and economic growth. Patrick (1966) claimed that economic growth may 
generate more demand for financial services and lead to the development of these 
services, which has also contributed to the growth of the economy. Ward and 
Zurbruegg (2000), Lee (2011), Pradhan, Arvin and Norman (2015) and Alhassan and 
Biekpe (2016) provided evidence of bi-directional causality between non-life 
insurance expenditure and economic growth in both the short run and long run. 
Therefore, using per capita income as the main explanatory variable in this research 
may cause a reverse causality problem between this variable and non-life insurance 
expenditure. To check this problem in the sample of OECD countries, this chapter uses 
the IV model. 
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Empirical model: Following Brückner (2013), this chapter uses the instrumental 
variables (IV) model to examine the relationship between per capita income and non-
life insurance expenditure. The empirical model is suggested as follows:48 
log(INSi,t) = ai + bt + c log(INCi,t) + ei,t       (1) 
log(INCi,t) = hi + it + k log(INSi,t) + ui,t      (2) 
where: log(INSi,t) is the log-change of non-life insurance expenditure for country i in 
year t; log(INCi,t) is the log-change of per capita income for country i in year t; ai, hi 
are country-fixed effects that capture long-run (unobservable) differences across 
countries; bt, it are year-fixed effects; and ei,t, ui,t are error terms. 
Estimation strategy: To estimate the effect of per capita income on non-life insurance 
expenditure as described in (1), this study uses CO2 emissions (CO2, metric tons per 
capita) and gross fixed capital formation (GCF, % of GDP) as IVs in the 2SLS_IV 
estimation.49 
Similarly, this chapter uses temperature (TEM, oC) and merchandise trade (MER, % 
of GDP) as IVs in the IV estimation to estimate the effect of non-life insurance 
expenditure on per capita income as illustrated in (2). 50 
5.3.2 System GMM model for the determinants of non-life insurance expenditure 
This chapter follows Chapter 4 to use the system GMM estimator developed by Holtz-
Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1988), Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover 
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). The empirical model is suggested as follows: 
lnINSi,t  = αlnINSi,t-1 + β1lnINCi,t + β2EFIi,t + β3BDVi,t + β4EDUi,t + β5URBi,t +β6CULi  
                + β7LSYi + at + ɛ i,t        (3) 
                                                 
48 Excluding other explanatory variables in the equation may lead to a biased magnitude of coefficients; 
however, this chapter follows the literature by only including non-life insurance and the per capita 
income variable to examine their relationship. 
49 Narayan, Saboori and Soleymani (2016) found a significant relationship between per capita income 
and CO2 emissions. Krkoska (2001) also showed that higher gross fixed formation leads to greater 
economic growth.      
50 Previous papers have found significant effects of temperature on mortality (e.g., Curriero et al. 2002; 
Deschenes and Greenstone 2007) and crime (e.g., Field 1992; Jacob, Lefgren and Moretti 2007). These 
effects may affect the risk aversion of customers in spending on non-life insurance products. Elango 
and Jones (2011) found that merchandise trade has a positive effect on non-life insurance expenditure. 
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where: lnINSi,t is the natural logarithm of non-life insurance expenditure (density) for 
country i in year t; EFIit is the Index of Economic Freedom for country i in year t; 
lnINCit is the natural logarithm of per capita GDP for country i in year t; BDVit is the 
bank development for country i in year t; EDUit is school enrolment, tertiary (% gross); 
URBit is urbanisation for country i in year t; CULi is an array of cultural variables 
(Hofstede and Minkov) that are time-invariant and only vary across countries; LSYi is 
an array of dummy variables (Common Law) that vary across countries; at is a year-
fixed effect; α, β1 to β7 are vectors of coefficients and it is the error term for country i 
in year t.51 
5.3.3 Estimation strategy and specification tests 
5.3.3.1 Estimation strategy 
In addition to the system GMM estimator, this chapter also follows Chapter 4 to use 
the pooled OLS and IV regressions to show the differences between the magnitude 
and sign of coefficients between the OLS, IV regressions and the system GMM 
estimator due to the endogeneity problem. The estimate strategy of this chapter is as 
follows. First, the research runs the pooled OLS regression. Then 2SLS regression 
using IVs including life expectancy, CO2 emissions and gross fixed capita formation 
variables to account for endogeneity, is used.52 Next, the system GMM estimation is 
applied to overcome disadvantages of the OLS regressions including causality and 
omitted variables.53 Using too many lagged instruments in the system GMM estimator 
may yield a p-value of 1 in the Hausen or Sargan test and lead to the rejection of the 
null hypothesis implausibly. This may cause biased coefficient estimates and fail to 
check the validity of the instruments. Therefore, the number of instruments needs to 
be reduced by using higher orders and/or collapsing the lags of the instruments 
(Bowsher 2002; Roodman 2009b). 
                                                 
51 In the results, this study does not show the estimated coefficients of the year dummy variables because 
the effects of time are not the focus of this study. 
52 Following the literature, these instruments, which correlate with per capita income and economic 
freedom and may not correlate with non-life insurance expenditure, are used to address the endogeneity 
problem.   
53 This chapter applies the one-step system GMM estimators using Stata command ‘Xtabond2’ 
developed by Roodman (2009a). The system one-step GMM estimator is used because it can help to 
examine time-invariant variables as cultural variables. Further, using a two-step estimator may be less 
reliable than a one-step estimator (Bond 2002) and may lead to biased parameters and asymptotic 
standard errors in terms of a small sample (Windmeijer 2005). 
CHAPTER FIVE 
123 
 
5.3.3.2 Specification tests 
This chapter employs two specification tests to evaluate the consistency of the system 
GMM estimator. First, the over-identifying restrictions (Hansen/Sargan) test is applied 
to check the joint validity of the instruments. The instruments are valid if the test fails 
to reject the null hypothesis. The second test is the test of second-order serial 
correlation. To support the estimated model, both the test of over-identifying 
restrictions and second-order serial correlation must fail to reject the null hypotheses. 
For IV estimation, this study uses two tests: (1) Sargan test to check the validity of the 
instruments, and (2) weak identification test. Instruments are weak if the first F-value 
of this test is smaller than 1054. 
5.4 Results and discussion 
5.4.1 Reverse causality problem 
5.4.1.1 Effect of per capita income on non-life insurance expenditure 
The results in Table 5-1 show the baseline 2SLS estimates for the model that tests the 
effect of per capita income on non-life insurance expenditure. Column (1) in Table 5-
1 presents the first-stage estimates that link CO2 emission and gross fixed capital 
formation to per capita income. The results in column (1) show that these two 
instruments have significant effects on per capita income and yield a first-stage F-
statistic of about 18.38. Column (2) in Table 5-1 provides the least squares (LS) 
estimates of the effect of per capita income on non-life insurance expenditure. This 
column is used for comparison purposes with other second-stage estimates presented 
in columns (3)(5). The results in column (2) show that per capita income has a 
significant effect on non-life insurance. Nevertheless, the LS estimates in column (2) 
cannot be taken if the causal effect between non-life insurance expenditure and per 
capita income exists. That is, if non-life insurance expenditure also has a significant 
effect on per capita income, the results in column (2) are biased. Column (3) therefore 
presents the 2SLS estimate using the CO2 emission and gross fixed capital formation 
as excluded instruments. The results in the second-stage estimate in column (3) show 
that the effect of per capita income on non-life insurance expenditure is significantly 
positive. The p-value of the Sargan test on the over-identification restrictions reported 
                                                 
54 As mentioned in previous chapters, the first-stage F-statistic is based on the single endogenous 
regression. 
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in column (3) does not reject the hypothesis and shows that all instruments are valid. 
This indicates that the instruments are uncorrelated with the second-stage error. The 
magnitude of the coefficient in the 2SLS regression in column (3) is smaller than that 
in the LS estimates in column (2), which proves that the results of the LS estimates are 
biased. Columns (4) and (5) in Table 5-1 show 2SLS estimates when the instruments 
are included to the right-hand side of the regression. These regressions directly 
estimate the effect of the instruments, along with per capita income, on non-life 
insurance expenditure. As can be seen, the coefficients on the CO2 emission and gross 
fixed capital formation have a small size and an insignificant effect on non-life 
insurance expenditure. This supports the validity of the instruments. 
Table 5-1. Effect of per capita income on non-life insurance expenditure 
 lnINC lnINS 
 (1) 
LS 
(2) 
LS 
(3) 
2SLS 
(4) 
2SLS 
(5) 
2SLS 
lnINC  0.961*** 0.877*** 0.971*** 0.394 
  (0.075) (0.247) (0.276) (0.719) 
lnCO2 0.155***   -0.089  
 (0.077)   (0.117)  
lnGCF 0.311***    0.180 
 (0.063)    (0.249) 
Sargan test for overidentification 
restrictions of the instruments (p-
value)  
  0.443   
First stage, F-stat. 15.27     
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 297 387 297 297 297 
Country 34 34 34 34 34 
R-squared 0.705 0.603 0.602 0.603 0.549 
Notes: *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. All variables are 
in natural logarithms. 
5.4.1.2 Effect of non-life insurance expenditure on per capita income 
Similarly, this chapter also carries out regressions in columns (1)(5) of Table 5-2 
based on the baseline 2SLS estimates that link non-life insurance expenditure to per 
capita income. The results in column (3) of Table 5-2, which use the temperature and 
merchandise trade as excluded instruments, show that non-life insurance expenditure 
has a significant effect on per capita income. The first-stage F-statistic of about 29.56 
proves the strength of the instruments. In addition, the insignificant coefficients of the 
instruments that are added to the regressions in column (4) and (5), together with the 
p-value of the Sargan test in column (3), support the evidence that the instruments are 
valid. 
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In summary, the results of column (4) in both Table 5-1 and Table 5-2 show that there 
is reverse causality between non-life insurance expenditure and per capita income.55 
Based on the coefficients of non-life insurance expenditure and per capita income in 
column (4) of both Table 5-1 and Table 5-2, this research finds that the LS estimates 
of the effect of per capita income on non-life insurance expenditure is downward 
biased.56 This finding is consistent with previous papers (e.g., Ward and Zurbreuugg 
2000; Lee 2011). In addition, the results based on 2SLS-IV regressions show that the 
influence of per capita income on non-life insurance expenditure is greater than the 
effect of non-life insurance expenditure on per capita income. This finding is 
consistent with the results in Table A5-5 in the Appendix, as well as the finding of Lee 
(2011). Therefore, two endogenous variables, including economic freedom and per 
capita income, need to be addressed in the main regression.57 
Table 5-2. Effect of non-life insurance expenditure on per capita income 
 lnINS lnINC  
 (1) 
LS 
(2) 
LS 
(3) 
2SLS 
(4) 
2SLS 
(5) 
2SLS 
lnINS  0.337*** 0.868*** 0.843*** 0.785* 
  (0.026) (0.096) (0.087) (0.476) 
lnTEM 0.057  
(p-value=0.152) 
  -0.003  
 (0.040)   (0.029)  
lnMER -0.813***    -0.047 
 (0.097)    (0.393) 
Sargan test for over-identification 
restrictions of the instruments (p-
value) 
  0.910   
First stage, F-stat. 35.83     
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 347 387 347 347 347 
Country 34 34 34 34 34 
R-squared 0.539 0.774 0.564 0.563 0.611 
Notes: *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. All variables are 
in natural logarithms. 
                                                 
55 Following the study of Christopoulos and Tsionas (2004), this research uses the panel unit-root test, 
panel cointegration test and panel causality test for the robustness check and found reverse causality 
between non-life insurance expenditure and per capita income. To save space, this study only includes 
the panel causality test results, which are illustrated in Table A5-5 in the Appendix. 
56 From (1) and (2), this study has covariance between the log-change of per capita income and the error 
term as follows: Cov(∆log(INCi,t), ei,t) = (c/(1-c.k)). If Cov(∆log(INCi,t), ei,t) > 0 (<0), the OLS estimates 
are expected to be larger (smaller) than the IV and GMM estimates. 
57 This chapter also checked the reverse causality problem caused by economic freedom. The results in 
Table A5-6 and Table A5-7, based on IV regression, show that economic freedom has a significant 
effect on non-life insurance expenditure. The finding in Table A5-8, based on the panel causality test, 
supports this result. That is, economic freedom may not cause the reverse causality problem in the short 
run. However, Trinh, Nguyen and Sgro (2016) found that economic freedom may cause the endogeneity 
problem due to omitted variables. Therefore, this research treats the economic freedom variable as an 
endogenous variable because the sample countries in this research are relevant to the sample of 
developed countries in the study of Trinh, Nguyen and Sgro (2016). 
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5.4.2 Determinants of non-life insurance expenditure in all OECD countries 
This chapter investigates the effect of socio-economic determinants on both 
aggregated non-life insurance and non-life insurance expenditure across non-life 
insurance products including property insurance, accident and health insurance, motor 
insurance, and general liability insurance, based on pooled OLS, IV regression and the 
system GMM estimator. The results are reported in Tables 5-35-7. The results of the 
statistic tests and running regressions will be discussed in turn. 
5.4.2.1 Statistical tests 
The results of the statistic tests in Tables 5-35-7 show that IVs used in the system 
GMM estimator are valid; hence, they are not correlated with the residuals because the 
p-values of the Sargan and Hansen tests fail to reject the joint null hypothesis. 
Additionally, the p-values of the Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in column (3) in Tables 
5-35-7 indicate that the errors in the difference equation do not exhibit second-order 
autocorrelation. For the IV regression, the p-values of the Sargan test in column (2) in 
Tables 5-35-7 show that the instruments in the IV regressions are valid. However, 
these instruments are not strong because the first F-values in the weak identification 
test are close to 10. 
From the above analysis, it is appropriate to choose the system GMM estimator as a 
baseline model to solve the endogenous problems caused by reverse causality and 
omitted variables. The findings based on the system GMM estimation in Tables 5-35-
7 prove that the influences of various factors on non-life insurance expenditure differ 
significantly among products. These differences will be discussed in turn. 
5.4.2.2 Aggregated non-life insurance expenditure 
The findings in Table 5-3, based on the system GMM estimator, indicate that the 
estimated coefficients of cultural variables are insignificant. A possible explanation 
for this is the contribution of different non-life insurance products that led to an 
ambiguous effect. This will be discussed in the next section. The empirical results also 
show that one-year-lagged aggregated non-life insurance expenditure, economic 
freedom and per capita income have a statistically significant positive effect on non-
life insurance expenditure. These results are consistent with hypothesis H5-1 and 
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support the findings of the previous chapters and earlier studies (e.g., Outreville 1990; 
Browne, Chung and Frees 2000; Park, Borde and Choi 2002; Esho et al. 2004; Chui 
and Kwok 2008; Elango and Jones 2011; Feyen, Lester and Rocha 2011; Park and 
Lemaire 2012). There can be no doubt that spending on non-life insurance products in 
the prior year may induce people to increase expenditure on these products in a later 
stage. This is because using non-life insurance products continuously may help people 
to obtain further benefits, such as reduced renewal costs and waived waiting periods. 
More economic freedom and higher per capita income, which increase both wealth and 
the value of risky properties, may induce people to increase their spending on non-life 
insurance products. However, the positive coefficient of per capita income in this study 
is inconsistent with the finding of Kamiya, Li and Zanjani (2014). A possible 
explanation may be that Kamiya, Li and Zanjani used pooled OLS and fixed-effects 
regressions as the baseline, and this may yield biased results due to the endogeneity 
problem caused by per capita income. 
Interestingly, bank development and urbanisation have a significantly negative effect 
on aggregated non-life insurance expenditure. These results are consistent with the 
findings of Chapter 4, and they may be explained in the context of this study as follows. 
The negative effect of bank development on non-life insurance expenditure could be 
due to a decline in the level of investments during and after the GFC. Furceri and 
Mourougane (2012) and Rioja, Rios-Avila and Valev (2014) showed that there is a 
reduction in the level of investments when there was a shock to bank lending (or credit 
supply) during the GFC. In addition, Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache and Gupta (2006) 
claimed that banks tend to shift away from higher-risk and higher-return investments 
towards safer activities during the post-crisis period. As a result, a decline in 
investments may lead to a decrease in non-life insurance expenditure. The negative 
sign of the coefficient of bank development in this research may arise due to the 
dominant effect of bank development in the post-crisis period compared with the pre-
crisis period, which will be explored later in this section. The negative coefficient of 
urbanisation in OECD countries may be due to people living in higher urban areas 
feeling more secure than those living in less urbanised areas. Lall and Deichmann 
(2010) claimed that urban hazard risks can be reduced though everyday city 
management, including maintenance of public services, smart land use management 
and increased supply of formal housing in safe areas. Further, Kohara (2001) showed 
that individuals living in urban areas may suffer less from a loss of income compared 
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with rural residents. Therefore, urban residents’ spending on related non-life insurance 
products may decline. Finally, the effect of Common Law on aggregated non-life 
expenditure is positive. This result supports hypothesis H5-3 and the findings of 
Chapter 4, and it provides evidence that creditors’ rights and shareholders are protected 
better in Common Law countries than in other countries (see La Porta et al. 1999); 
Park and Lemaire 2012). 
Table 5-3. Determinants of aggregated non-life insurance expenditure in OECD 
countries 
 OLS IV  System GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Lagged lnINS 0.9098*** 0.9808*** 0.6584*** 
 (0.0192) (0.0440) (0.1382) 
EFI 0.0314 0.2310*** 0.2120* 
 (0.0233) (0.0693) (0.1253) 
LnINC 0.1096*** -0.1447 0.6815*** 
 (0.0326) (0.0977) (0.2219) 
BDV -0.0001 -0.0002* -0.0006** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) 
EDU -0.0002 -0.0010 -0.0048 
 (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0031) 
URB -0.0014 -0.0009 -0.0086* 
 (0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0049) 
IND -0.0129 0.1284 -0.0816 
 (0.0602) (0.0869) (0.2225) 
IDV 0.0331 0.0870 -0.0139 
 (0.0508) (0.0634) (0.2719) 
LTO 0.1003* -0.0734 0.2985 
 (0.0566) (0.0893) (0.1886) 
MAS -0.0999** -0.2032*** -0.3528 
 (0.0457) (0.0703) (0.2168) 
UAI 0.0430 -0.0376 0.2624 
 (0.0522) (0.0682) (0.2335) 
PDI 0.0354 0.0628 0.3078 
 (0.0449) (0.0609) (0.1968) 
HPM 0.0051 -0.1035** 0.0095 
 (0.0196) (0.0409) (0.0865) 
CML 0.0619* -0.0962 0.2553* 
 (0.0334) (0.0601) (0.1363) 
Observations 295 247 295 
R-squared 0.9924 0.9895 0.978 
Weak identification test (1st F)  11.53  
Sargan test (p-value)  0.458 0.141 
Hansen test (p-value)   0.674 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-value)   0.974 
Notes: *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Numbers in 
parentheses show asymptotic standard errors. Constant and year-fixed effects are included but not 
reported here. 
5.4.2.3 Property insurance expenditure 
This section discusses the determinants of property insurance expenditure in OECD 
countries. Similar to the cases of aggregated non-life insurance, the results in Table 5-
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4, based on the system GMM estimator, show positive effects of one-year-lagged 
property expenditure, economic freedom and per capita income on property insurance 
expenditure. These results support hypothesis H5-1 and the results of previous chapters. 
Notably, bank development, education and urbanisation have a negative effect on 
property insurance expenditure and are inconsistent with hypothesis H5-1. These 
contradictions can be explained as follows. Similar to the case of aggregated non-life 
insurance, the negative sign of the coefficient of bank development may be due to a 
decline in property sales caused by a decline in investments during the post-crisis 
period, and thus a decrease in non-life insurance expenditure. Further, the negative 
influence of bank development may be driven by the effect of the GFC since 2007. 
The significant negative effect of the banking crisis on non-life insurance consumption 
was found in a related study by Kamiya, Li and Zanjani (2014). Trinh, Nguyen and 
Sgro (2016) also found significant changes in the determinants of non-life insurance 
expenditure during the GFC. Inklaar and Yang (2012) found that the GFC had a 
negative effect on investment, particularly in countries with low tolerance for 
uncertainty that results in a fall in total output. In addition, Rose and Spiegel (2011) 
claimed that countries with looser credit market regulation and higher incomes 
suffered the most from the crisis. The effects of the GFC on non-life insurance 
expenditure will be discussed later. 
The negative effect of education on property insurance expenditure in OECD countries 
is inconsistent with hypothesis H5-1, but supports the finding based on the OLS 
regression of Outreville (1990) and Zhu, Kui and Fang (2011). The hypothesis 
suggests that a higher-educated individual should have a higher awareness of risks and 
spend more on property insurance. However, highly educated people may also avoid 
risks by installing equipment such as fire extinguishers, smoke detectors and security 
cameras and managing risks themselves as part of a self-insured plan before 
purchasing property insurance. Hence, their properties may have a lower risk than 
others, and therefore their spending on this product may be low. According to Swiss 
Re (2016a), high losses from natural catastrophes, which can be covered by property 
insurance policies, may lead to an increase in the price of property insurance. This may 
negatively affect demand for this product. For example, Australia experienced a 6% 
fall in property insurance expenditure in 2009 due to a rise of premium rates after 
major losses arising from weather eventsin particular, the Victoria bushfire in early 
2009 (Swiss Re 2016a). Additionally, Outreville (1990) argued that higher education 
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might not affect on non-life insurance expenditure at an earlier stage of development, 
but rather at a later stage. Another explanation is that education has a high correlation 
with other explanatory variables, such as masculinity, and this may yield biased 
results.58 
The results in Table 5-4 show that urbanisation has a negative effect on property 
insurance expenditure in OECD countries, which is inconsistent with hypothesis H5-1. 
As explained earlier, people living in areas with higher urbanisation may spend less 
on non-life insurance products because there is more security in urban areas, although 
these areas may be more affected by economic and financial crises than other areas. 
Another possible explanation is that a decline in property sales in areas with a high 
degree of urbanisation where there is a high concentration of properties may be more 
serious than a decline in property sales in less urbanised areas, especially during the 
GFC. For example, expenditure on property insurance in Spain in 2010 decreased by 
12% due to the weak economic conditions during the GFC (OECD 2015a; Swiss Re 
2016a). 
For cultural variables, Table 5-4 shows some interesting results. The positive effect of 
individualism on property insurance expenditure is consistent with hypothesis H5-1 and 
supports the aggregating data-based study of Park and Lemaire (2012). These results 
may arise because individuals living in higher individualism countries such as the US, 
the UK and the Netherlands are wealthier and may spend more on non-life insurance 
products (Hofstede 1983). Further, Park and Lemaire (2012) claimed that people living 
in countries with higher individualism may tend to have more non-life insurance 
products for protection.  
The empirical results in Table 5-4 also prove that long-term orientation has a positive 
influence on property insurance expenditure, and this finding is inconsistent with 
hypothesis H5-2. A possible explanation may be that individuals in OECD countries 
may choose property insurance that covers all damages or loss of property caused by 
fire, storm, natural forces, land subsidence and theft due to a desire to protect their 
family and support their optimistic outlook of the future. The empirical finding also 
shows that masculinity has a significant negative effect on property insurance 
                                                 
58 This chapter examines this issue by dropping the masculinity variable and undertaking a regression 
using the system GMM estimator. The results show that the estimated coefficient of the education 
variable becomes insignificant. 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
131 
 
expenditure. This result is consistent with hypothesis H5-2 and suggests that men in 
high masculine countries may focus on their material success, such as career and 
business, while women may focus on looking after their family. Therefore, the family 
unit may consume less on property insurance expenditure given the limited income 
and specific roles of men and women (Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov 2010).59 
Finally, the positive sign of the coefficient of uncertainty avoidance in terms of 
property insurance is consistent with hypothesis H5-1 and supports the aggregated non-
life-based findings of Park and Lemaire (2012). 
Table 5-4. Determinants of property insurance expenditure in OECD countries 
 OLS IV System GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Lagged lnINS 0.8801*** 0.9114*** 0.8651*** 
 (0.0311) (0.0488) (0.0442) 
EFI 0.0949 0.0587 0.1054* 
 (0.0627) (0.1776) (0.0611) 
LnINC 0.1803** 0.1123 0.2201** 
 (0.0707) (0.1589) (0.1080) 
BDV -0.0006** -0.0004 -0.0006** 
 (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
EDU -0.0039** -0.0023 -0.0043** 
 (0.0016) (0.0022) (0.0021) 
URB -0.0090*** -0.0090*** -0.0099** 
 (0.0026) (0.0030) (0.0039) 
IND 0.2256 0.2424 0.2307 
 (0.1555) (0.2072) (0.1629) 
IDV 0.6694*** 0.6865*** 0.7105*** 
 (0.1595) (0.1810) (0.2296) 
LTO 0.2754* 0.2693 0.2988* 
 (0.1480) (0.1714) (0.1525) 
MAS -0.3331*** -0.2464 -0.3546*** 
 (0.1121) (0.1714) (0.1245) 
UAI 0.3426** 0.2858** 0.3756** 
 (0.1386) (0.1418) (0.1699) 
PDI 0.0552 0.1077 0.0707 
 (0.0999) (0.1061) (0.0621) 
HPM -0.0074 0.0116 -0.0042 
 (0.0483) (0.0933) (0.0370) 
CML 0.1185 0.0667 0.1306 
 (0.0823) (0.1195) (0.0862) 
Observations 274 230 274 
R-squared 0.9708 0.9728 0.942 
Weak identification test (1st F)  9.45  
Sargan test (p-value)  0.863 0.145 
Hansen test (p-value)   1.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-value)   0.181 
Notes: *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Numbers in 
parentheses show asymptotic standard errors. Constant and year-fixed effects are included but not 
reported here.  
                                                 
59 Non-life insurance expenditure in some OECD countries with a high masculinity index was lower 
than that of countries with a low masculinity index. For instance, Slovakia had a masculinity index that 
was 7.9 times higher than that of the Netherlands; however, the Netherlands’ non-life insurance 
expenditure was 16.8 times higher than that of Slovakia in 2011. 
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5.4.2.4 Accident and health insurance expenditure 
This section presents the results for the determinants of accident and health insurance 
expenditure in OECD countries. As shown in Table 5-5, findings based on the system 
GMM estimator prove that the estimated coefficient of one-year-lagged accident and 
health insurance expenditure is significantly positive. This result is consistent with 
hypothesis H5-1, the result of aggregated non-life insurance, Chapter 4 and the findings 
of Bolhaar, Lindeboom and Van Der Klaauw (2012) at the individual level, suggesting 
that using this product in an earlier year may induce people to increase spending on it 
in a later year. For example, to be covered for pre-existing conditions in medical 
expenses, which are one of the benefits of accident and health insurance, policyholders 
must satisfy the waiting period conditions. This may not apply for renewed 
policyholders who enrol yearly. According to the Kaiser Family Foundation (2012), 
insurers may have the right to deny enrolment to individuals with pre-existing 
conditions, which are health problems or medical conditions that existed before 
individuals used the health insurance policy. Insurance companies may also charge 
such individuals higher premiums, but the waiting period conditions must be applied.60 
Chatterji, Brandon and Markowitz (2016) found that expanding coverage options for 
pre-existing conditions for children in the US may increase the job mobility of their 
parents. Additionally, buying accident and health insurance yearly may help people to 
reduce their renewal costs. The results in Table 5-5 also show that per capita income 
has a positive effect on accident and health insurance expenditure. This finding is 
consistent with hypothesis H5-1 and previous studies at the individual level (see 
Palangkaraya et al. 2009; Bolhaar, Lindeboom and Van Der Klaauw 2012; Hopkins, 
Kidd and Ulker 2013). 
Interestingly, economic freedom has a negative effect on accident and health insurance 
expenditure. This result is inconsistent with hypothesis H5-1 and previous chapters, and 
can be explained by the quality of the national health care systems in OECD countries, 
which are primarily publicly funded by the government through taxation. Miller, Kim 
and Holmes (2014) claimed that the performance of healthcare services in countries 
with high economic freedom may increase.61 National insurance plans in OECD 
countries may cover the following benefits: treatment by health professionals and 
treatment and accommodation in a public hospital. Therefore, they may help people to 
cover health risks and decrease spending on accident and health insurance. The finding 
                                                 
60 In the US, applicants for health insurance are required to have at least 18 months of past health 
insurance coverage (The Kaiser Family Foundation 2012). 
61 Healthcare providers in the Netherlands provide services 24 hours a day, seven days a week by 
medical professionals (Bjornberg 2015). 
CHAPTER FIVE 
133 
 
in Table 5-5 also indicates that per capita income has a positive influence on accident 
and health insurance expenditure. This result is consistent with hypothesis H5-1 and the 
findings of earlier chapters, and it provides evidence that higher income per capita 
increases accident and health insurance expenditure. 
For cultural effects, the empirical results in Table 5-5, based on the system GMM 
estimator, support the view that long-term orientation has a positive influence on 
accident and health insurance expenditure and is inconsistent with hypothesis H5-2. 
This finding may be explained as follows. In societies with high long-term orientation, 
people have an optimistic outlook oriented towards the future. They are encouraged to 
be thrifty and invest in education, and they have a duty to financial support their 
parents (Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov 2010). Therefore, non-life insurance products 
regarding accident and health insurance may be more relevant to those with an 
optimistic outlook and who want to take care of their family. That is, individuals in 
OECD countries may choose accident and health insurance to protect their dependents 
against risks. De Janvry, Dequiedt and Sadoulet (2014) also stated that spending of a 
group (rather than an individual) on insurance may increase due to reducing transaction 
costs. In the life insurance sector, Park and Lemaire (2011) also found that long-term 
orientation has a significantly positive effect on the demand for aggregated life 
insurance. 
Finally, Common Law has a positive effect on accident and health insurance 
expenditure. This finding supports hypothesis H5-3 and Chapter 4, and it can be 
explained as follows. The right of parents to have a health policy to cover pre-existing 
conditions for their children is well protected by some OECD countries with the 
Common Law system. Policymakers may issue policies to protect the right of parents 
to have a health insurance policy, regardless of whether their children have pre-
existing conditions. That is, their children would be covered by the insurance policy 
even if they have a chronic illness, cancer or disability. These policies may induce 
people to increase their spending on accident and health insurance. For example, in the 
US, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), enacted in March 2010, 
requires all private health insurance companies not to increase their premium 
surcharges or refuse to enrol children due to their pre-existing conditions. Prior to the 
ACA, the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 1985 and Health 
Insurance Portability were also designed to ensure the quality of health insurance 
coverage for workers when moving to other companies (Chatterji, Brandon and 
Markowitz 2016). 
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Table 5-5. Determinants of accident and health insurance expenditure in OECD 
countries 
 OLS IV System GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Lagged lnINS 0.9559*** 0.9569*** 0.9115*** 
 (0.0153) (0.0260) (0.0395) 
EFI -0.0197 0.0203 -0.1358* 
 (0.0528) (0.1839) (0.0752) 
LnINC 0.1066** 0.0616 0.3114* 
 (0.0528) (0.1627) (0.1619) 
BDV 0.00001 0.00003 0.000007 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
EDU -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0009 
 (0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0024) 
URB -0.0016 -0.0019 -0.0038 
 (0.0020) (0.0024) (0.0031) 
IND 0.0829 0.0892 0.0773 
 (0.1267) (0.1534) (0.2531) 
IDV -0.0861 -0.0792 -0.1080 
 (0.1095) (0.1197) (0.1480) 
LTO 0.1003 0.1094 0.2909* 
 (0.1165) (0.1936) (0.1702) 
MAS -0.0491 -0.0297 -0.0662 
 (0.0900) (0.1373) (0.0959) 
UAI 0.1663 0.1301 0.3346 
 (0.1131) (0.1501) (0.2254) 
PDI -0.1461* -0.1347 -0.1254 
 (0.0871) (0.0955) (0.1166) 
HPM 0.0523 0.0492 0.1297 
 (0.0428) (0.1055) (0.0815) 
CML 0.0511 0.0256 0.1742* 
 (0.0682) (0.1146) (0.1044) 
Observations 286 238 286 
R-squared 0.9862 0.9861 0.985 
Weak identification test (1st F)  6.53  
Sargan test (p-value)  0.431 0.411 
Hansen test (p-value)   1.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-value)   0.584 
Notes: *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Numbers in 
parentheses show asymptotic standard errors. Constant and year-fixed effects are included but not 
reported here.  
5.4.2.5 Motor insurance expenditure 
As shown in Table 5-6, findings based on the system GMM estimator indicate that the 
estimated coefficients of one-year-lagged motor insurance expenditure are statistically 
significantly positive. These results are consistent with hypothesis H5-1 and the results 
of Chapter 4, and they provide evidence that using non-life insurance products in a 
prior year may induce people to increase expenditure on these products in a later year. 
A valid illustration for this is that using motor insurance continuously may help people 
to reduce renewed costs. In particular, policyholders in the current year may have a 
discount on motor insurance premiums if there were no claims in the prior year. Borda 
and Jedrzychowska (2012) conducted analysis to identify attitudes and choices of 
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customers in purchasing motor insurance in Poland and concluded that policyholders 
are willing to continue cooperating with motor insurance companies based on the 
amount of the premium, possible discounts and the quality of insurance service. 
Additionally, approximately 40% of the respondents had not changed their insurers for 
more than three years.     
With regard to per capita income, the findings in Table 5-6 indicate that per capita 
GDP has a highly significant effect on motor insurance expenditure in OECD 
countries. These findings are consistent with those of Browne, Chung and Frees (2000) 
and the results of previous chapters, and they support hypothesis H5-1, that higher 
income per capita increases non-life insurance expenditure due to raising both wealth 
and the value of risky assets. However, this result is inconsistent with the study of 
Kamiya, Li and Zanjani (2014). A possible explanation may be that Kamiya, Li and 
Zanjani used pooled OLS and fixed-effects regressions as baseline ones, and this may 
yield biased results due to the endogeneity problem caused by per capita GDP. The 
results in Table 5-6 also show that economic freedom has an insignificantly positive 
effect on motor insurance expenditure. This can be explained because the motor 
insurance market in OECD countries may have matured development and may 
therefore not be affected by the competitive factor caused by economic freedom. The 
negative effects of bank development and urbanisation on motor insurance expenditure 
are consistent with the case of aggregated non-life and property insurance. 
For cultural variables, the positive effect of individualism on motor insurance 
expenditure is consistent with hypothesis H5-1 and the results in the case of property 
insurance, and they support the finding of Park and Lemaire (2012). Masculinity has 
a significantly negative effect on motor insurance expenditure. This result is consistent 
with hypothesis H5-2 and the findings in the case of property insurance. The result in 
Table 5-6 also proves that power distance has a positive effect on motor insurance 
expenditure. This result is inconsistent with hypothesis H5-2 and may be because 
employees in OECD countries may buy related non-life insurance products to protect 
their families rather than expect their superiors’ help. Hofstede (1983, 2006) claimed 
that the degree of centralisation of authority and autocratic leadership may grow over 
time in high power distance countries, and hence the degree of dependence of 
subordinates on their superiors is high. In contrast, there may be less inequality 
between a superior and a subordinate in wealth and power in low power distance 
countries. Non-life insurance expenditure in some OECD countries with low power 
distance indexes was several times higher than that of developing countries with high 
power distance indexes. For instance, Australia has a power distance index that was 
two times lower than that of China, but Australia’s non-life insurance expenditure was 
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15 times higher than that of China in 2013 (Hofstede, Hofstede and Mikov 2010; 
OECD 2015a) 
Finally, the effect of Common Law on motor insurance expenditure is positive but 
insignificant. This result does not support hypothesis H5-3 and is inconsistent with the 
study of Browne, Chung and Frees (2000). This can be explained because motor 
insurance products in OECD countries include motor vehicle liability insurance, which 
is compulsory by law, and land vehicle insurance, which is non-compulsory (OECD 
2015a). The insignificant effect of Common Law on motor insurance expenditure may 
be because individuals have the right to make their own decision when choosing land 
vehicle insurance, which has a premium rate that is several times higher than that of 
vehicle liability insurance. 
Table 5-6. Determinants of motor insurance expenditure in OECD countries 
 OLS IV System GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Lagged lnINS 0.8239*** 0.9155*** 0.6773*** 
 (0.0310) (0.0757) (0.1120) 
EFI 0.0096 0.3463*** 0.0667 
 (0.0358) (0.1144) (0.1133) 
LnINC 0.2208*** -0.1301 0.4944* 
 (0.0487) (0.1557) (0.2755) 
BDV -0.0001 -0.0003* -0.0004* 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
EDU 0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0007 
 (0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0020) 
URB -0.0023* -0.0020 -0.0059* 
 (0.0014) (0.0020) (0.0035) 
IND -0.1113 0.2091 -0.2398 
 (0.0851) (0.1468) (0.2262) 
IDV 0.1374* 0.2088** 0.1904* 
 (0.0753) (0.0906) (0.1005) 
LTO 0.1367* -0.0997 0.2302 
 (0.0789) (0.1281) (0.1818) 
MAS -0.1148* -0.2980*** -0.1850* 
 (0.0606) (0.0978) (0.1089) 
UAI 0.1114 -0.0443 0.2939 
 (0.0765) (0.1054) (0.2046) 
PDI 0.1556** 0.2222** 0.3170* 
 (0.0628) (0.0871) (0.1785) 
HPM 0.0154 -0.1563** 0.0385 
 (0.0288) (0.0657) (0.0855) 
CML 0.1190** -0.1087 0.2429 
 (0.0506) (0.0984) (0.1477) 
Observations 290 242 290 
R-squared 0.9757 0.9706 0.972 
Weak identification test (1st F)  8.95  
Sargan test (p-value)  0.564 0.007 
Hansen test (p-value)   0.624 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-value)   0.433 
Notes: *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Numbers in 
parentheses show asymptotic standard errors. Constant and year-fixed effects are included but not 
reported here.  
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5.4.2.6 General liability insurance expenditure 
This section studies the determinants of general liability insurance expenditure in 
OECD countries. The findings based on the system GMM estimator in Table 5-7 show 
that the estimated coefficients of one-year-lagged general liability insurance 
expenditure, economic freedom, bank development, urbanisation, individualism, long-
term orientation and uncertainty avoidance are significantly positive. These findings 
are consistent with the cases of other non-life insurance products and were explained 
earlier. 
Interestingly, Common Law has a positive effect on general liability insurance 
expenditure, while the effect of per capita income on this product’s expenditure is 
insignificant. This may be because spending on general liability insurance is 
compulsory by law. For example, National Parks South Australia (2011) stated that 
commercial tours in parks, reserves and marine areas must have and maintain public 
liability insurance for a minimum of A$10 million. Similarly, the Australian 
Government requires organisations to have public liability insurance of at least A$20 
million to carry out a commercial activity in a Commonwealth reserve. In addition, in 
Australia, employers’ liability insurance expenditure has increased due to the related 
legal framework. For instance, the framework requires compulsory liability insurance 
for some fields, such as aviation, maritime oil pollution and residential construction, 
medical practitioners, property brokers and stock brokers. In the US, general liability 
insurance is compulsory for workers’ compensation in all states (Danzon and 
Harrington 1992). Therefore, the effect of per capita income on general liability 
insurance in OECD countries may be insignificant due to domination by the legal 
system. 
The results in Table 5-7 also show that indulgence has a significant effect on general 
liability insurance expenditure. The positive effects of indulgence and long-term 
orientation are inconsistent with hypothesis H5-2 and may be explained as follows. 
Indulgence refers to a society in which people are optimistic and have the right to enjoy 
life and have fun. The indulgence index is used to explain the paradox of the poor 
Filipinas being happier than the rich people of Hong Kong (Minkov 2011). Individuals 
in high-indulgence OECD countries may accept risks due to their optimism, and hence 
they may decrease non-life insurance expenditure. Nevertheless, they must choose 
general liability insurance products due to compulsory characteristics of the law 
system in OECD countries. A valid illustration for this is that some OECD countries 
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with high indulgence (e.g., Denmark, the United Kingdom and Australia) have high 
general liability insurance expenditure. 
Table 5-7. Determinants of general liability insurance expenditure in OECD countries 
 OLS IV System GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Lagged lnINS 0.9320*** 0.9333*** 0.9333*** 
 (0.0213) (0.0308) (0.0211) 
EFI 0.0827 0.1431 0.0753* 
 (0.0521) (0.1493) (0.0395) 
LnINC 0.0737 0.0287 0.0645 
 (0.0527) (0.1275) (0.0568) 
BDV -0.0003* -0.0003 -0.0003*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
EDU -0.0017 -0.0013 -0.0016 
 (0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0010) 
URB -0.0035* -0.0041* -0.0033** 
 (0.0020) (0.0023) (0.0014) 
IND 0.1701 0.2028 0.1714** 
 (0.1288) (0.1630) (0.0872) 
IDV 0.2092* 0.2367* 0.2098** 
 (0.1168) (0.1279) (0.0838) 
LTO 0.1829 0.1960 0.1803** 
 (0.1183) (0.1571) (0.0873) 
MAS -0.1395 -0.1322 -0.1350** 
 (0.0918) (0.1432) (0.0647) 
UAI 0.1416 0.1267 0.1312 
 (0.1108) (0.1254) (0.0892) 
PDI 0.0202 0.0961 0.0146 
 (0.0866) (0.0948) (0.0566) 
HPM -0.0357 -0.0422 -0.0359 
 (0.0426) (0.0847) (0.0393) 
CML 0.1412* 0.1077 0.1373** 
 (0.0743) (0.1112) (0.0652) 
Observations 277 231 277 
R-squared 0.9850 0.9853 0.975 
Weak identification test (1st F)  10.03  
Sargan test (p-value)  0.716 0.203 
Hansen test (p-value)   1.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-value)   0.428 
Notes: *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Numbers in 
parentheses show asymptotic standard errors. Constant and year-fixed effects are included but not 
reported here.  
According to the OECD (2015a), the contribution of the non-life insurance market of 
the US to OECD countries in 2013 was 61.3% (the largest). This dominance means 
that the determinants of non-life insurance expenditure in OECD countries may be 
driven by those in the US. To check this, this chapter investigates the effects of 
determinants of non-life insurance in OECD countries excluding the US. Table 5-8 
reports the results using the system GMM estimator and show some interesting points. 
The determinants of aggregated non-life insurance expenditure in OECD countries, 
such as education, urbanisation, masculinity and Common Law, may be driven by 
these variables in the US. Notably, the insignificant coefficients of economic freedom, 
long-term orientation and Common Law on accident and health insurance expenditure 
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in the case of excluding the US indicate that the effect of these factors in the US may 
overshadow those in OECD countries. Similarly, the insignificant effects of bank 
development, urbanisation and individualism on motor insurance expenditure in 
OECD countries excluding the US prove the dominant influence of these factors in the 
US. Finally, the results in Table 5-9 show that the effects of bank development and 
Common Law on general liability insurance expenditure in OECD may be affected by 
those in the US. 
Table 5-8. Determinants of non-life insurance expenditure in OECD countries 
(property, and accident and health insurance, including and excluding the US, system 
GMM) 
 Aggregated non-life Property Accident and health 
All sample Excluded 
the US 
All sample Excluded 
the US 
All sample Excluded 
the US 
 (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) 
Lagged lnINS 0.6584*** 0.6924*** 0.8651*** 0.8666*** 0.9115*** 0.8637*** 
 (0.1382) (0.1417) (0.0442) (0.0441) (0.0395) (0.0574) 
EFI 0.2120* 0.3066*** 0.1054* 0.1122* -0.1358* -0.0793 
 (0.1253) (0.1099) (0.0611) (0.0625) (0.0752) (0.0856) 
LnINC 0.6815*** 0.5855** 0.2201** 0.2127* 0.3114* 0.2899* 
 (0.2219) (0.2368) (0.1080) (0.1120) (0.1619) (0.1494) 
BDV -0.0006** -0.0007** -0.0006** -0.0006** 0.0000 0.0003 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) 
EDU -0.0048 -0.0058** -0.0043** -0.0043** -0.0009 -0.0018 
 (0.0031) (0.0028) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0024) (0.0021) 
URB -0.0086* -0.0082 -0.0099** -0.0099** -0.0038 -0.0030 
 (0.0049) (0.0055) (0.0039) (0.0040) (0.0031) (0.0035) 
IND -0.0816 -0.0411 0.2307 0.2390 0.0773 0.1983 
 (0.2225) (0.1951) (0.1629) (0.1620) (0.2531) (0.3044) 
IDV -0.0139 -0.0457 0.7105*** 0.7106*** -0.1080 -0.1923 
 (0.2719) (0.2498) (0.2296) (0.2335) (0.1480) (0.1393) 
LTO 0.2985 0.2164 0.2988* 0.2970* 0.2909* 0.2477 
 (0.1886) (0.1901) (0.1525) (0.1546) (0.1702) (0.1698) 
MAS -0.3528 -0.4112* -0.3546*** -0.3574*** -0.0662 -0.2158 
 (0.2168) (0.2386) (0.1245) (0.1268) (0.0959) (0.1514) 
UAI 0.2624 0.2245 0.3756** 0.3764** 0.3346 0.2563 
 (0.2335) (0.2281) (0.1699) (0.1784) (0.2254) (0.2306) 
PDI 0.3078 0.3148 0.0707 0.0713 -0.1254 -0.1366 
 (0.1968) (0.2054) (0.0621) (0.0614) (0.1166) (0.1321) 
HPM 0.0095 -0.0465 -0.0042 -0.0059 0.1297 0.0372 
 (0.0865) (0.1074) (0.0370) (0.0478) (0.0815) (0.1076) 
CML 0.2553* 0.1848 0.1306 0.1310 0.1742* 0.0709 
 (0.1363) (0.1243) (0.0862) (0.0904) (0.1044) (0.1114) 
Observations 295 283 274 262 286 274 
R-squared 0.978 0.978 0.942 0.969 0.985 0.984 
Sargan test (p-
value) 
0.141 0.347 0.145 0.168 0.411 0.386 
Hansen test (p-
value) 
0.674 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Arellano-Bond 
test for AR(2) 
(p-value) 
0.974 0.821 0.181 0.186 0.584 0.579 
Notes: *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Numbers in 
parentheses show asymptotic standard errors. Constant and year-fixed effects are included but not 
reported here.  
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Table 5-9. Determinants of non-life insurance expenditure in OECD countries (motor, 
and general liability insurance, including and excluding the US, system GMM) 
 Aggregated non-life Motor General liability 
All sample Excluded 
the US 
All sample Excluded 
the US 
All sample Excluded 
the US 
 (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) 
Lagged lnINS 0.6584*** 0.6924*** 0.6773*** 0.6471*** 0.9333*** 0.9272*** 
 (0.1382) (0.1417) (0.1120) (0.1082) (0.0211) (0.0221) 
EFI 0.2120* 0.3066*** 0.0667 0.1384 0.0753* 0.1264*** 
 (0.1253) (0.1099) (0.1133) (0.1165) (0.0395) (0.0366) 
LnINC 0.6815*** 0.5855** 0.4944* 0.4764* 0.0645 0.0146 
 (0.2219) (0.2368) (0.2755) (0.2622) (0.0568) (0.0474) 
BDV -0.0006** -0.0007** -0.0004* -0.0003 -0.0003*** -0.0001 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
EDU -0.0048 -0.0058** -0.0007 -0.0015 -0.0016 -0.0026*** 
 (0.0031) (0.0028) (0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0010) (0.0008) 
URB -0.0086* -0.0082 -0.0059* -0.0056 -0.0033** -0.0025** 
 (0.0049) (0.0055) (0.0035) (0.0036) (0.0014) (0.0012) 
IND -0.0816 -0.0411 -0.2398 -0.2347 0.1714** 0.1979** 
 (0.2225) (0.1951) (0.2262) (0.2130) (0.0872) (0.0874) 
IDV -0.0139 -0.0457 0.1904* 0.1664 0.2098** 0.1792** 
 (0.2719) (0.2498) (0.1005) (0.1040) (0.0838) (0.0726) 
LTO 0.2985 0.2164 0.2302 0.1673 0.1803** 0.1195* 
 (0.1886) (0.1901) (0.1818) (0.1772) (0.0873) (0.0698) 
MAS -0.3528 -0.4112* -0.1850* -0.2620** -0.1350** -0.2149*** 
 (0.2168) (0.2386) (0.1089) (0.1223) (0.0647) (0.0678) 
UAI 0.2624 0.2245 0.2939 0.2325 0.1312 0.0284 
 (0.2335) (0.2281) (0.2046) (0.2011) (0.0892) (0.0674) 
PDI 0.3078 0.3148 0.3170* 0.3325* 0.0146 0.0027 
 (0.1968) (0.2054) (0.1785) (0.1748) (0.0566) (0.0519) 
HPM 0.0095 -0.0465 0.0385 -0.0252 -0.0359 -0.1080*** 
 (0.0865) (0.1074) (0.0855) (0.0990) (0.0393) (0.0369) 
CML 0.2553* 0.1848 0.2429 0.1840 0.1373** 0.0594 
 (0.1363) (0.1243) (0.1477) (0.1463) (0.0652) (0.0446) 
Observations 295 283 290 278 277 265 
R-squared 0.978 0.978 0.972 0.984 0.975 0.993 
Sargan test (p-
value) 
0.141 0.347 0.007 0.002 0.203 0.093 
Hansen test (p-
value) 
0.674 1.000 0.624 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Arellano-Bond 
test for AR(2) 
(p-value) 
0.974 0.821 0.433 0.441 0.428 0.509 
Notes: *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Numbers in 
parentheses show asymptotic standard errors. Constant and year fixed-effects are included but not 
reported here.  
5.4.3 Determinants of non-life insurance expenditure in the 19 GFC-affected OECD 
countries  
5.4.3.1 Effect of GFC on non-life insurance expenditure 
Finally, this section explores the role of the GFC on spending on non-life insurance 
products in OECD countries. To this end, this subsection extends the main regression 
by adding the GFC variable, where a banking crisis dummy variable is used as a proxy 
for the GFC. The data cover the 19 OECD countries (see Table A5-4 in the Appendix 
for a complete list) that have been severely affected by the GFC since 2007.62 
                                                 
62 These 19 OECD countries are chosen from the list of countries affected by the financial crisis since 
2007 provided by the World Bank (2015b) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2011, 2013). 
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As shown in Table 5-10, the GFC variable in the 19 GFC-affected OECD countries 
has a negative efefct on aggregated non-life, property, motor and general liability 
insurance expenditure and is consistent with hypothesis H5-4. This result provides 
evidence that discounting the future labour income of individuals and investments 
caused by the GFC may reduce non-life insurance expenditure. Additionally, 
decreasing potential output in these countries during the GFC is a reasonable 
explanation for the decline in non-life insurance expenditure.63     
Table 5-10. Determinants of non-life insurance expenditure in the 19 GFC-affected 
OECD countries (system GMM estimator) 
 Aggregated 
non-life 
Property Accident 
and health 
Motor General 
liability 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lagged lnINS 0.8578*** 0.6138*** 0.8230*** 0.7420*** 0.8686*** 
 (0.0506) (0.1211) (0.0646) (0.0446) (0.0687) 
EFI -0.0465 0.0260 -0.1928** -0.0140 -0.0708 
 (0.0890) (0.1856) (0.0778) (0.0615) (0.1370) 
LnINC 0.2651** 0.5320** 0.5501*** 0.3954*** 0.4342** 
 (0.1081) (0.2359) (0.2125) (0.0789) (0.2094) 
BDV -0.0001* -0.0010* -0.0002 -0.0002* -0.0006*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
EDU -0.0011 -0.0059 -0.0042 0.0031*** -0.0052* 
 (0.0011) (0.0046) (0.0032) (0.0010) (0.0027) 
URB -0.0028 -0.0126*** -0.0059 -0.0039** -0.0041 
 (0.0021) (0.0049) (0.0041) (0.0015) (0.0037) 
GFC -0.0381** -0.0505* -0.0320 -0.0806*** -0.2195*** 
 (0.0154) (0.0291) (0.0508) (0.0255) (0.0320) 
IND 0.0008 0.8717* -0.2448 -0.4549*** 0.0762 
 (0.1893) (0.4866) (0.4282) (0.1413) (0.2539) 
IDV 0.0125 0.4467 -0.3384 -0.0385 -0.0362 
 (0.1190) (0.4195) (0.2839) (0.0926) (0.2141) 
LTO 0.1505 0.6304 0.5130* 0.2773*** 0.3109 
 (0.1138) (0.4118) (0.2656) (0.0913) (0.2012) 
MAS -0.0080 0.0052 -0.2129 0.0515 0.1118 
 (0.0488) (0.2000) (0.1700) (0.0376) (0.1274) 
UAI -0.0081 -0.1987 -0.0285 -0.3149*** -0.0658 
 (0.0802) (0.2456) (0.2381) (0.0877) (0.1829) 
PDI 0.0860 0.8989*** -0.0641 0.5171*** 0.2145** 
 (0.0635) (0.1662) (0.1559) (0.0697) (0.1086) 
HPM 0.1111 0.3314 0.4842** 0.1528** 0.1202 
 (0.0916) (0.2084) (0.2004) (0.0713) (0.1167) 
CML 0.0193 -0.0358 0.0666 0.0176 0.2102 
 (0.0383) (0.1400) (0.1215) (0.0461) (0.1299) 
Observations 150 137 151 151 141 
R-squared 0.990 0.952 0.987 0.973 0.982 
Sargan test (p-value) 0.253 0.143 0.407 0.189 0.589 
Hansen test (p-value) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(2) (p-value) 
0.745 0.709 0.174 0.885 0.101(a) 
Notes: *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Numbers in 
parentheses show asymptotic standard errors. A constant and year-fixed effects are estimated but not 
reported here. (a) indicates the p-value of the test for AR(3).  
 5.4.3.2 Determinants of non-life insurance expenditure in the 19 GFC-affected OECD 
countries before and during the GFC 
                                                 
63 Furceri and Mourougane (2012) found a negative effect of financial crises on the potential output in 
OECD countries.  
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To make the analysis transparent, I now divide the data into two sub-periods: before 
the crisis (20002006) and during the crisis (20072013).64 The findings based on the 
system GMM estimator in Tables 5-11 and 5-12 show the following interesting results. 
There are significant positive effects of one-year-lagged non-life insurance 
expenditure during the GFC. This finding is consistent with hypothesis H5-1 and 
provides evidence that the prior development of non-life insurance may be the key 
driver in explaining non-life insurance expenditure in the later stage and that it may 
not be affected by the GFC. The empirical results also suggest that economic freedom 
has a significant effect on non-life insurance products before the GFC, but is 
insignificant during the GFC. In contrast, the positive effect of per capita income on 
non-life insurance expenditure products, apart from accident and health insurance, held 
both before and during the GFC. There can be no doubt that the effect of per capita 
income may dominate that of economic freedom during the GFC, where people may 
have lost their jobs or reduced their expenses due to decreased income. 
The bank development factor has an insignificant effect on aggregated non-life and 
property insurance expenditure before the GFC, but a significant negative effect during 
the GFC. This may be because some worldwide banks collapsed during the GFC (Cull 
and Peria 2013). There is an insignificant effect of education on aggregated non-life, 
accident and health, and property insurance expenditure during the GFC, which may 
be attributed to the domination of the effect of per capita income during the GFC.  
The results in Table 5-11 also show that urbanisation has a positive effect on 
aggregated non-life insurance expenditure before the GFC, but a negative effect during 
the GFC. The negative effect of urbanisation on aggregated non-life insurance during 
the GFC may be attributed to the negative effects of urbanisation on property and 
motor insurance expenditure. A possible explanation for this is that during the GFC, 
property and motor sales may have decreased more in urbanised areas than in less 
urbanised areas, and hence expenditure on property and motor insurance may decline. 
 
 
                                                 
64 This study assumes that the consequences of the GFC may still occur in later years, although the crisis 
ended in 2009. 
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Table 5-11. Determinants of non-life insurance expenditure in the 19 GFC-affected 
OECD countries before and during the GFC (system GMM) 
 Aggregated non-life Property Accident and health 
 20002006 20072013 20002006 20072013 20002006 20072013 
 (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) 
Lagged lnINS 0.2361 0.9075*** 0.6975*** 0.4774** 0.5675*** 0.8249*** 
 (0.2980) (0.0788) (0.0663) (0.2222) (0.1835) (0.1389) 
EFI 0.4129* 0.0828 -0.3469* 0.0681 0.7190* 0.1638 
 (0.2206) (0.0660) (0.1871) (0.4601) (0.3787) (0.2917) 
LnINC 1.1402** 0.2104* 0.4008** 0.6151** 1.2560* 0.4882 
 (0.5295) (0.1248) (0.1689) (0.2754) (0.6556) (0.4537) 
BDV -0.0002 -0.0002* 0.0008 -0.0020** -0.0029*** -0.0003 
 (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0004) 
EDU -0.0057** -0.0000 0.0037 -0.0161 -0.0241*** 0.0009 
 (0.0023) (0.0012) (0.0037) (0.0103) (0.0087) (0.0041) 
URB 0.0083** -0.0036* -0.0025 -0.0310** -0.0189** -0.0037 
 (0.0033) (0.0018) (0.0030) (0.0123) (0.0091) (0.0037) 
IND -1.2520* 0.1512 -0.0329 1.5660 -0.0761 -0.4351 
 (0.6890) (0.1884) (0.2960) (1.0582) (1.3739) (0.4570) 
IDV 0.2093 0.0426 -0.1161 0.6164 0.5817 -0.4888 
 (0.3354) (0.1133) (0.2791) (0.7293) (0.8509) (0.3403) 
LTO -0.5080 0.1116 0.2498 1.8894* 0.6471 0.3737 
 (0.4646) (0.0750) (0.2592) (1.0939) (1.2317) (0.3471) 
MAS -0.3512*** -0.0505 0.4064* -0.4180 -1.7627*** -0.3415 
 (0.1165) (0.0669) (0.2103) (0.5070) (0.6159) (0.2968) 
UAI -0.3382 0.1862* -0.4444** 0.3770 0.3100 -0.1188 
 (0.3410) (0.1042) (0.1809) (0.8320) (0.5499) (0.2913) 
PDI -0.4410*** 0.0597 0.3767*** 0.9244 0.3499 -0.0609 
 (0.1707) (0.0749) (0.1449) (0.5647) (0.5321) (0.1714) 
HPM 0.1809 0.0152 0.4170** 0.7472 0.2041 0.3022 
 (0.3279) (0.0726) (0.2096) (0.5705) (0.6960) (0.4047) 
CML -0.2137 0.0640** 0.0914 0.3369 -0.0905 0.0237 
 (0.1350) (0.0320) (0.0870) (0.2816) (0.3777) (0.1226) 
Observations 80 70 77 59 83 68 
R-squared 0.991 0.987 0.975 0.927 0.971 0.993 
Sargan test (p-
value) 
0.116 0.522 0.248 0.117 0.757 0.354 
Hansen test (p-
value) 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Arellano-Bond 
test for AR(2) 
(p-value) 
0.330 0.211 0.170 0.436 0.078 0.122 
Notes: *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Numbers in 
parentheses show asymptotic standard errors. A constant and year-fixed effects are estimated but not 
reported here. 
In relation to cultural variables, the results in Tables 5-11 and 5-12 indicate that 
indulgence, individualism, masculinity, power distance and hypometropia do not 
explain expenditure on aggregated non-life and property insurance during the GFC. 
Uncertainty avoidance fails to explain spending on motor insurance, while long-term 
orientation has a significantly positive effect on property insurance expenditure during 
the GFC. Spending on non-life insurance expenditure in OECD countries during the 
GFC, apart from accident and health insurance, may be dominated by other factors 
such as per capita income, bank development and urbanisation. Notably, the positive 
effect of long-term orientation indicates that expenditure on property insurance may 
not be affected by the GFC. 
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Finally, with regard to the legal systems, the empirical results find that Common Law 
in the selected OECD countries has a positive effect on aggregated non-life, motor and 
general liability insurance expenditure during the GFC, and an insignificant effect on 
property and accident and health insurance expenditure. The significant coefficient of 
Common Law variable in the case of aggregated non-life insurance can be explained 
by the attribution of general liability insurance and third-party liability of motor 
insurance, which may be compulsory. The result provides evidence that protecting the 
rights of creditors and investors in Common Law OECD countries may induce people 
to increase expenditure on non-life insurance expenditure, particularly during the GFC. 
Table 5-12. Determinants of non-life insurance expenditure in the 19 GFC-affected 
OECD countries before and during the GFC (system GMM) 
 Aggregated non-life Motor General liability 
 20002006 20072013 20002006 20072013 20002006 20072013 
 (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) 
Lagged lnINS 0.2361 0.9075*** 0.6718*** 0.5354*** 0.8805*** 0.4651** 
 (0.2980) (0.0788) (0.0542) (0.1657) (0.0341) (0.2348) 
EFI 0.4129* 0.0828 -0.5693* 0.0513 -0.0580 -0.1727 
 (0.2206) (0.0660) (0.3194) (0.1285) (0.1801) (0.1732) 
LnINC 1.1402** 0.2104* 0.7187*** 0.9567*** 0.6469** 1.3023** 
 (0.5295) (0.1248) (0.1836) (0.3225) (0.2781) (0.5489) 
BDV -0.0002 -0.0002* 0.0006 -0.0006*** -0.0015*** -0.0007** 
 (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0003) 
EDU -0.0057** -0.0000 0.0073** 0.0041* -0.0080** -0.0053 
 (0.0023) (0.0012) (0.0036) (0.0022) (0.0034) (0.0052) 
URB 0.0083** -0.0036* -0.0025 -0.0092*** 0.0053 -0.0090 
 (0.0033) (0.0018) (0.0050) (0.0028) (0.0096) (0.0066) 
IND -1.2520* 0.1512 -1.5045*** -0.9019** -0.4461 0.0820 
 (0.6890) (0.1884) (0.3901) (0.4120) (0.6892) (0.5594) 
IDV 0.2093 0.0426 -0.8305** 0.1577 -1.1397 -0.3133 
 (0.3354) (0.1133) (0.3679) (0.1472) (1.0725) (0.5109) 
LTO -0.5080 0.1116 0.9844*** 0.2435* 0.4643 0.8956 
 (0.4646) (0.0750) (0.3399) (0.1368) (0.2989) (0.5537) 
MAS -0.3512*** -0.0505 0.4386* -0.1011 0.9236 0.4254 
 (0.1165) (0.0669) (0.2275) (0.0939) (0.7072) (0.2702) 
UAI -0.3382 0.1862* -0.6379*** -0.2779 -0.5855 -0.6318 
 (0.3410) (0.1042) (0.1641) (0.2417) (0.5557) (0.6087) 
PDI -0.4410*** 0.0597 0.2771 0.9060*** 0.9272* 0.4584 
 (0.1707) (0.0749) (0.1904) (0.3206) (0.5173) (0.2796) 
HPM 0.1809 0.0152 0.6820*** 0.1331 0.1119 0.3529* 
 (0.3279) (0.0726) (0.2606) (0.1318) (0.1487) (0.2086) 
CMW -0.2137 0.0640** 0.2594** 0.1494** 0.3352** 0.6153* 
 (0.1350) (0.0320) (0.1097) (0.0695) (0.1570) (0.3633) 
Observations 80 70 82 68 77 64 
R-squared 0.991 0.987 0.964 0.979 0.979 0.983 
Sargan test (p-
value) 
0.116 0.522 0.635 0.379 0.146 0.283 
Hansen test (p-
value) 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Arellano-Bond 
test for AR(2) 
(p-value) 
0.330 0.211 0.230 0.114 0.205 0.460 
Notes: *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Numbers in 
parentheses show asymptotic standard errors. A constant and year-fixed effects are estimated but not 
reported here. 
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Table 5-13 summarises the findings of the determinants of non-life, property, accident 
and health, motor, and general liability insurance expenditure in OECD countries in 
the period 20002013 and before and during the GFC. 
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Table 5-13. Summary of results of determinants of non-life, property and accident and health insurance expenditure in OECD countries 
  All OECD Countries 
20002013 
Exclude the US 
20002013 
19 OECD Countries 
20002006 
19 OECD Countries 
20072013 
 Hyp Non Pro A&H Mo GL Non Pro A&H Mo GL Non Pro A&H Mo GL Non Pro A&H Mo GL 
Lagged non-life insurance 
expenditure 
+ + + + + + + + + + + In. + + + + + + + + + 
Economic freedom + + + - In. + + + In. In. + + - + - In. In. In. In. In. In. 
Per capita income + + + + + In. + + + + In. + + + + + + + In. + + 
Bank development + - - In. - - - - In. In. In. In. In. - In. - - - In. - - 
Education + In. - In. In. In. - - In. In. - - In. - + - In. In. In. + In. 
Urbanization + - - In. - - In. - In. In. - + In. - In. In. - - In. - In. 
Indulgence + In. In. In. In. + In. In. In. In. + - In. In. - In. In. In. In. - In. 
Individualism + In. + In. + + In. + In. In. + In. In. In. - In. In. In. In. In. In. 
Long-term orientation - In. + + In. + In. + In. In. + In. In. In. + In. In. + In. + In. 
Masculinity - In. - In. - - - - In. - - - + - + In. In. In. In. In. In. 
Uncertainty avoidance + In. + In. In. In. In. + In. In. In. In. - In. - In. + In. In. In. In. 
Power distance - In. In. In. + In. In. In. In. + In. - + In. In. + In. In. In. + In. 
Hypometropia + In. In. In. In. In. In. In. In. In. - In. + In. + In. In. In. In. In. + 
Common Law + + In. + In. + In. In. In. In. In. In. In. In. + + + In. In. + + 
Notes: Hyp, Non, Pro., A&H, and In. indicate hypothesis, property, accident and health, and insignificant, respectively. + and -: indicate positive and negative, respectively. 
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5.4.4 Implications 
The findings in this chapter provide many useful implications for both non-life 
insurance companies and governments in OECD countries. 
The first implication is for multinational non-life insurance companies to choose 
potential markets properly. Some interesting socio-economic results of this research 
can be used to help multinational non-life insurance companies choose the location of 
potential markets. A valid illustration for this is that OECD countries with a lower 
degree of economic freedom (e.g., Slovenia, Turkey and Mexico) might be chosen as 
potential markets for accident and health insurance. Another illustration is that 
multinational non-life insurance firms can choose locations in OECD countries with a 
lower degree of urbanisation (e.g., Slovenia, Slovakia and Poland) to expand products 
of property, motor and general liability insurance. With regard to cultural factors, 
multinational non-life insurers can promote sales of property, motor and general 
liability insurance in OECD countries with a higher degree of individualism and a 
lower degree of masculinity (e.g., the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway). 
Additionally, OECD countries with a higher degree of long-term orientation (e.g., 
South Korea, Belgium and Germany) can be chosen as potential markets to sell 
products of property, accident and health, and general liability insurance.  
The second implication concerns the policies that may be applied during the GFC and 
that may affect the development of the non-life insurance sector. For example, 
governments in OECD countries should implement policies to support low-income 
individuals who may be seriously affected by the GFC so they can continue to use 
related non-life insurance products, especially compulsory ones. These policies may 
help governments to maintain social security. 
The final implication refers to economic freedom in OECD countries. Governments in 
these countries may foster expenditure on non-life insurance products, including 
property insurance, by adopting liberal policies such as encouraging low tariff rates, 
low government spending, high effective enforcement of the law and security of 
property rights. 
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5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the determinants of non-life insurance expenditure across 
products in OECD countries in the period 20002013. By using the system GMM 
estimator, the chapter overcomes the endogeneity of joint variables caused by reverse 
causality and omitted variables. In particular, reverse causality between non-life 
insurance expenditure and per capita GDP using the IV model and panel causality tests, 
which have been ignored by the previous chapters and existing literature, has also been 
addressed. This chapter finds strong evidence for the effects of economic and legal 
factors on aggregated non-life insurance spending in OECD countries. Notably, one-
year-lagged non-life insurance spending, economic freedom, per capita income, bank 
development, urbanisation and Common Law are the key drivers of aggregated non-
life insurance expenditure in OECD countries.  
By disaggregating non-life insurance into various products, this study finds some 
interesting results. First, the effect of per capita income on property, accident and 
health, and property insurance expenditure is positive, but it is insignificant for general 
liability insurance expenditure. Second, economic freedom has a positive effect on 
property and general liability insurance expenditure, but a negative effect on accident 
and health insurance expenditure. Third, bank development, urbanisation and 
masculinity have a negative effect on property, motor and liability insurance 
expenditure, while individualism has a positive influence on these products. 
However, the presence of the GFC has nullified many of the aforementioned effects, 
particularly those on health insurance expenditure. In contrast, non-life insurance 
expenditure across products in the past significantly affects subsequent spending, 
regardless of the GFC. Indeed, the results in this chapter reconfirm the importance of 
compulsory health insurance policy in many OECD countries as an effective 
mechanism to sustain demand for health insurance during the GFC. Generally, results 
at the aggregated level tend to be driven by the results of motor and property insurance. 
This is not surprising given that these products’ shares contribute the largest amount 
to aggregated non-life insurance. 
This study is among a few that have attempted to examine disaggregated insurance 
data in OECD countries at the product level. Its findings have many useful economic 
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and policy implications, especially in regard to the development of the property, 
accident and health, motor, and general liability insurance markets in OECD countries.  
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Appendix 
Table A5-1. Definitions and sources of data 
Variable Hypothesis Description Abbrev. Data source 
Aggregated non-life 
insurance expenditure 
 Total non-life insurance gross written premiums per capita, US dollars (including motor vehicle, transport, freight, fire and other property damage, 
pecuniary loss, general liability, accident and health, and other non-life insurance products). Given OECD classification standards, non-life 
insurance data includes accident and health insurance. 
INS OECD (2015a); OECD 
(2015b); IMF (2015) 
Property insurance 
expenditure 
 Total property (another name is fire and other property damage) gross written premiums per capita, US dollars (covering for all damage or loss of 
property, due to fire, explosion, storm, nuclear, energy, hail or frost, theft …) 
PRO 
Accident and health 
insurance expenditure 
 Total accident and health (another name is accident and sickness) gross written premiums per capita, US dollars (covering for fixed pecuniary 
benefits, benefits in the nature of indemnity, industrial injury and occupational diseases, and injury to passengers). The products of accident and 
health insurance in the OECD countries are different across these countries due to their regulations. 
HEL 
Motor expenditure  Total motor gross written premiums per capita, US dollars (covering for cars, motorbikes, trucks, and other road vehicles). MOT 
General liability insurance 
expenditure  
 Total general liability gross written premiums per capita, US dollars (covering for the risk of being sued for negligence or strict liability torts). GLI 
Economic freedom index + It is a chain-linked index of the Fraser Institute, calculated based on 5 areas: (1) size of government, (2) legal system and property rights, (3) access 
to sound money, (4) freedom to trade internationally, and (5) regulation. The index ranges from 0 to 100 with higher values indicating more 
freedom. 
EFI Fraser Institute (2015) 
Per capita income + Per capita GDP at market price in US dollars INC OECD (2015b) 
Bank development + Banks' assets to GDP (%). BDV Helgilibrary (2015) 
Education + School enrolment, tertiary (% gross). EDU World bank (2015b) 
Urbanisation + Urban population (% of total). URB World bank (2015b) 
Global financial crisis  Banking crisis dummy, value = 1 if banking crisis occurred otherwise = 0. GFC World bank (2015a) 
Indulgence - A society in which people have the right to enjoy life and have fun. It is an index ranging from 0 to 100, with higher values indicating more 
happiness, leisure and enjoying life. 
IND Hofstede, Hofstede and 
Minkov (2010) and 
Minkov (2011) Individualism + A society in which the attachment between individuals is loose. It is an index ranging from 0 to 100, with higher values indicating a lower level 
of developing human relationships. 
IDV 
Long-term orientation - A positive, dynamic and future-oriented culture linked with four ‘positive’ Confucian values. It is an index ranging from 0 to 100, with higher 
values indicating more national pride, preservation of family values and traditions, and saving. 
LTO 
Masculinity - A society in which social gender roles are clearly distinct. In these societies, men focus on their material success, such as career and business, 
whereas women focus on improving the quality of their family. It is an index ranging from 0 to 100, with higher values indicating more masculinity. 
MAS 
Uncertainty avoidance + A society in which people feel threatened by uncertain situations and they want to avoid these matters. It is an index ranging from 0 to 100, with 
higher values indicating more uncertainty avoidance. 
UAI 
Power distance - Measures the interpersonal power or influence between the boss and subordinates and/or the degree of inequality among people in a society. It is 
an index ranging from 0 to 100, with higher values indicating more inequality, power distance. 
PDI 
Hypometropia + A society that has high national murder rates and acceptance of mortal risks. It is an index ranging from 0 to 1000, with higher values indicating 
more serious violence and higher murder rates. 
HPM 
Common Law + Dummy variables with value = 1 for countries with a Common Law (Common Law dummy) and value = 0 otherwise. CML 
 IVs: the degree of trade openness (% of GDP) and life expectancy at birth (years) (data source: World Bank 2015b) 
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Table A5-2. Descriptive statistics (34 OECD countries) 
Table A5-3. List of OECD economies 
Australia Denmark Hungary Luxembourg Portugal Switzerland 
Austria Estonia Iceland Mexico Slovakia Turkey 
Belgium Finland Ireland Netherlands Slovenia United Kingdom 
Canada France Israel New Zealand South Korea United States 
Chile Germany Italy Norway Spain  
Czech Greece Japan Poland Sweden  
Source: OECD (2015a)  
Table A5-4. List of 19 OECD economies affected by the GFC since 2007 
Austria Germany Ireland Portugal Switzerland 
Belgium Greece Italy Slovenia United Kingdom 
Denmark Hungary Luxembourg Spain United States 
France Iceland Netherlands Sweden  
Sources: GFDD, World Bank (2015b) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2011, 2013). 
 
 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Log of density of aggregated non-life 
insurance (lnINC) 
436 6.49 1.05 3.30 8.30 
Log of density of property insurance (lnPRO) 403 4.75 1.28 1.34 7.49 
Log of density of accident and health 
insurance insurance (lnHEL) 
301 3.16 2.19 -3.91 7.20 
Economic freedom index (EFI) 476 7.55 0.53 5.2 8.76 
Log of income per capita (lnINC) 473 10.16 0.72 8.03 11.63 
Education (EDU)  402 62.38 17.79 9.81 113.98 
Bank development (BDV) 470 267.22 397.90 38.49 3072.6 
Urbanisation (URB) 476 76.29 11.44 49.87 97.54 
Global financial crisis (GFC) 408 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Indulgence (IND) 448 0.53 0.18 0.16 0.97 
Individualism (IDV) 462 0.60 0.21 0.12 0.91 
Long-term orientation (LTO) 462 0.52 0.21 0.21 1.00 
Masculinity (MAS) 448 0.52 0.24 0.08 1.10 
Uncertainty avoidance (UAI) 448 0.68 0.22 0.23 1.12 
Power distance (PDI) 448 0.49 0.19 0.11 1.04 
Hypometropia (HPM) 434 1.33 0.61 0.18 3.22 
Common Law (CML) 476 0.21 0.40 0 1 
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Table A5-5. Panel causality test’s results of checking the causal relationship between 
non-life insurance expenditure and per capita income 
Dependent 
variable 
Source of causation (independent variable) 
Short run Long run Joint (short run/long 
run) 
ECT 
coefficients 
 INS INC ECT INS, 
ECT 
INC, 
ECT 
INS  0.5396*** 0.6765***  0.5396*** -0.5519*** 
INC 0.5063***  1.6388*** 0.5063***  0.0559 
Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level. ECT indicates the estimated error-correction terms. 
The results show that there is a bi-directional causal relationship between non-life insurance density and 
income per capita in both the short run and long run. This chapter uses Stata code: ‘xtwest’ developed 
by Persyn and Westerlund (2008). 
Table A5-6. Effect of economic freedom on non-life insurance expenditure 
 lnEFI lnINS 
 (1) 
LS 
(2) 
LS 
(3) 
2SLS 
(4) 
2SLS 
(5) 
2SLS 
lnEFI  0.995*** 13.460*** 1.139 24.479** 
  (0.307) (4.773) (3.061) (11.558) 
lnTRA -0.041**   0.010  
 (0.020)   (0.011)  
lnLIFE 0.525**    -10.782 
 (0.239)    (7.823) 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman/Hausman 
test for endogeneity, p-value 
 0.714 0.000   
Sargan test for overidentification 
restrictions of the instruments (p-
value)  
  0.016   
First stage, F-stat.   4.081 3.608 4.260 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 356 390 356 356 356 
Country 34 34 34 34 34 
Notes: *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. All variables are 
in natural logarithms. 
Table A5-7. Effect of non-life insurance expenditure on per capita income 
 lnINS lnINC 
 (1) 
LS 
(2) 
LS 
(3) 
2SLS 
(4) 
2SLS 
(5) 
2SLS 
lnINS  0.027*** 0.018 0.025 -0.147 
  (0.008) (0.023) (0.023) (0.162) 
lnTEM 0.063    -0.011  
 (0.041)   (0.007)  
lnMER -0.714***    -0.122 
 (0.095)    (0.118) 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman/Hausman test 
for endogeneity, p-value 
 0.378 0.531 − − 
Sargan test for overidentification 
restrictions of the instruments (p-
value) 
  0.145   
First stage, F-stat.   29.56 56.94 2.38 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 347 390 347 347 347 
Country 34 34 34 34 34 
Notes: *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. All variables are 
in natural logarithms 
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Table A5-8. Panel causality test’s results of checking the causal relationship between 
non-life insurance expenditure and economic freedom 
Dependent 
variable 
Source of causation (independent variable) 
Short run Long run Joint (short 
run/long run) 
ECT 
coefficients 
 INS EFI ECT INS, 
ECT 
EFI, 
ECT 
INS  -0.988 
(p-value=0.285) 
3.538***  -0.988 -0.408*** 
EFI 0.001  
(p-value=0.965) 
 0.310*** 0.001  0.056 
Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level. ECT indicates the estimated error-correction terms. 
The results show that there is a bi-directional causal relationship between non-life insurance density and 
income per capita in both the short run and long run. This chapter uses Stata code: ‘xtwest’ developed 
by Persyn and Westerlund (2008). 
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Table A5-9. Aggregated non-life insurance correlation matrix 
  LnINS 
Lagged 
lnINS EFI LnINC BDV EDU URB GFC IND IDV LTO MAS UAI PDI HPM CML 
LnINS 1.00                
Lagged lnINS 0.99 1.00               
EFI 0.71 0.69 1.00              
LnINC 0.94 0.94 0.65 1.00             
BDV 0.64 0.65 0.49 0.59 1.00            
EDU 0.41 0.41 0.31 0.42 -0.05 1.00           
URB 0.37 0.37 0.35 0.42 0.09 0.21 1.00          
GFC 0.27 0.30 -0.07 0.26 0.34 0.08 -0.06 1.00         
IND 0.34 0.35 0.30 0.37 0.30 -0.13 0.41 0.07 1.00        
IDV 0.49 0.49 0.56 0.44 0.31 0.11 0.38 0.12 0.27 1.00       
LTO -0.03 -0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.04 0.08 0.17 -0.03 -0.46 -0.21 1.00      
MAS -0.21 -0.20 0.01 -0.19 -0.06 -0.37 -0.20 0.03 -0.04 0.07 0.06 1.00     
UAI -0.48 -0.48 -0.56 -0.43 -0.29 -0.15 -0.21 -0.07 -0.45 -0.62 0.18 0.06 1.00    
PDI -0.54 -0.53 -0.60 -0.53 -0.35 -0.35 -0.24 -0.03 -0.31 -0.50 0.10 0.19 0.58 1.00   
HPM -0.02 -0.02 0.21 -0.05 -0.04 -0.17 0.11 -0.02 0.47 0.27 -0.45 -0.24 -0.45 -0.16 1.00  
CML 0.36 0.36 0.55 0.28 0.23 0.20 0.20 0.06 0.43 0.55 -0.50 0.19 -0.59 -0.41 0.33 1.00 
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Table A5-10. Property insurance correlation matrix 
  LnPRI 
Lagged 
lnPRI EFI LnINC BDV EDU URB GFC IND IDV LTO MAS UAI PDI HPM CML 
LnPRI 1.00                
Lagged lnPRI 0.98 1.00               
EFI 0.66 0.66 1.00              
LnINC 0.85 0.86 0.65 1.00             
BDV 0.58 0.59 0.52 0.61 1.00            
EDU 0.28 0.29 0.27 0.43 -0.03 1.00           
URB 0.33 0.35 0.40 0.48 0.29 0.17 1.00          
GFC 0.28 0.30 -0.04 0.25 0.34 0.10 -0.03 1.00         
IND 0.31 0.32 0.23 0.36 0.30 -0.15 0.43 0.07 1.00        
IDV 0.65 0.64 0.56 0.43 0.33 0.10 0.43 0.14 0.20 1.00       
LTO -0.07 -0.06 0.14 0.05 0.23 0.07 0.15 0.00 -0.44 -0.13 1.00      
MAS -0.17 -0.17 0.02 -0.23 -0.11 -0.45 -0.15 0.04 -0.09 0.09 0.16 1.00     
UAI -0.49 -0.49 -0.54 -0.38 -0.17 -0.12 -0.23 -0.04 -0.35 -0.61 0.05 0.03 1.00    
PDI -0.54 -0.55 -0.54 -0.55 -0.35 -0.36 -0.35 -0.08 -0.25 -0.49 0.03 0.27 0.44 1.00   
HPM 0.07 0.05 0.19 -0.06 -0.06 -0.17 0.13 -0.02 0.45 0.24 -0.43 -0.23 -0.46 -0.14 1.00  
CML 0.39 0.39 0.50 0.25 0.07 0.18 0.29 0.10 0.38 0.56 -0.41 0.14 -0.53 -0.29 0.34 1.00 
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Table A5-11. Accident and health insurance correlation matrix 
  LnAHI 
Lagged 
lnAHI EFI LnINC BDV EDU URB GFC IND IDV LTO MAS UAI PDI HPM CML 
LnAHI 1.00                
Lagged lnAHI 0.99 1.00               
EFI 0.52 0.51 1.00              
LnINC 0.81 0.81 0.66 1.00             
BDV 0.61 0.61 0.52 0.61 1.00            
EDU 0.32 0.32 0.26 0.43 -0.03 1.00           
URB 0.34 0.35 0.34 0.43 0.14 0.16 1.00          
GFC 0.31 0.34 -0.04 0.27 0.36 0.10 -0.02 1.00         
IND 0.45 0.45 0.26 0.38 0.31 -0.13 0.40 0.06 1.00        
IDV 0.26 0.26 0.58 0.45 0.32 0.13 0.43 0.14 0.20 1.00       
LTO -0.06 -0.07 0.07 -0.02 0.05 0.05 0.16 -0.03 -0.44 -0.12 1.00      
MAS -0.33 -0.32 0.03 -0.22 -0.04 -0.45 -0.19 0.05 -0.08 0.10 0.12 1.00     
UAI -0.24 -0.23 -0.57 -0.41 -0.28 -0.13 -0.16 -0.04 -0.38 -0.59 0.11 -0.01 1.00    
PDI -0.42 -0.41 -0.56 -0.56 -0.38 -0.36 -0.28 -0.07 -0.28 -0.49 0.08 0.24 0.49 1.00   
HPM 0.04 0.03 0.21 -0.05 -0.05 -0.16 0.16 -0.03 0.44 0.22 -0.39 -0.22 -0.42 -0.14 1.00  
CML 0.25 0.25 0.52 0.30 0.28 0.16 0.16 0.12 0.39 0.54 -0.47 0.18 -0.58 -0.35 0.31 1.00 
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Table A5-12. Motor insurance correlation matrix 
  LnMOI 
Lagged 
lnMOI EFI LnINC BDV EDU URB GFC IND IDV LTO MAS UAI PDI HPM CML 
LnMOI 1.00                
Lagged lnMOI 0.98 1.00               
EFI 0.69 0.67 1.00              
LnINC 0.90 0.90 0.66 1.00             
BDV 0.54 0.56 0.52 0.61 1.00            
EDU 0.49 0.48 0.24 0.41 -0.04 1.00           
URB 0.30 0.31 0.34 0.42 0.14 0.14 1.00          
GFC 0.26 0.30 -0.03 0.27 0.37 0.09 -0.02 1.00         
IND 0.18 0.20 0.25 0.37 0.32 -0.15 0.38 0.08 1.00        
IDV 0.49 0.48 0.57 0.44 0.33 0.07 0.41 0.16 0.21 1.00       
LTO 0.00 -0.02 0.08 -0.01 0.04 0.07 0.19 -0.04 -0.46 -0.15 1.00      
MAS -0.18 -0.17 0.04 -0.21 -0.05 -0.44 -0.18 0.04 -0.07 0.10 0.13 1.00     
UAI -0.38 -0.38 -0.56 -0.39 -0.30 -0.08 -0.15 -0.06 -0.37 -0.60 0.12 -0.01 1.00    
PDI -0.46 -0.47 -0.56 -0.56 -0.39 -0.33 -0.27 -0.08 -0.28 -0.49 0.08 0.23 0.48 1.00   
HPM -0.10 -0.10 0.20 -0.06 -0.03 -0.19 0.14 -0.01 0.45 0.25 -0.42 -0.23 -0.45 -0.14 1.00  
CML 0.40 0.40 0.52 0.29 0.28 0.15 0.16 0.12 0.40 0.54 -0.46 0.17 -0.59 -0.36 0.32 1.00 
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Table A5-13. General liability insurance correlation matrix 
  LnGLI 
Lagged 
lnGLI EFI LnINC BDV EDU URB GFC IND IDV LTO MAS UAI PDI HPM CML 
LnGLI 1.00                
Lagged lnGLI 0.99 1.00               
EFI 0.73 0.72 1.00              
LnINC 0.84 0.85 0.66 1.00             
BDV 0.65 0.67 0.52 0.60 1.00            
EDU 0.29 0.29 0.26 0.44 -0.02 1.00           
URB 0.36 0.36 0.34 0.42 0.12 0.16 1.00          
GFC 0.29 0.32 -0.03 0.27 0.39 0.11 -0.03 1.00         
IND 0.40 0.41 0.24 0.37 0.30 -0.14 0.39 0.09 1.00        
IDV 0.61 0.60 0.57 0.44 0.30 0.14 0.41 0.15 0.19 1.00       
LTO -0.10 -0.10 0.07 -0.01 0.03 0.04 0.18 -0.01 -0.47 -0.14 1.00      
MAS 0.03 0.03 0.06 -0.19 0.02 -0.47 -0.15 0.03 -0.05 0.13 0.16 1.00     
UAI -0.51 -0.51 -0.56 -0.40 -0.29 -0.12 -0.14 -0.08 -0.36 -0.60 0.14 -0.03 1.00    
PDI -0.54 -0.54 -0.55 -0.56 -0.40 -0.36 -0.28 -0.11 -0.27 -0.49 0.10 0.22 0.47 1.00   
HPM 0.01 0.01 0.19 -0.06 -0.05 -0.15 0.14 -0.02 0.45 0.22 -0.41 -0.24 -0.44 -0.14 1.00  
CML 0.58 0.58 0.53 0.31 0.31 0.16 0.17 0.13 0.41 0.56 -0.47 0.15 -0.61 -0.36 0.32 1.00 
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Table A5-14. Summaries of results of the determinants of non-life insurance expenditure 
 
Non-life insurance 
Trinh, 
Nguyen and 
Sgro (2016) 
Kamiya, Li and Zanjani (2014) Park and 
Lemaire 
(2012) 
Elanggo 
and 
Jones 
(2011) 
Feyen, Lester 
and Rocha 
(2011) 
Esho 
et al. 
(2004) 
Browne, Chung 
and Frees 
(2000) 
Outreville 
(1990) 
Dependent variable   
Aggregated data Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Disaggregated  data No 3 products No No No No 2 products No 
Independent variables  Non-life 
(OECD) 
Motor 
(High-income) 
Property 
(High-income) 
Liability 
(High-income) 
  Motor 
(OECD) 
Liability 
(OECD) 
 
Economic freedom + 
 
   
 
+/- 
 
   
 
Income per capita + - -   + + + + + + + 
Bank development + Insig. Insig.   
  
+    
 
Education Insig. 
 
   Insig. Insig. 
 
+ Insig. - - 
Urbanisation + 
 
   Insig. 
  
+ Insig. - 
 
Bank crisis  Insig. Insig. + Insig        
Indulgence Insig. 
 
   
   
   
 
Individualism Insig. 
 
   + 
  
   
 
Long term-orientation - 
 
   
   
 
 
 
 
Masculinity - 
 
   Insig. 
  
 
 
 
 
Uncertainty avoidance Insig 
 
   + 
  
Insig. 
 
 
 
Power distance + 
 
   - 
  
 
 
 
 
Hypometropia Insig.            
Islamic Law -     -       
Common Law Insig.     Insig.   Insig.    
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
This thesis examines the determinants of non-life insurance expenditure using a panel 
dataset in the short term and long term and at the product level. By undertaking 
comprehensive empirical analysis of the determinants of non-life insurance 
expenditure, this thesis fills a number of existing gaps in the literature, including the 
issues of endogeneity, the inclusion of the latest cultural variables, analysis of the 
effects of the recent GFC, a dynamic panel data model, and the use of aggregated non-
life insurance expenditure data. The main findings of this thesis indicate that socio-
economic factors such as one-year-lagged non-life insurance spending, per capita 
income, economic freedom, bank development, education, urbanisation and a number 
of cultural and legal system variables are the key drivers of non-life insurance 
expenditure across countries. 
Chapter 3 develops a theoretical model that incorporates socio-economic factors as 
determinants of non-life insurance expenditure, which creates a number of testable 
hypotheses. The key findings of the theoretical model are that when the market for 
non-life insurance is perfectly competitive, an individual will (i) increase his or her 
non-life insurance expenditure if the value of his or her property at risk increases; (ii) 
increase his or her non-life insurance expenditure if the probability of loss increases; 
and (iii) decrease his or her non-life insurance expenditure if the discount factor 
increases. Empirically, Chapter 3 applies the IV model to investigate the determinants 
of non-life insurance expenditure using a panel dataset covering 67 countries in the 
short term (20002011). It finds that economic freedom, income, bank development, 
urbanisation, long-term orientation, masculinity, power distance and Islamic Law are 
the key factors of spending on non-life insurance.  
By dividing all sample countries in Chapter 3 into 36 developed countries and 31 
developing countries, empirical results based on the IV analysis show that the effects 
of these factors vary significantly between developed countries and developing 
countries, suggesting that heterogeneity among countries in terms of the level of 
development plays an important role in the analysis. Further, the findings of this 
chapter are robust to two alternative measures of non-life insurance 
expenditurenamely, non-life insurance penetration and density adjusted by PPP. 
Chapter 3 also captures the effect of the GFC by disaggregating the data into before 
CHAPTER SIX 
161 
 
and during the crisis sub-periods. A number of factors emerge (e.g., urbanisation, 
masculinity in developed countries and power distance in developing countries) and 
disappear (e.g., education in developed countries and uncertainty avoidance in 
developing countries) as significant drivers of non-life insurance expenditure during 
the GFC. The results indicate that at the aggregate level, the effects of various socio-
economic factors on non-life insurance expenditure in developed countries tended to 
overshadow those in developing countries during the GFC. 
Chapter 4 extends Chapter 3 by investigating the determinants of non-life insurance 
expenditure using the same sample countries in both the short term (20002011), as 
Chapter 3 did, and over the long term (19802009). The contributions made by 
Chapter 4 are as follows. First, by applying the system GMM dynamic panel data 
estimator, the chapter not only overcomes the endogeneity problem caused by omitted 
variables of economic freedom and reverse causality between per capita income and 
non-life insurance expenditure, but also provides further results compared with 
Chapter 3. For the short term (20002011), the findings based on the system GMM 
estimator indicate that the effects of one-year-lagged non-life insurance expenditure 
and per capita income on non-life insurance expenditure in all sample countries are 
significantly positive, while the effects of economic freedom and urbanisation are 
insignificant. A positive effect of long-term orientation on non-life insurance 
expenditure is also found, in contrast with the finding of Chapter 3. By dividing all 
sample countries into developed and developing countries, the chapter finds that while 
results based on the system GMM estimator in the case of developed countries are 
consistent with the findings in Chapter 3, it is generally not the case for developing 
countries. First, one-period-lagged non-life insurance expenditure may dominate the 
insignificant effects of economic freedom, bank development and education in 
explaining non-life insurance expenditure. Second, Common Law plays an important 
role in explaining non-life insurance expenditure. 
For the long term (19802009), the effects of lagged non-life insurance expenditure, 
per capita income, masculinity and legal system on non-life insurance expenditure are 
significant. These results are consistent with those for the short term and are consistent 
with the hypotheses. In contrast to the findings of Chapter 3, Chapter 4 indicates that 
the initial non-life insurance expenditure, education, indulgence, individualism, 
uncertainty avoidance, hypometropia and Common Law have a significant effect on 
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non-life insurance expenditure in the long term. That is, the findings of Chapter 4 show 
that economic freedom, education, urbanisation, indulgence, individualism, 
uncertainty avoidance and hypometropia have a significant effect on non-life insurance 
expenditure in the long term, but insignificant in the short term. However, the influence 
of long-term orientation on non-life insurance expenditure is insignificant in the long 
term, but significant in the short term. 
The results of Chapter 4, based on the system GMM estimator, also indicate that the 
effects of the determinants of non-life insurance expenditure may vary across the three 
groups of countries based on their income levels over the long term. Notably, 
indulgence, individualism and long-term orientation explain spending on non-life 
insurance in upper-middle-income countries, whereas uncertainty avoidance does so 
in high-income countries, and these cultural factors mostly do not affect non-life 
insurance expenditure in lower-middle-income countries. For other factors, the 
empirical findings illustrate that the effect of urbanisation on expenditure of non-life 
insurance is positive in the group of lower-middle-income countries, while the effect 
of education is negative in the group of high-income countries. Finally, the results 
show that the effect of Common Law on non-life insurance expenditure in lower-
middle-income countries is negative. 
Chapter 5 examines the determinants of non-life insurance expenditure across product 
lines in OECD countries in the period 20002013. It provides evidence that using 
aggregated non-life insurance expenditure data may lead to biased conclusions 
regarding the economic behaviour of individuals. Another important contribution of 
the chapter is that reverse causality between non-life insurance expenditure and per 
capita income has been found empirically using the IV model and panel causality tests. 
The findings in Chapter 5, based on the system GMM estimator, provide strong 
evidence of the effect of economic factors, along with legal factors, on aggregated non-
life insurance spending in OECD countries and therefore support the findings of 
previous chapters.  
Notably, the chapter finds some interesting results relating to biased estimates when 
using aggregated non-life insurance data. First, the effect of per capita income on 
property, accident and health, and property insurance expenditure is significantly 
positive, but it is insignificant for general liability insurance expenditure. Second, 
economic freedom has a positive effect on property and general liability insurance 
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expenditure, but a negative effect on accident and health insurance expenditure. Third, 
bank development, urbanisation and masculinity have a significantly negative effect 
on property, motor and liability insurance expenditure, while individualism has a 
significantly positive influence on these products. Fourth, determinants of non-life 
insurance expenditure at the aggregated level in OECD countries tend to be driven by 
the factors of motor and property insurance. This is not surprising given that these 
products’ shares contribute the largest amount to aggregated non-life insurance. 
Finally, the findings in Chapter 5 illustrate that the presence of the GFC has nullified 
many of these effects, particularly those on health insurance expenditure. In contrast, 
non-life insurance expenditure across products in the past significantly affected 
subsequent spending, regardless of the GFC. Indeed, the results in this chapter 
reconfirm the importance of compulsory health insurance policies in many OECD 
countries as an effective mechanism to sustain demand for health insurance during the 
GFC. 
The findings of this thesis have provided many implications for the development of 
the non-life insurance sector across countries. They can be used as a reference to 
support multinational non-life insurance firms in seeking new markets or expanding 
existing markets in developed, developing and OECD countries. These findings will 
also assist policymakers in these countries to design better frameworks for the 
development of the insurance market in the future. A number of implications are 
outlined below. 
For insurance companies, the results in this thesis suggest that multinational insurers 
may increase their sales of non-life insurance policies through banks’ bancassurance 
departments by selling their products to existing bank customers. Non-life insurance 
companies should examine the cultural factors of potential marketsin particular, 
indulgence, long-term orientation, uncertainty avoidance and hypometropiaas these 
may greatly influence their sales outcomes and profitability. For example, 
multinational non-life insurers can expand their business by setting up branches in 
upper-middle-income countries that have a higher degree of hypometropia and a lower 
degree of masculinity. Similarly, potential markets could be set up in lower-middle-
income countries with a lower degree of hypometropia and in high-income countries 
with a higher degree of uncertainty avoidance and masculinity. In addition to these 
factors, non-life insurers can use the results regarding the effects of other socio-
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economic factors, such as economic freedom, per capita income, education and 
urbanisation, to support their decision-making process with regard to what drives 
spending on non-life insurance products. Notably, governments of lower-middle-
income countries can develop the non-life insurance sector through policies that 
support urbanisation. 
For governments around the world, the important policy implication of the thesis’ 
analysis refers to the regulation of law, trade and commerce. The positive effects of 
economic freedom on non-life insurance expenditure in both developed and 
developing countries illustrate that policies that support improvements in the economic 
freedom index (e.g., low tariffs, high effective enforcement of the law and security of 
property rights, and high personal choice) will promote non-life insurance expenditure. 
Another significant implication is that governments in both developed and developing 
countries should assist in the development of the non-life insurance sector with policies 
enhancing income, bank development, education and cultural advantageous 
characteristics. 
Finally, by disaggregating non-life insurance into various products, this thesis yields 
further implications. The findings suggest that OECD countries with a lower degree of 
economic freedom (e.g., Slovenia, Turkey and Mexico) might be chosen as potential 
markets for accident and health insurance. Additionally, multinational non-life 
insurance firms can choose locations in OECD countries with a lower degree of 
urbanisation (e.g., Slovenia, Slovakia and Poland) to expand products of property, 
motor and general liability insurance. With regard to cultural factors, multinational 
non-life insurers can promote sales of property, motor and general liability insurance 
in OECD countries with a higher degree of individualism and a lower degree of 
masculinity (e.g., Netherlands, Denmark and Norway), while OECD countries with a 
higher degree of long-term orientation (e.g., South Korea, Belgium and Germany) can 
be chosen as potential markets to sell products of property, accident and health, and 
general liability insurance. In particular, this thesis suggests policies that may be 
applied during the GFC and that may affect the development of the non-life insurance 
sector. For example, governments in OECD countries should implement policies to 
support low-income individuals who may be seriously affected by the GFC so they 
can continue to use related non-life insurance products, especially compulsory ones. 
These policies may help governments to maintain social security. 
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However, the findings of this thesis have raised at least two issues that require further 
investigation. The first issue relates to the use of yearly aggregated data collected by 
Swiss Re and OECD Insurance Statistics. Using yearly aggregated data may lead to a 
loss of information that reflects individual spending on non-life insurance products. 
Therefore, a future study should collect non-life insurance data at the individual level. 
In addition, using five-year average data of the economic freedom index in Chapter 4 
may be another limitation of this thesis. A future study should find alternative data of 
economic freedom that are available yearly before 2000. The second issue relates to 
product-based non-life insurance data. In Chapter 5, although non-life insurance data 
are disaggregated into the product level, they only cover 34 OECD countries only. A 
disaggregated panel dataset that covers the same sample countries used in Chapters 3 
and 4 may generate richer and more useful results.
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